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Introduction
Promoting investment and innovation is a key component in many countries’ long term
economic strategies. For example, the European Commission’s ‘Lisbon Strategy’ and its
successor ‘Europe 2020’ mainly focus on how to improve the conditions for investment and
innovation in the European Union. Moreover, the U.S. Government has issued a ‘Strategy
for American Innovation’ for the same purpose.1 This is not surprising as investment and
innovation have long been identified as key factors for economic growth (see, e.g., Romer,
1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998, and Grossman and Helpman, 1989, 1991, 1994).
Since Adam Smith (1776) economists have seen markets as a powerful tool to promote
investment and innovation (compare, e.g., Olley and Pakes, 1996, Ng and Seabright, 2001,
and Fabrizio et al., 2007, for empirical evidence). This understanding is reflected in the
shift of public policy from state control to deregulation during the last 40 years. Beginning
with the oil shocks of the 1970s, which were accompanied with a slow down in economic
growth and a contraction of public budgets, a huge change from state ownership towards
reliance on market guidance could be witnessed in the western world. Moreover, the
collapse of the communist block in 1989 has led to massive privatization and deregulation
programs in the Eastern European countries (see, e.g., Newbery, 2000, and Alesina et al.,
2005).2
However, deregulation is no panacea. Problems associated with market failure might make
it di cult to reap the full benefits markets possibly provide.3 This makes market regu-
lation necessary. While it can take many forms, this dissertation focuses on two specific
kinds of market regulation: Sector-specific regulation and competition policy. Sector-
specific regulation relies on ex-ante regulation of business conduct, such as control of
prices or revenues by sector-specific regulatory authorities. Competition policy, however,
1Compare European Commission (2005, 2010) for the European programs and National Economic
Council (2009, 2011) for the U.S. programs.
2For example, a study on deregulation in the US shows a steady decline in the share of US GDP
produced under heavy regulation from 11.52% in 1977 to 2.96% in 2006 (see Crandall, 2007). Moreover,
according to the World Bank 238 market reforms were introduced in 175 countries between 2003 and
2007. 213 of these reforms in 112 economies make it easier to do business (compare World Bank, 2006).
Further evidence on deregulation in the OECD countries can be found in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
3For a thorough definition of market failure see, e.g., Ledyard (2008).
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operates ex-post and is basically harm-based. That is, policy makers establish general
guidelines that are enforced ex-post by a generalist antitrust authority which is in charge
of all industries. While competition policy is applied to the whole economy, sector-specific
regulation is generally applied only when the underlying industry exhibits properties of a
natural monopoly, posing hurdles for competition (see, e.g., Rey, 2003, and Motta, 2004).
It is essential to use regulatory instruments carefully and adequately as insu cient regula-
tion or ill-designed markets might lead to ine cient and harmful outcomes. In particular,
in industries that crucially depend on investment and innovation or undergo a period of
technological change with high investment needs, it is essential to take the dynamic dimen-
sion of regulation and competition policy into account (see, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee,
2002, Segal and Whinston, 2007, and Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). Two prominent exam-
ples for failed regulatory policies are the initial privatization of the British railway system
in 1993 (see Economist, 1999, 2000, 2001) and the Californian electricity crisis following
market restructuring in 2000/01 (see Borenstein, 2002).
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the dynamic aspects of market
regulation. The following three chapters analyze di erent topics in market regulation and
its implications on investment and innovation. The first two chapters deal with the sector-
specific regulation of network industries which exhibit features of natural monopolies. In
particular, both chapters were inspired by institutional characteristics of the electricity
sector and hence, contribute to the discussion on its regulation. The first chapter considers
the impact of di erent pricing methods of scarce transmission resources on investment in
generation and transmission capacities. The second chapter investigates the impact of
di erent regulation-imposed ‘investment regimes’ in network industries on downstream
process innovation. This is specifically interesting in light of recent advances in electricity
metering technology. The third chapter studies the equilibrium incentives of producers
to market their products exclusively via a single retailer, the e ect of such behavior on
competition and the necessity for regulation of such behavior. Thus, it is mostly related
to the competition policy literature. This chapter was motivated by observations on the
marketing of handsets in the telecommunications industry.
In the remainder of this introduction, we present a brief overview of the three chapters
and highlight their main contributions. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read
independently.
In Chapter 1, ‘On Investment Incentives in Network Industries’, we study the e ect of
di erent allocation methods for scarce transmission resources on investment incentives in
generation and transmission capacity in network industries.4 When a good is sold through
a network, either a uniform market price in the whole network is charged or market prices
di er among locations in the network. Locationally di erentiated market prices are able to
4This chapter is based on joint work with Gregor Zöttl.
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take potential network congestion directly into account. A uniform market price, however,
makes a mechanism outside the market necessary to alleviate congestion.
A prominent example for such a problem is the management of network transmission
capacity in electricity markets. In the U.S., seven regional electricity markets have imple-
mented locationally di erentiated prices, where transmission constraints are directly taken
into account at the spot market. In contrast, most European electricity markets continue
to use uniform pricing systems, where a single price per market exists and transmission
constraints are resolved by the network operator after the spot market has taken place.
Nevertheless, intense debates about shifting towards locationally di erentiated prices are
ongoing in Europe (compare, e.g., European Parliament, 2009, European Council, 2011,
Acer, 2011, and Electricity Regulatory Forum, 2011).
We analyze the impact of these two di erent transmission management regimes on invest-
ment in regulated transmission and unregulated generation facilities. First, in line with
the related literature, we find that locationally di erentiated prices lead to the socially
optimal investment outcome. Second, we find that a uniform market price leads to over-
investment in generation and transmission capacity. Finally, we are able to show that a
uniform market price also distorts the generation technology mix.
Many contributions have extensively analyzed the impact of di erent transmission man-
agement regimes. However, they basically focus on short run market performance, leaving
aside long run aspects such as investment incentives in transmission and generation facil-
ities. Experts and policy makers have emphasized the importance of long run investment
incentives for the proper functioning of electricity markets (compare, e.g., Baldick et al.,
2011, and European Parliament, 2009). This chapter is the first study which explicitly
analyzes the e ect of transmission management on these long run investment incentives
in generation and transmission capacity.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the impact of di erent regulatory mea-
sures on transmission investment. Yet, this literature takes the generation stock as given
and ignores potential interdependencies between generation and transmission capacities.
Sauma and Oren (2006) show that this leads to significantly distorted predictions. We
take this critique into account by assuming the generation stock to be endogenous, while
transmission investment is regulated optimally. Thus, we are able to correct for potential
distortions in our results.
Finally, this chapter extends the peak load pricing literature, which has investigated
generation investment incentives under fluctuating and potentially uncertain demand and
emphasized the e ect of the spot market design. Yet, this literature completely abstracts
from the presence of a transmission network. We use a model framework inspired by the
peak load pricing literature and explicitly consider the impact of the transmission network
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on investment incentives.
In Chapter 2, ‘Regulating Investments in Vertically Related Industries’, we study the
influence of diverse regulation-imposed ‘investment regimes’ on downstream process inno-
vation in network industries. Many network industries, such as utilities, are characterized
through their vertical structure with a monopolistic upstream and a competitive down-
stream segment. In order to dampen the market power stemming from the upstream
segment, utilities are usually subject to partial or full vertical separation. If new tech-
nological opportunities arise in such an industry, it is often not clear which segment of
the industry should invest on these new technologies. In these situations the regulator
decides who should be responsible for the investment, that is, the ‘investment regime’.
An example for such a scenario is the emerging ‘smart metering technology’ in electricity
distribution networks. Electricity suppliers need metering technology to measure their
customers’ consumption in order to bill them. Traditional electricity metering technology
can only measure the delivered quantity over a specified period of time, while the emerging
smart metering technology has higher functionality and accuracy. Investment in this new
metering technology is technically not linked to a distinct segment in the vertically re-
lated electricity industry. National regulators have chosen di erent approaches regarding
investment in new metering technology. While in Italy the regulated upstream network is
in charge of the investment, in Germany the unregulated downstream electricity suppliers
are supposed to undertake these investments.
This chapter compares investment by a regulated upstream monopolist to investment
by downstream competitors in downstream process innovation. We show that in order
to enhance investment in this new technology, the regulator should carefully take the
specific characteristics of the industry under regulation into account, when determining
the ‘investment regime’. In particular, the optimal investment regime depends on the
specific vertical ownership structure, the mode of competition and on the capital intensity
of the upstream segment.
A substantial literature has extensively analyzed the impact of di erent regulatory mea-
sures on infrastructure investment. Though this literature considers di erent kinds of
investment, it does not consider that an investment in one and the same technology could
be undertaken by di erent investors. As our leading example shows, this is a highly
relevant case to be investigated. In addition, this chapter is the first study compar-
ing di erent regulation-imposed ‘investment regimes’ with respect to their performance.
Moreover, several contributions have analyzed the impact of modern electricity metering
technologies on competition, generation capacities and welfare. This chapter, however, is
the first contribution to investigate how to best incentivize the initial investment in these
new technologies.
Introduction 5
In Chapter 3, ‘Exclusive Retailing’, we study firms’ retail strategies in markets for new
and complex consumer products.5 In such markets it can be often observed that a man-
ufacturer markets its products exclusively via a single retail company. In particular, this
behavior can be frequently found in the mobile phone industry, where new handsets are
often sold exclusively via a single mobile carrier. A very prominent example for such an
‘exclusive retailing’ arrangement is the introduction of the ‘iPhone’ by Apple Inc. in 2007,
where marketing e orts were undertaken exclusively via one mobile carrier per country.
In this chapter, we study the equilibrium incentives of a manufacturer to market its prod-
ucts via an exclusive retailing arrangement. Thereby, we consider the e ect of exclusivity
arrangements on market conduct and welfare. In addition, we investigate the scope for
regulatory intervention.
Exclusive retailing arrangements have been a matter of intense debate (see, e.g., Dobson
et al., 2008). Supporters of these arrangements argue that exclusive retailing serves as
a pro-competitive device to incentivize retail marketing investment in complex consumer
products. Such products may be produced by firms without e cient marketing technolo-
gies to conduct this marketing on their own. Thus, exclusive retailing arrangements might
incentivize product development in the long run. Critics, however, argue that exclusive
retailing arrangements are established out of market power considerations and distort
competition. This chapter integrates both views and derives conditions when exclusivity
is anti-competitive and when it is pro-competitive.
Prior contributions have extensively investigated exclusivity arrangements, where the sell-
ing party restricts the buying party in establishing alternative trading relationships. How-
ever, pointing to the mobile phone industry, it can be often observed that the selling party
restricts itself to trade only with one of the buyers. To the best of our knowledge, this
study is the first contribution investigating such behavior.
Moreover, a major part of the literature on vertical restraints analyzes only ‘triangular’
market structures, where either the upstream or the downstream segment is characterized
by the absence of competition. While this raises the tractability of these models, it ignores
potential feedback e ects stemming from competition in both segments. Whinston (2006,
p. 176) argues that triangular market structures are too simplistic and hence, developing
models with competition in both segments is of high priority. In this study we acknowledge
this critique and explicitly analyze the e ect from competition in both segments.
5This chapter is based on joint work with Michal Masika.
Chapter 1
On Investment Incentives in
Network Industries
1.1 Introduction
When a good is sold through a network, one of the important questions to be answered
is whether locationally di erentiated prices or a uniform market price should be charged.
Locationally di erentiated market prices take potential network congestion directly into
account. A uniform market price, however, ‘enlarges’ the market, but makes a mechanism
outside the market necessary to alleviate potential congestion. A prominent example for
such a problem is given by the management of transmission capacity in liberalized electric-
ity markets. In the U.S., seven regional electricity markets have implemented locational
marginal pricing, where prices can di er among locations in the same market and thus,
implicitly price transmission constraints directly at the spot market.6 In contrast, most
European electricity markets continue to use redispatch systems, where a single price per
market exists and transmission constraints are solved by the system operator after the
spot market has taken place. However, intense debates about shifting towards locational
marginal pricing are ongoing in the U.K., Germany as well as at the wider European
level.7
Many contributions have extensively analyzed the impact of di erent transmission man-
6For a description of the regional electricity markets in the U.S. compare, e.g., http://www.ferc.gov/.
7Compare, e.g., Ofgem (2010) and Redpoint Energy (2011) for the British discussion, Frontier (2011)
for the discussion in Germany and European Parliament (2009), European Council (2011), Acer (2011)
and Electricity Regulatory Forum (2011) for e orts on the European level.
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agement regimes.8 However, all these articles typically focus on short run market perfor-
mance, leaving aside long run aspects such as investment incentives in transmission and
generation facilities. Recently, experts as well as policy makers have increasingly empha-
sized that for the proper functioning of electricity markets not only short run e ciency
but also long run incentives are of central importance.9 Moreover, a detailed analysis of
the long run perspective seems to be of particular importance in the light of the ongoing
debate on insu cient incentives in liberalized electricity markets to provide generation
investment.10 Till date this debate has entirely abstracted from issues arising due to a
transmission network.
This study sheds light on the relationship between transmission management and long
term investment in (unregulated) generation and (regulated) transmission capacity. Thus,
we develop a network model with endogenous generation and transmission capacities.
Competitive firms invest in two di erent generation technologies, which allow produc-
tion at di erent levels of demand. Transmission investment is assumed to be optimally
determined, anticipating subsequent generation investment. The capacity of the trans-
mission line limits the amount of physical trade that can take place. As transmission
constraints might potentially exist in this network, a mechanism for transmission alloca-
tion is needed. Our benchmark case is given by simultaneous market clearing (‘locational
marginal pricing’), where separate spot market prices exist at the di erent nodes in the
network. Whenever the level of demand and hence, the amount of trade is high, such
that a transmission line is constrained, the spot market prices at the two ends of the
constrained line diverge from each other. This leads to an e cient allocation and the
spot market is directly cleared. With sequential market clearing (‘redispatch system’), a
single spot market price exists in the whole network. Whenever the level of demand is
high, such that the transmission line is constrained, the spot market outcome becomes
physically infeasible. In order to achieve market clearing, an adjustment market has to
be run, where the system operator engages in counter-trading. That is, the system op-
erator acts as a seller at the exporting side of the constrained line and as a buyer at the
importing side of the constrained line. These additional transactions reduce the level of
trade between the two nodes to a physically feasible level.11
8Compare Joskow and Tirole (2000) and Gilbert et al. (2004) who analyze the e ect of di erent
transmission allocation mechanisms on generation spot market conduct and Green (2007) who estimates
the short run welfare loss due to sequential market clearing compared to simultaneous market clearing.
9Compare, e.g., Baldick et al. (2011) for an expert opinion and European Parliament (2009) for a
policy viewpoint.
10See, e.g., Oren(2005), Hogan (2005), Cramton and Stoft (2006), Joskow (2007) or Cramton and
Ockenfels (2011) on the ‘missing money discussion’.
11The expressions counter-trading and (market-based) redispatch are used interchangeably in this
study. Both expressions describe methods to alleviate transmission congestion outside the spot mar-
ket. Under both methods, the system operator makes market transactions against the ‘direction’ of trade
at the spot market in order to reduce the traded quantity over the transmission line until the congestion
is eliminated.
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First, our benchmark case with simultaneous market clearing produces the socially optimal
investment outcome.12 Simultaneous market clearing ensures that generation is priced at
its locational marginal value. This gives competitive firms the e cient price signals for
generation investment and hence, given the optimal generation capacity, transmission
investment is also conducted e ciently.
Second, sequential market clearing, on the other hand, leads to overinvestment in total
generation and transmission capacity. Sequential market clearing disentangles the price
signal from the location of production and hence, from its locational marginal value.
This leads to higher generation scarcity rents and therefore, to exaggerated investment
incentives in generation. As we show, the transmission capacity matches the generation
capacity. Thus, there is also overinvestment in the corresponding transmission line.
Finally, we find that with simultaneous market clearing the socially optimal technology
mix is reached. In contrast, with sequential market clearing the technology mix is distorted
towards more peakload and less baseload generation capacity.
The central message of our findings is that policy makers should be aware that switching
from a system of sequential market clearing to a system of simultaneous market clearing
leads to a reduction of investment incentives. In a setting like ours, without any mar-
ket distortions, this is desirable as it leads to the socially optimal investment outcome.
However, if investment incentives in a specific market are already perceived as too low, a
change of the transmission management regime might then further aggravate these prob-
lems. Inadequate investment incentives might be a result of market imperfections and
institutional constraints in electricity markets, such as price caps, which suppress elec-
tricity prices below the e cient level. Hence, generation revenues might be insu cient
to provide adequate generation capacity (compare the ‘missing money discussion’, e.g.,
Oren, 2005, Hogan, 2005, Cramton and Stoft, 2006, Joskow, 2007, and Cramton and Ock-
enfels, 2011). Policy makers should then be aware of the potentially increased necessity
to adopt appropriate measures to enhance firms’ investment activities. However, in this
study we abstract from any of these market imperfections. Notice that our results should
not be understood as a justification for the introduction or the retention of sequential
market clearing as a proper mechanism to enhance firms’ investment activity in a specific
electricity market.
This work is related to the literature on the regulation of electricity transmission. Bushnell
(1999), Joskow and Tirole (2000), and Gilbert et al. (2004) analyze di erent transmission
capacity allocation methods and how these a ect the spot market outcomes in markets
with simultaneous market clearing. Wolak (2011) measures the benefits from introducing
simultaneous market clearing in the Californian electricity market and Green (2007) cal-
12This result is in line with the previous literature on locational marginal pricing (see, e.g., Hogan,
1999).
On Investment Incentives in Network Industries 9
culates the welfare loss associated with sequential market clearing relative to simultaneous
market clearing in England and Wales. However, these articles do not take any long term
aspects like investment in generation or transmission capacities into account. Another
strand in the literature explicitly considers the impact of di erent regulatory measures on
transmission investment. Léautier (2000), Vogelsang (2001), Bushnell and Stoft (1997),
Hogan (1992), Joskow and Tirole (2005), Sauma and Oren (2009), and Hogan et al.
(2010) analyze di erent regulatory instruments to incentivize transmission investment.
As compared to our work, however, these articles do not consider the impact of di erent
transmission management systems. Moreover, we also analyze a potential change in the
generation stock.13 To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one to derive the
impact of the transmission management system on investment incentives in generation
and transmission facilities.
Last but not least, this study is related to the peak load pricing literature, that has
investigated generation investment incentives under fluctuating and potentially uncertain
demand and emphasized the e ect of the spot market design. A good overview of the
literature is provided by Crew et al. (1995). Boom (2009) and Fabra et al. (2011) analyze
the e ect of auctions at the spot market. Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and Fabra and
de Frutos (2011) analyze the case of Bertrand spot markets. Gabszewicz and Poddar
(1997), Murphy and Smeers (2005), and Zöttl (2011) analyze strategic investment prior
to Cournot competition. All these contributions completely abstract from the problem of
a transmission network.
The next Section presents our model. In Section 1.3 we analyze simultaneous market
clearing. In Section 1.4 we analyze sequential market clearing and compare the results.
In Section 1.5 we relate our work to the current discussion on transmission management
in the electricity sector. In Section 1.6 we discuss an extension and generalize our results
in a n-node star network. In Section 1.7 we put forward some concluding remarks.
1.2 The Model
We consider a network as described in Figure 1.1 where consumption takes place at a
‘demand node’, denoted by D, and production takes place at a ‘supply node’, denoted
by S. Both nodes are connected via a transmission line. Trade between consumers at
the demand node and producers at the supply node is limited by the transmission line’s
capacity L.
13Our work explicitly considers investment in transmission and generation. Sauma and Oren (2006)
show in their paper that analyzing transmission investment, taking the generation capacity in the market
as given, leads to significantly distorted predictions. Rious et al. (2010) extend the analysis by Sauma
and Oren by assuming that anticipation is costly.
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Figure 1.1: Two-node network
Competitive firms at the supply node can invest in production capacity. This allows these
firms to produce at a spot market with variable levels of demand at the demand node.
Production takes place given the constraints by transmission and generation capacities.
Inverse demand is given by the function P (Q, ◊), which depends on output Q œ +, and
the variable ◊ œ which captures the di erent levels of demand. The frequencies of
all di erent levels of demand are denoted by f(◊), their support is given by [◊, ◊] and
their cumulative distribution is denoted by F (◊). We normalize F (◊) such that F (◊) = 0
and F (◊) = 1. Throughout this chapter we refer to the di erent levels ◊ of spot market
demand simply as to ‘spot market ◊’.14 The firms are assumed to be price takers and the
spot market is perfectly competitive.
We analyze the case of two di erent production technologies, which are available at the
supply node, production technology B (for ‘baseload’) and technology P (for ‘peakload’).
Technology B (P ) comes with production cost c1 (c) and the cost of capacity investment is
given by k1 (k), with c1 < c and k1 > k.15 We denote the equilibrium industry investment
by (X,X1), where X represents total investment and X1 represents baseload investment.
Peakload investment is given by the di erence of total and baseload investment (X ≠X1).
Investment in the transmission line is taking place optimally, given subsequent gener-
ation investment. A natural and realistic interpretation of this assumption would be
that transmission line investment is determined by a welfare maximizing regulator. The
transmission line is assumed to be operated by a (independent) system operator and trans-
mission capacity is fully utilized. The nominal line size is denoted by L and the marginal
cost of investment in the transmission line by t. For the main part of this chapter we
14Notice that at the time of investment firms do not necessarily need to know the demand levels at
all spot markets. In order to keep notation to a minimum, we do not explicitly disentangle demand
fluctuations occurring at spot markets in several periods from uncertainty regarding the precise pattern
of those fluctuations. Notice, however, that the parameter ◊‘[◊, ◊] of our model is suited to capture both
phenomena. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the demand fluctuations are central to our analysis, as only
then the di erent market clearing mechanisms begin to matter. An analysis without demand fluctuations
would thus not generate any useful insights for the design of liberalized electricity markets. We discuss
the implications stemming from the demand fluctuations in detail in Section 1.4.
15In the case of the electricity sector, nuclear-, lignite-, coal-, and gas-fired power plants are usually
used by energy companies. Nuclear power plants have very high investment costs but a low cost of
production, while gas-fired power plants have relatively low investment cost and a high cost of reduction.
Hence, nuclear power plants can be interpreted as baseload plants and gas-fired power plants as peakload
plants. Lignite- and coal-fired power plants have a cost structure that locates them somewhere in between
nuclear- and gas-fired plants.
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assume that investment in additional transmission capacity is less costly than investment
in peakload capacity, t < k. This reflects the situation in the electricity sector, where
transmission expansion is considerably cheaper than generation expansion.16 In Section
1.6 we relax this assumption in order to discuss its relevance for our results. Generators
know their production capacities, the nominal line capacity as well as the spot market
demand at the time of making their production decision. Hence, produced quantities are
contingent on the demand scenarios ◊ œ [◊, ◊]. However, the exact transmission capacity
is only known after spot market production decisions have been made. This assumption
is needed in order to establish an equilibrium and is explained in detail in Section 1.3. We
abstract from any cost of transmission operation like line losses or other system services.
We consider two di erent mechanisms for transmission pricing in this study. Under simul-
taneous market clearing the operation of the network is governed by a system of optimal
nodal prices, that is, a price at the supply node and a price at the demand node. These
nodal prices adjust in such a way that the market is always cleared. If transmission ca-
pacity is abundant, trade between the two nodes leads to identical prices at both nodes.
However, if transmission capacity is scarce, trade between the two nodes is restricted and
prices at the two nodes diverge. At the demand node a high price occurs, while at the
supply node competition among generators leads to a low price. The price di erences
between the two nodes in the case of a congested transmission line (‘congestion rents’)
can be used by the regulator to finance transmission investment.
Under sequential market clearing the operation of the network is governed by a single spot
market price in the whole network. In case the transmission capacity is scarce, trade at
the spot market takes place as if no congestion occurs, though this might lead to physically
infeasible spot market outcomes. After the spot market has taken place and the de facto
transmission capacities are realized, the system operator assures whether or not the spot
market outcome is feasible, that is, production is not larger than transmission capacity.
If this is not the case, the system operator runs an adjustment market. In this market
the system operator engages as a seller at the demand node and as a buyer at the supply
node, such that the production volume just matches the transmission capacity. Notice
that in the adjustment market the price at the demand node always lies above the price
at the supply node. Hence, it is costly for the system operator to run the adjustment
market. The adjustment market as well as transmission investment are financed via a
transmission fee raised from the generators.
The timing is as follows: 1.) The optimal transmission investment decision is made.
2.) Generators decide upon generation capacity investments. 3.) The system operator
runs the spot market: (i) Spot market realization ◊ is determined. (ii) Generators set
16An overview of investment costs for di erent generation and transmission technologies can be found
in Schaber, Steinke and Hamacher (2012).
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production quantities. (iii) Transmission line uncertainty is revealed. (iv) If necessary,
in a system with sequential market clearing, the system operator runs the adjustment
market.
1.3 Simultaneous Market Clearing
In this section, we analyze the e ect of a spot market design with simultaneous market
clearing on industry investment in generation capacity and the optimal transmission ca-
pacity investment. With simultaneous market clearing, spot market prices at the two
nodes in the network diverge from each other when the transmission line is constrained.
This system allows to directly take transmission constraints into account at the spot
market.
We provide a short description of the spot market, in order to understand the concept
of simultaneous market clearing: For given generation and transmission capacities and
demand realizations, competitive generators want to produce until marginal cost equals
the market price. The marginal cost is either given by the characteristics of the baseload
or the peakload production units. Moreover, generators are constrained by their capacity
in their production decision. The latter is denoted by QÕ (◊). Demand is restricted by the
transmission capacity L, which is needed to transport the electricity from the supply to
the demand node. As long as the transmission capacity exceeds the generation production
decision (QÕ (◊) < L) trade takes place without limitations. However, if the generation
production decision exceeds the transmission capacity (QÕ (◊) > L) prices at the two nodes
have to diverge to clear the market. The price at the supply node is kept down at marginal
cost through competition among generators. The price at the demand node, however, rises
above the price at the supply node, such that consumers just demand a quantity equal to
the transmission capacity L.
In order to establish an equilibrium under simultaneous market clearing, a small techni-
cal assumption has to be made. When the production decision equals the transmission
capacity (QÕ (◊) = L) an arbitrarily small amount of uncertainty for the overall size of
transmission capacity is needed: The transmission line is subject to some uncertainty,
that is, the de facto transmission capacity, denoted by T , is slightly di erent from the
nominal line size and given by T = L + Á.17 The support [≠‘,+‘] of the random shock
Á can be deliberately small (i.e., ‘ æ 0). We denote the density of T by g (T ) and its
17Notice that this assumption is in line with the technical properties of electricity transmission. De
facto transmission capacities usually depend on environmental conditions and operational actions in the
transmission network. For example, ‘the import capacity of Path 15 (connecting Northern and Southern
California) varies between about 2600 MW and 3950 MW depending upon the ambient temperature and
remedial action schemes that are in place to respond to unanticipated outages of generating plants and
transmission lines.’ (see Joskow and Tirole (2005), fn. 20)
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distribution by G (T ). For simplicity, if |L≠QÕ (◊)| < Á holds, we refer to QÕ (◊) = L in
the remainder of this chapter. This implies that peakload generation units can only earn
positive scarcity rents, if the de facto line capacity exceeds the total generation capacity
(T Ø X).
The following Lemma characterizes investment under a system with simultaneous market
clearing.
Lemma 1.1. [Generation and Transmission Investment - Simultaneous Market Clearing]
Under a system with simultaneous market clearing, industry investment in generation1
Xˆ, Xˆ1
2
is uniquely characterized by
Xˆ :
I1
1≠G
1
Xˆ ≠ Lˆ
22 ˆ ◊¯
◊X
1
P
1
Xˆ, ◊
2
≠ c
2
dF (◊) = k
J
Xˆ1 :
Y][
ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
1
P
1
Xˆ1, ◊
2
≠ c1
2
dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊¯
◊X1
(c≠ c1) dF (◊) = k1 ≠ k
Z^
\ .
The optimal line
1
Lˆ = Xˆ
2
, given industry investment, is uniquely characterized by
Lˆ :
I
G
1
Xˆ ≠ Lˆ
2 ˆ ◊¯
◊X
1
P
1
Lˆ, ◊
2
≠ c
2
dF (◊) = t
J
.
◊X1 is the spot market scenario beyond which baseload investment is binding, ◊X1 is the
spot market scenario beyond which firms produce at the marginal cost of the peak load
technology c and ◊X is the spot market scenario beyond which total investment is binding.
Proof. See Appendix.
The critical spot market scenarios are illustrated in graph (a) of Figure 1.2. Notice that
◊X1 , ◊X1 and ◊X are defined by the respective spot market conditions, that is: At ◊X1 and
quantity X1 marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of baseload production c1. At ◊X1
and quantity X1 marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of peakload production c. At
◊X and quantity X marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of peakload production
c.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the critical spot market scenarios for given investment decisions
(X,X1, L), withX = L. (a) critical spot market scenarios in the absence of a transmission
fee · . (b) critical spot market scenarios when a transmission fee · exists.
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The characterization of the investment outcome in the lemma is rather intuitive.
First, generation and transmission capacity are of equal size
1
Xˆ = Lˆ
2
: The optimal trans-
mission line capacity does not exceed the generation capacity built by investors
1
Lˆ Æ Xˆ
2
as capacity is costly and the exceeding capacity would never be utilized. In addition,
peakload generators can only earn positive scarcity rents at the spot market, when they
constitute the constraining element in the market
1
Xˆ Æ Tˆ
2
. Hence, generation capacity
does not exceed the transmission capacity
1
Xˆ Æ Lˆ
2
. As neither generation nor transmis-
sion capacity is larger than the other in equilibrium, it has to hold that both are of equal
size
1
Xˆ = Lˆ
2
.
Second, consider total generation capacity. In equilibrium, the scarcity rents earned by
generators beyond spot market ◊X , when the transmission line is not congested, are equal
to the marginal cost of investment k. As the nominal transmission capacity Lˆ di ers
from the de facto transmission capacity
1
Tˆ = Lˆ+ Á
2
the transmission line is uncongested
with probability 1 ≠ G
1
Xˆ ≠ Lˆ
2
. Notice that investment in generation capacity is solely
determined by the peakload generation characteristics. Due to the higher production
cost, the peakload generation units are employed in the spot market only after baseload
generation units have been fully utilized, that is, beyond demand realization ◊X1 . Hence,
the characteristics of these ‘marginally’ employed generation units are decisive for total
capacity investment. Additional capacity is only valuable at the marginal demand levels,
when capacity is scarce, that is, beyond demand realization ◊X , when total capacity is
met and the spot market price rises above the peakload production cost c.
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Third, consider transmission capacity. In equilibrium, the marginal value of transmission
capacity, namely, the scarcity rents when the transmission line is congested beyond spot
market ◊X , is equal to the marginal cost of investment t. Congestion only occurs beyond
spot market ◊X with probability G
1
Xˆ ≠ Lˆ
2
. Notice that the price di erences occurring
between the supply and the demand node just equal the transmission investment costs.
Hence, no additional revenue for financing the transmission line is necessary and no ex-
tra transmission fee is needed. The identical result can also arise as the outcome in a
transmission merchant investment model, where financial transmission rights are issued
to investors to determine and finance the transmission capacity (see also Joskow and
Tirole, 2005).
Fourth, the most intuitive way to describe baseload capacity investment Xˆ1 is as a replace-
ment trade-o . Replacing a unit of baseload generation with a unit of peakload generation
causes higher investment costs by k1≠k as the former is more expensive to build than the
latter. However, the baseload unit has cheaper production costs. Therefore, at all spot
markets when peakload generation is used, that is, beyond ◊X1 , substituting peakload
with baseload generation creates a gain equal to the di erence in production cost c≠ c1.
Moreover, the baseload unit is already profitable to run at lower spot markets as the
peakload unit, that is, before ◊X1 , and earns additional scarcity rents whenever baseload
capacity is constrained but peakload generation is not profitable to run yet, that is, at all
spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊X1 , ◊X1
È
.
The following remark compares the investment performance under simultaneous market
clearing with the socially optimal investment outcome which is denoted by (Xú, Xú1 , Lú).
Remark 1.1. [Generation and Transmission Investment - Simultaneous Market Clearing]
The solution obtained under a system with simultaneous market clearing gives rise to the
socially optimal investment, in total generation investment
1
Xˆ = Xú
2
, in the baseload
technology
1
Xˆ1 = Xú1
2
as well as in the transmission line
1
Lˆ = Lú
2
.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is in line with the previous literature on locational marginal pricing (see,
e.g., Hogan, 1999, and Joskow and Tirole, 2005). Since generation investors behave
perfectly competitive, firms invest in additional generation capacity up to the point when
the generation scarcity rents equal the investment cost and the marginal profit from
investment is zero. With simultaneous market clearing, these scarcity rents at each spot
market realization just reflect the locational marginal value of generation at each node
and provide the e cient signal for investment. Hence, the generation investment outcome
corresponds to the socially optimal solution.
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1.4 Sequential Market Clearing
This section analyzes industry investment in generation capacity and optimal investment
in transmission capacity under sequential market clearing. Subsequently, we compare the
outcome to the results from Section 1.3. With sequential market clearing only a single
spot market price for the whole network exists. This single spot market price is insu cient
to take transmission constraints into account and might lead to infeasible spot market
outcomes. Therefore, if necessary, the system operator runs an adjustment market to
finally achieve market clearing after the spot market has taken place and when the actual
transmission capacity is known.
In order to understand the concept of sequential market clearing, we provide a short
description of the spot market: For given capacities, competitive generators want to
produce until marginal cost equals the market price. The marginal cost is either given
by the characteristics of the baseload or the peakload production units. The resulting
spot market production decision, denoted by Q’ (◊), is constrained by the generators
capacity. Moreover, trade is physically restricted by the de facto transmission capacity T .
However, with sequential market clearing, trade at the spot market takes place as if this
transmission constraint did not exist. Thus, the generators’ production decision at the
spot market might even exceed the transmission capacity (Q’ (◊) > T ). Yet, such a spot
market outcome is physically infeasible. In order to ensure market clearing in this case, the
system operator runs an adjustment market after the spot market has taken place. At the
adjustment market, the system operator engages as a buyer of the ‘exceeding’ quantity
Q’ (◊) ≠ T at the demand node and as a seller of equal quantity at the supply node,
such that the market outcome becomes feasible. This produces prices at the adjustment
market, which are equal to the spot market prices at the di erent nodes with simultaneous
market clearing, though the trade volume at the adjustment market is less. Notice that
in contrast to simultaneous market clearing, where revenues are generated through the
price di erences, running a market with sequential market clearing is costly. The reason
is that the system operator has to engage as a buyer at the ‘expensive’ demand node and
as a seller at the ‘inexpensive’ supply node.
The following Lemma characterizes investment in generation and transmission under a
system with sequential market clearing.
Lemma 1.2. [Generation and Transmission Investment - Sequential Market Clear-
ing] Under a system with sequential market clearing, industry investment in generation1
X˜, X˜1
2
is uniquely characterized by
X˜ :
Iˆ ◊¯
◊X·
!
P
!
X˜, ◊
"≠ · ≠ c" dF (◊) = kJ
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X˜1 :
Y][
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
!
P
!
X˜1, ◊
"≠ · ≠ c1" dF (◊) + ˆ ◊¯
◊
X1
·
(c≠ c1) dF (◊) = k1 ≠ k
Z^
\ .
The optimal line
1
L˜ = X˜
2
, given industry investment, is uniquely characterized by
L˜ :
Iˆ ◊¯
◊L·
!
P
!
L˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊) Ø tJ .
· is a transmission fee the regulator charges in order to compensate the transmission
investment expenses. ◊X1· is the spot market scenario beyond which baseload investment is
binding, ◊X1· is the spot market scenario beyond which firms produce at the marginal cost
of the peak load technology c, ◊X· is the spot market scenario beyond which total investment
is binding and ◊L· is the spot market scenario beyond which the transmission capacity is
binding.
Proof. See Appendix.
The critical spot market scenarios are illustrated in graph (b) of Figure 1.2. ◊X1· , ◊X1· ,
◊X· and ◊L· are defined by the respective spot market conditions, that is: At ◊
X1
· and
quantity X1 marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of baseload production plus
the transmission fee, c1 + · . At ◊X1· and quantity X1 marginal revenue is equal to the
marginal cost of peakload production plus the transmission fee, c+· . At ◊X· and quantity
X marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of peakload production c plus the
transmission fee, c + · . Again, the characterization of the investment outcome in the
Lemma is rather intuitive. We discuss the investment outcome in detail in the following
paragraphs.
First, generation capacity is built as if transmission constraints did not exist. In equilib-
rium, the total generation scarcity rents, that is, beyond spot market realization ◊X· , are
equal to the peakload generation investment cost k, regardless of potential transmission
congestion. However, notice that the generation scarcity rents are reduced by the trans-
mission fee · . As the transmission fee increases the generators’ perceived production cost
above the actual production cost, the generators produce less quantity at all spot markets
when capacity constraints are not met and capacity constraints are only reached at higher
spot markets. That is, generators earn scarcity rents only at spot markets beyond ◊X· .
An illustration of these distortions can be found in graph (b) of Figure 1.2.
Second, consider transmission capacity. In equilibrium, the marginal value of transmis-
sion capacity is equal to the marginal cost of investment t. Notice that, as generation
investment takes place regardless of the existence of su cient transmission capacity, the
marginal value of transmission capacity is equal to the full scarcity rents beyond spot mar-
ket ◊L· for L˜ Æ X˜. Furthermore, since t < k, the marginal value of transmission capacity
is larger than the marginal revenue of generation capacity. Hence, the optimal transmis-
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sion capacity is never smaller than the generation capacity. As the optimal transmission
capacity also never exceeds the generation capacity, the transmission capacity again just
matches the generation capacity
1
L˜ = X˜
2
. Finally, observe that since L˜ = X˜ there is no
trading volume at the adjustment market and no extra cost for running the adjustment
market occurs.
Third, the baseload generation investment outcome can again be best understood in a
replacement context as in Section 1.3, under simultaneous market clearing. Replacing a
peakload by a baseload generation unit causes higher investment costs. However, it also
decreases the production cost, whenever it is profitable for a peakload unit to produce.
In addition, production becomes profitable at spot market realizations, when peakload
units would still be unprofitable to run.
Now we can state our main result, which compares investment under sequential market
clearing with investment under simultaneous market clearing.
Proposition 1.1. [Generation and Transmission Investment] If demand is inelastic,
|÷| Æ 1, the solution obtained under a system with sequential market clearing gives rise
to
(i) higher investment in total generation capacity
1
X˜ > Xˆ
2
,
(ii) lower investment in baseload capacity
1
X˜1 < Xˆ1
2
and
(iii) higher investment in total transmission capacity
1
L˜ > Lˆ
2
compared to investment under a system with simultaneous market clearing.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us provide an intuition for this result. Regardless of the specific market design, the cost
of transmission investment has to be fully recouped from the market participants. Under
simultaneous market clearing, the transmission congestion rents are su cient for financing
the transmission line. These price di erences only occur at the ‘marginal’ spot markets,
that is, beyond ◊X , when generators potentially earn scarcity rents which determine the
generation capacity. Under sequential market clearing, no such price di erences occur.
A linear transmission fee is levied on the generators’ usage of the transmission line at all
spot market realizations. This implies that the cost of transmission investment is partly
recouped at the ‘inframarginal’ spot market realizations, that is, before ◊X· , which are
irrelevant for the investment decision. Therefore, the transmission fee is lower than it
would be if it was only collected at the marginal spot market realizations. Thus, the
transmission fee is also lower at all spot market realizations beyond ◊X· , and consequently,
the scarcity rents earned by generators’ are larger compared to a system with simultaneous
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market clearing. With larger scarcity rents, investment becomes more profitable and more
generation capacity is built.
However, notice that the spot market distortions caused through the transmission fee have
the reverse e ect on investment. Hence, the result in Proposition 1.1 only holds if demand
is inelastic (|÷| Æ 1). Most studies find price elasticities of demand in the electricity sector
of 0.1 ≠ 0.5 in the short run and 0.3 ≠ 0.7 in the long run. See, e.g., Lijsen (2006) for
an overview of recent contributions on that issue. This implies that the introduction
of the transmission fee does not cause too severe spot market distortions. That is, the
spot market quantities are not distorted too much, and hence, the critical spot market
realizations are not too di erent from those without a transmission fee.
The result for baseload investment is contrary to that for total investment. Under si-
multaneous market clearing, firms’ replacement decisions are independent of the level
of transmission capacity (as long as we have an interior solution with positive peakload
investment). Hence, the replacement decision is independent of the cost of the transmis-
sion line. In principle, this also obtains under sequential market clearing, that is, the
transmission fee · has no impact on the replacement decision. An exception is given,
however, by those spot market realizations, where baseload is binding, as scarcity rents
in those cases are reduced. In total, this leads to lower baseload investment compared to
simultaneous market clearing. Eventually, as the transmission capacity just matches the
generation capacity, the transmission capacity is also larger compared to simultaneous
market clearing.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the assumption on fluctuating demand is central for our
results. Only then the di erent market clearing mechanisms begin to matter. As ex-
plained in this section, investment di ers between sequential and simultaneous market
clearing, as the generation scarcity rents are di erent. This is due to the fact that under
sequential market clearing the cost of transmission investment is partly recouped at the
‘inframarginal’ spot market realizations before ◊X· . Hence, the transmission fee is lower
at all spot market realizations beyond ◊X· , and consequently, the scarcity rents earned by
generators are larger compared to a system with simultaneous market clearing. Without
demand fluctuations, this distinction could not be made, as only a single spot market
realization exists. An analysis without demand fluctuations would thus not generate
any useful insight on the impact of di erent transmission management regimes on firms’
investment incentives as analyzed in the present framework.
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1.5 Policy Implications
The allocation of scarce transmission capacity in electricity markets is an intensively de-
bated topic. In the U.S., seven regional electricity markets have introduced simultaneous
market clearing: The PJM electricity market in 1998, the New York (NYISO) market in
1999, the New England market (ISO-NE) in 2003, the Midwest market (MISO) in 2005,
the California market (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) in 2007 and the
Texas market (ERCOT) in 2010.18 In contrast, most European electricity markets con-
tinue to use sequential market clearing. To this date, simultaneous market clearing has
only been introduced in the Polish electricity market in 2011. However, the rapid and
regionally concentrated increase in new low-carbon generation as well as the retirement
of old generation in Europe puts pressure on the existing transmission grid. Old and new
generation facilities are typically not located at the same production site. This creates
the need for e cient transmission management.19 This development has led to intense
debates about shifting towards simultaneous market clearing in the U.K. as well as in
Germany. The British electricity regulator Ofgem is currently reviewing the electricity
transmission charging arrangements as part of its ‘Project TransmiT’ (compare Ofgem,
2010, and Redpoint Energy, 2011). The German electricity regulator Bundesnetzagentur
has recently commissioned a study on the introduction of locational pricing (see Frontier,
2011). Moreover, the debate in Germany has gained pace after the decision in 2011 to
phase out nuclear power, which has put the transmission grid under pressure (see Bun-
desnetzagentur, 2011). Also, the European authorities exert strong pressure towards an
approach using locational pricing between regional markets on the European level. Trans-
mission congestion management is seen as a key element in the e orts by the European
Commission to establish a fully functioning electricity market in Europe until 2014 (see,
e.g., European Parliament, 2009, and European Council, 2011). For this purpose the
European energy regulator Acer has developed ‘Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allo-
cation and Congestion Management for Electricity’ (see Acer, 2011) and the Electricity
Regulatory Forum, which was established by the European Commission to promote an
internal market for energy, has proposed a ‘Target Model for Capacity Allocation and
Congestion Management’ (see Electricity Regulatory Forum, 2011).20
Many contributions have extensively analyzed the impact of the di erent transmission
management regimes. Compare, e.g., Joskow and Tirole (2000) and Gilbert et al. (2004)
who analyze the e ect of di erent transmission allocation mechanisms on generation spot
market conduct. Moreover, Wolak (2011) and Green (2007) estimate the short run welfare
18Compare also, e.g., O’Neill et al. (2006, 2008).
19Neuho  et al. (2011a, 2011b) show that the introduction of simultaneous market clearing might lead
to substantial operational cost savings as well as a reduction in marginal power prices in the majority of
the European countries.
20To the Electricity Regulatory Forum it is also regularly referred as the ‘Florence Forum’.
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loss due to non-locational pricing in California resp. England and Wales. However, all
these articles typically focus on short run spot market conduct, leaving aside long run
aspects such as investment incentives in transmission and generation facilities. Recently,
experts21 as well as policy makers22 have increasingly emphasized that for the proper func-
tioning of electricity markets not only short run e ciency, but also long run incentives are
of central importance. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the long run perspective seems to
be of particular importance in the light of the ongoing debate on insu cient incentives
in liberalized electricity markets to provide generation investment (see for the ‘missing
money discussion’, Oren, 2005, Hogan, 2005, Cramton and Stoft, 2006, Joskow, 2007,
and Cramton and Ockenfels, 2011). Till date, this debate has entirely abstracted from
issues arising due to the presence of transmission networks. As we show, in a system with
sequential market clearing, investment incentives turn out to be higher than in systems
with simultaneous market clearing. As a central message of our findings, policy makers
should thus be aware that switching from a system of sequential market clearing to a
system of simultaneous market clearing probably has a negative impact on firms’ invest-
ment incentives. This is desirable in a setting like ours, where no market distortions exist.
However, if investment incentives in a specific market are already perceived as too low, as
indicated in the literature on missing money, a change in the transmission management
regime might then further aggravate these problems. This leads to an increased need for
adequate measures to overcome these problems.
As pointed out throughout our analysis, the investment outcome closely depends on the
structure of transmission financing. So far our analysis of sequential market clearing has
only considered a linear transmission fee. However, in some electricity markets non-linear
elements in the transmission fee can be found. The e ect of such non-linearities critically
depends on their specific structure. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the impact
of two common non-linearities in the transmission fee.
First, the transmission fee is raised as a lump sum payment per generator.23 Then the
e ect on total generation and transmission investment is even stronger compared to a
linear transmission tari . However, investment in baseload capacity is undistorted. With
a lump sum transmission fee, no spot market distortion occurs and generation scarcity
rents are even larger. Hence, more investment takes place in generation capacity and also
the transmission line. Notice that overinvestment in transmission capacity always occurs,
21Baldick et al. (2011) argue that ‘the energy sector is now facing an unprecedented investment
challenge driven by the need to connect large amounts of new generation to the electricity networks to
meet climate change targets, while continuing to provide value for money for consumers and security of
supply.’
22The 2009 EU directive states that ‘undistorted market prices would provide an incentive for cross-
border interconnections and for investments in new power generation’, compare European Parliament
(2009).
23This might be the case when the transmission fee is levied on generators in a way uncorrelated to
the system demand. This is, for example, the case with a fee for network connection as the sole source
of transmission financing.
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that is even for t > k. Baseload investment takes place e ciently again, as long as the
lump sum fee is levied on generators regardless of the generation technology used.
Second, the transmission fee can be conditioned on the spot market outcome.24 In such
a system the transmission fee is calculated on the basis of the generators’ individual
contribution to market output during demand peak. This implies that the transmission
fee is implicitly conditioned on the spot market realization ◊. If the transmission fee is
perfectly set, the net revenue a generator receives, that is, the market price minus the
transmission fee, is equal to the revenue in a system with simultaneous market clearing.
Hence, such a system can lead to the socially optimal investment outcome.
1.6 Extensions
Expensive Transmission. Our analysis so far was based on the assumption t < k.
This assumption implies that the transmission capacity matches the generation capacity
under sequential market clearing. If we relax this assumption, the transmission capacity
can also be smaller than the generation capacity, L˜ < X˜. Nevertheless, all results es-
tablished in Lemmata 1.1 and 1.2 and Proposition 1.1 (i) and (ii) remain valid. While
our results with respect to generation investment do not change, there is not necessarily
overinvestment in transmission capacity. The regulator faces two e ects when deciding
how much transmission capacity to build, that is, a sunk cost e ect and a spot market dis-
tortion e ect. The sunk cost e ect captures the fact that generation investment does not
depend on the available transmission capacity under sequential market clearing. When
expanding transmission capacity, the regulator does not have to take the additional cost
of generation investment into account as it is already sunk. The spot market distortion
e ect captures the distortion at the spot market caused by the transmission fee and is
detrimental to the sunk cost e ect. Technically, the e ects are given by
≠
ˆ ◊L·
◊L
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)¸ ˚˙ ˝
SpotMarketDistortionEffect
+ k¸˚˙˝
SunkCostEffect
.
Notice that both e ects are independent from each other. Hence, one or the other e ect
can be larger. If the sunk cost e ect exceeds the spot market distortion e ect, the trans-
mission capacity is smaller than under simultaneous market clearing
1
L˜ < Lˆ
2
otherwise
24E.g., in the British electricity market, one element in the calculation of the transmission fee
(i.e., the Transmission Network Use of System or TNUoS charges) is based on the so called
‘triad demand’. According to National Grid ‘Triad Demand is measured as the average demand
on the system over three half hours between November and February (inclusive) in a financial
year. These three half hours comprise the half hour of system demand peak and the two other
half hours of highest system demand which are separated from system demand peak and each
other by at least ten days.’ (see http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/SYS/glossary/#tri and
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/ElecTransPolicy/Charging/Pages/Charging.aspx)
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it is larger
1
L˜ > Lˆ
2
. Notice that the sunk cost e ect is clearly larger than the spot market
distortion e ect for t < k, and hence, overinvestment in transmission capacity
1
L˜ > Lˆ
2
occurs.
Complex Networks. In this section, we show that our results from Section 1.4 for
a two-node network can be easily generalized to more complex networks. In principle,
our findings hold for any star-network with an arbitrarily large number of nodes. An
example for such a network with n nodes is presented in Figure 1.3. We illustrate this
generalization in the simplest possible star-network with one demand and two supply
nodes.25
Figure 1.3: n-node star network
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We assume that the cost of transmission investment t is identical for both transmission
lines. Moreover, we denote the capacity of the transmission line connecting the ‘baseload
node’ with the demand node by L1 and the sum of transmission line capacities by L.
The capacity of the transmission line connecting the ‘peakload node’ with the demand
node is given by L≠ L1 = L0. Thus, the only di erence between the three-node network
and the two-node network lies in the fact that the baseload generators are connected to
the demand node via a separate line, where congestion can occur independently of the
peakload line. In the subsequent analysis we focus on why this is irrelevant and does not
change our results.
With simultaneous market clearing - as before -, both transmission line capacities exactly
25Since the use of di erent generation technologies is often restricted to certain geographical locations
or nodes in the network, we consider a situation, where all the baseload generation is located at one
of the two supply nodes, while all the peakload generation is located at the other supply node. Wind
turbines or solar panels can only be used at su ciently windy or sunny locations, gas-fired power plants
require access to a gas pipeline, lignite-, coal- and nuclear-fired plants need access to large quantities of
water. Moreover, the transport of lignite and coal is rather costly, so that access to transport facilities is
required and the location of nuclear-fired plants has to fulfill certain safety regulations.
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match the generation capacities at the respective supply nodes
1
Lˆ = Xˆ, Lˆ1 = Xˆ1
2
. More-
over, though both generation technologies are connected via di erent transmission lines,
which can be congested independently from each other, baseload investment can again
be expressed as a replacement trade-o  independent from the cost of transmission. In
other words, under simultaneous market clearing, the contribution of a generation unit
to transmission financing is independent of the generation technology used. Replacing a
peakload unit with a baseload unit makes additional baseload transmission capacity nec-
essary. However, the same amount of transmission capacity becomes superfluous at the
peakload node. Hence, the total transmission capacity in the network remains unchanged.
Notice that in equilibrium the marginal value of transmission has to be equal for both
lines as the marginal cost of transmission investment t is the same for both lines. This
implies that both transmission lines are built such that the resulting total scarcity rents
at each line times the probability of congestion are identical. Since the total scarcity rents
from the baseload technology are higher than those from the peakload technology, it has
to hold that the baseload line is less often congested relative to the peakload line.
The following remark compares the investment performance under simultaneous mar-
ket clearing with the socially optimal investment outcome which is denoted by
(Xú, Xú1 , Lú, Lú1).
Remark 1.2. [Generation and Transmission Investment - Simultaneous Market Clearing]
The solution obtained under a system with simultaneous market clearing gives rise to the
socially optimal investment in the base load technology
1
Xˆ1 = Xú1
2
, in total generation
investment
1
Xˆ = Xú
2
as well as in the transmission lines
1
Lˆ = Lú, Lˆ1 = Lú1
2
.
This remark resembles the result stated in remark 1.1. Hence, simultaneous market
clearing also gives e cient investment signals in more complex star-networks.
With sequential market clearing, again, both transmission line capacities exactly match
the generation capacities at the respective supply nodes
1
L˜ = X˜, L˜1 = X˜1
2
. However,
as in a two-node network, the subsequently built generation capacity does not depend
on the existence of the transmission capacity. Hence, the size of the transmission lines
is solely determined by the generation capacity. This implies that the marginal value
of transmission capacity is not necessarily equal among both transmission lines as it
was the case under simultaneous market clearing. In the following, we state our main
result for the three-node network, which compares industry investment in generation and
optimal transmission investment under sequential market clearing with investment under
simultaneous market clearing.
Proposition 1.2. [Generation and Transmission Investment - Star Network] If demand
is inelastic, |÷| Æ 1, the solution obtained under a system with sequential market clearing
in a star-network with 3 nodes gives rise to the identical investment outcome as described
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in Proposition 1.1. That is, sequential market clearing leads to (i) higher total investment,
X˜ > Xˆ, (ii) lower investment in baseload generation capacity, X˜1 < Xˆ1, as well as (iii)
higher transmission capacity, L˜ > Lˆ, compared to investment under simultaneous market
clearing.
Proof. See Appendix.
This Proposition supports the results in Proposition 1.1 for the two-node network and
shows that our findings from Section 1.4 can be easily generalized to more complex star-
networks.
1.7 Conclusion
Market design is important in network industries as potential congestion between di erent
locations can create a significant barrier to trade. In this regard, there are two competing
approaches: Either, the whole network is designed as a single market with only one
price, where potential network congestion is treated through an alternative mechanism
outside the market, or di erent prices are introduced at di erent locations, which can take
potential congestion into account. A prominent example for such a problem is given by the
management of transmission capacity in liberalized electricity markets. In the U.S. most
markets already implemented simultaneous market clearing, but in Europe sequential
market clearing is still used in the vast majority of electricity markets. However, the
rapid replacement of old carbon intense power plants by new and low carbon generation
puts the transmission grid under pressure. Old and new generation facilities are typically
not located at the same production site, as di erent production technologies often have
di erent locational requirements. That is, e.g., gas-fired power plants need access to
gas pipelines, while solar plants are only e cient to use in sunny areas. This creates
the need for an e cient utilization of the existing transmission capacity. While many
contributions exist on the short run e ects on transmission management, experts and
policymakers have highlighted the need for the proper long run investment incentives in
generation and transmission capacity for the e cient functioning of the electricity sector.
This study sheds light on the long run e ects of di erent transmission management rules
by introducing a network model with endogenous generation and transmission capacities.
We analyze the impact of two regularly used market designs - simultaneous and sequential
market clearing - on generation and transmission capacities as well as on the generation
technology mix in the market.
First, we find that simultaneous market clearing leads to the socially optimal generation
and transmission capacity as well as to the optimal technology mix. This confirms results
from the previous literature (see, for example, Joskow and Tirole, 2005).
On Investment Incentives in Network Industries 26
Second, we find that sequential market clearing leads to overinvestment in total generation
and transmission capacity. Sequential market clearing disentangles the price signal from
the location of production and hence, from its locational marginal value. This leads to
exaggerated investment incentives.
Third, we find that under sequential market clearing the technology mix is distorted, that
is, overinvestment in peakload capacity and underinvestment in baseload capacity takes
place. This is because baseload generators contribute more to financing the transmis-
sion network than peakload generators and hence, investment in baseload becomes less
lucrative.
The central message of our findings is that policy makers should be aware that switch-
ing from a system of sequential market clearing to a system of simultaneous market
clearing probably has a negative impact on firms’ investment incentives. This in turn
aggravates potential investment problems stemming from market imperfections and insti-
tutional constraints in electricity markets, which have been identified in the literature on
missing money. This might lead to an increased need for adequate measures to overcome
those problems.
Chapter 2
Regulating Investments in Vertically
Related Industries
2.1 Introduction
Vertically related monopolistic industries such as utilities (e.g., the electricity, gas,
telecommunications or railway industry) are often under broad regulatory supervision.
This usually includes the regulation of the monopolist’s wholesale price and vertical sep-
aration. Under vertical separation the monopolistic upstream component is restricted
from being active on the competitive downstream market. These measures are supposed
to help avoid anticompetitive e ects resulting from a monopolistic upstream segment.26
However, if new technological opportunities arise in such an industry, it is often not clear
which segment of the industry (upstream monopolist or downstream competitors) should
conduct the investment on these new technologies. In such situations the regulator decides
who should be responsible for the investment.
This study compares two di erent investment regimes in order to determine which regime
provides the best possible investment incentives from a welfare perspective. Under an
upstream investment regime the monopolist is responsible for a specific investment in
the industry, while under a downstream investment regime the investment is ‘liberalized’
and the downstream firms may invest in the respective technology. We focus on how
investment incentives in the di erent regimes are influenced by the nature of downstream
competition (Bertrand- vs. Cournot competition) and the vertical structure of the indus-
try, that is, vertical separation (VS) and vertical integration (VI).
26Regulators generally refer to the ‘disaggregated approach to regulation’ according to which only
the monopolistic component of an industry is subject to regulation, while all other components are left
unregulated.
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An example for such an investment scenario is the recently emerging smart meter tech-
nology in electricity distribution networks. Metering technology is needed by electricity
suppliers to measure their customers’ consumption in order to bill them. Traditional
electricity metering technology (so called electromechanical induction meters) can only
measure the delivered quantity over a specified period of time. With the newly emerging
smart metering technology it has become possible to obtain a much higher functionality
and accuracy, as compared to traditional technologies. These new features include two-
way communication over power lines and the mobile phone network. This allows the use of
flexible retail tari s (‘real-time pricing’), makes estimated readings and bills due to remote
reading superfluous, avoids the need for profile estimation and improves information on
network losses (compare, e.g., Frontier Economics, 2006). Responsibility for investment
in this new metering technology is per se not linked to a distinct segment in the verti-
cally related electricity industry. Studies show that the biggest benefits from installing
smart meters do not arise at the (upstream) network segment, but at the (downstream)
production and retail segment. A study on the British electricity market estimates the
benefits from modern meter technology at  8.2bn for the downstream segment and at
 0.3bn for the upstream segment (see Frontier Economics, 2009).27 National regulators
have chosen di erent approaches regarding investment in new meter technology. While
in most of continental Europe the network owner is responsible for the investment (e.g.
Italy), in the UK and Germany this responsibility falls on the downstream segment or is
‘liberalized’, that is, anybody except the network owner is allowed to invest.28
Our model analyzes a vertically related industry where the upstream good is provided
by a regulated monopolist. For downstream firms the upstream good is an essential
input to o er products to customers. These products are o ered by a di erentiated
duopoly that competes either in quantities or in prices. Throughout the first part of
the chapter, the industry is vertically separated (VS), that is, the upstream monopolist
is not allowed to be active on the downstream market. Subsequently, we consider a
setting with vertical integration (VI), where the monopolist is partially integrated into
the downstream market. Before competition takes place, an investment opportunity for
downstream process innovation arises. This investment lowers the marginal costs of the
downstream firms. As the investment may possibly be conducted by both sectors of the
industry, it is ultimately the regulator who decides which segment is responsible for the
investment. Moreover, it is assumed that the investment cannot be undertaken by both
27Moreover, there is an undetermined externality on the environment (compare Frontier Economics,
2009). Another study argues that the particular needs of a heterogeneous customer base can be more
easily taken into account under a downstream investment regime (compare Frontier Economics, 2011).
28Among regulators, the fear was expressed that a lock-in e ect from investment in smart meter
technology might exist resulting in the fragmentation of the downstream electricity market. This would
render regulation of the access to meter equipment necessary. We abstract in our model from such e ects.
See, for example, Dow Jones Energy Weekly, 19, 2008, p.7-8.
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sectors jointly.29,30 The actual investment decision is taken after the investment regime is
determined and for a given regulated wholesale price, but before firms supply products
competitively to consumers. An interpretation of this assumption is that the investment
is non-verifiable. Thus, the wholesale prices cannot be conditioned on the investment. We
consider linear wholesale prices which are set in order to allow the upstream monopolist
to fully recover its fixed costs. Linear wholesale prices are typical for regulated industries
as regulators mostly do not allow for two-part tari s as access price schemes. These are
under suspicion to provide scope for misuse by the regulated monopolist.31
It is noteworthy that downstream process innovation has similar properties to our leading
example: Smart metering technology includes functionality that makes real-time pricing
possible. Real-time pricing allows generators to give their consumers time dependent
price signals reflecting their cost of production. This leads to a lower average electricity
generation cost given generation cost curves are convex and demand varies over time. Both
assumptions are fulfilled in the electricity sector. Thus, downstream process innovation
can be understood as a stylized way to model the e ect of real-time pricing in a one period
model.
Our main results are as follows: First, we show that in a vertically separated industry the
optimal investment regime depends on the mode of competition and on the capital inten-
sity of the upstream segment. Under Cournot competition, the downstream investment
regime is always superior from a welfare perspective. Under Bertrand competition, how-
ever, the upstream investment regime is superior if the capital intensity of the upstream
segment is su ciently high.
Second, we show that the vertical ownership structure of the industry influences the op-
timal investment regime. While di erent investment regimes are optimal under vertical
separation, under vertical integration, the downstream investment regime always outper-
forms the upstream investment regime, regardless of the mode of competition and the
upstream capital intensity.
Our results have implications for policy making. They justify sector-specific approaches
to regulatory decisions regarding the treatment of investments in network industries.
Besides considering the specific characteristics of an investment, the nature of competition
and the ownership structure of the industry should also be taken into account when the
29This assumption reflects reality as negotiations between the upstream monopolist and the downstream
competitors might result in coordination failure. Moreover, regulators often prevent collaboration between
the upstream monopolist and downstream competitors as they fear anticompetitive e ects.
30We are abstracting from the question which industry segment actually wants to conduct the invest-
ment. This might arise when the investment is associated with high enough fixed costs, so that only one
of the two segments is willing to invest. As we assume a convex investment cost function in our model,
any segment would invest at least a bit when allowed to do so.
31Non-linear tari s are under suspicion to make discrimination of the downstream competitors possible
(see, e.g., European Commission, 2007, part 1, p. 58).
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regulator determines the investment regime. These findings are particularly relevant for
industries that are undergoing rapid technological changes, as is witnessed in the electricity
industry.32
It has become a common notion in the literature to interpret di erent natures of compe-
tition as a manifestation of the importance of capacity constraints.33 This interpretation
allows us to derive the following tentative implications for regulatory policy: In sectors
where capacity constraints play an important role on the downstream market (Cournot
industries), the regulator should opt for the downstream investment regime, as it provides
superior investment incentives. In contrast, when capacity constraints are inconsequential
(Bertrand industries), upstream fixed costs in an industry are high (which might be the
case in industries where the initial upstream investment has taken place recently) and
the industry is vertically separated, the regulator should opt for the upstream investment
regime, as this would provide the superior investment performance. A similar setting is
often given just after rate-of-return regulation has been abandoned in an industry.34
This study contributes to the literature on investment behavior in vertically related in-
dustries. Buehler (2005) and Buehler et al. (2004, 2006) explore the issue of potential
underinvestment in infrastructure. They investigate the e ects of partial vertical inte-
gration as well as vertical separation on investment. Cremer et al. (2006) and Hö er
and Kranz (2011a, 2011b) study whether legal unbundling, as an intermediate structure
between vertical integration and vertical separation, can deliver a superior investment
performance through combining the benefits of both vertical structures. They find a
weakly positive impact on investments. However, all of these models solely investigate
the e ect of upstream investment activity, while we compare investment incentives by the
upstream monopolist and by the downstream competitors for identical investment tech-
nologies. Banerjee and Lin (2003), Brocas (2003) and Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) also
consider the impact of the vertical structure on downstream process innovation. However,
in their work the downstream firms are always in charge of the investment, while in this
study we also investigate investment by the upstream firm.
Moreover, this study relates to the literature on the nature of competition and its e ect on
investment behavior. Singh and Vives (1984) are the first to compare market outcomes of
Bertrand and Cournot competition in a duopoly with di erentiated goods. In our study,
we use a framework similar to theirs to model downstream competition. Bester and
Petrakis (1993) and Qui (1997) also use similar frameworks to model process innovation
32Detailed reports on new technological opportunities in the electricity industry can be found in
Economist (2009a, 2009b).
33As Tirole (1988), p. 219, points out, “[...] what we mean by quantity competition is really a choice of
scale that determines the firm’s cost functions and thus determines the conditions of price competition.
This choice of scale can be a capacity decision, [...]”. Another reference is Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
34Rate-of-return regulation is often associated with overinvestment in capacity (compare, e.g., Averch
and Johnson, 1962).
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and derive welfare comparisons among the di erent modes of competition.
Recently, several contributions have emerged, considering the impact of vertical owner-
ship structures under di erent modes of competition on market conduct and investment.
Arya et al. (2008) model di erent modes of competition in a vertical structure with an
upstream monopoly. They investigate the price setting behavior of a vertically integrated
monopolist owning the source of an essential input good with downstream competition.
They partly contradict the findings of Singh and Vives (1984). But they do not consider
pre-competition investments as we do. Chen and Sappington (2010) compare the incen-
tives of an upstream monopolist to invest into upstream cost reduction and upstream
product design for di erent vertical structures and modes of competition. They find
that under Cournot competition VI always increases investment incentives, while under
Bertrand competition VI might lead to a decrease. Mandy and Sappington (2007) model
the incentives of a vertically integrated monopolist to sabotage downstream competitors
by providing an inferior quality or raising their costs under di erent modes of compe-
tition.35 Although these actions harm economic e ciency whereas investments improve
it, the underlying incentives resemble those considered in our study. Finally, Chen and
Sappington (2009) analyze the optimal regulation of wholesale prices in order to stimulate
downstream process innovation considering di erent vertical structures as well as di erent
modes of competition.
In the next Section we present our model. In Section 2.3 we derive our results for a verti-
cally separated industry. In Section 2.4 we present the results for a vertically integrated
industry. In Section 2.5 we relate this study to the current discussion on the implementa-
tion of smart metering technology in electricity distribution networks and provide some
concluding remarks.
2.2 The Model
We consider an industry that consists of an upstream monopolist and a competitive
downstream segment. The monopolist U provides a good, which is an essential input
required for producing the final product downstream. The provision of the upstream
good involves a fixed cost F > 0, which is incurred whenever the monopolist decides to
produce. In addition, each unit of the input good comes at a constant marginal cost,
which we normalize to be 0. The upstream industry, thus, exhibits economies of scale
which explains the monopolistic industry structure.
The monopolist is price regulated, that is, all units that are demanded have to be served at
35More on sabotage can be found in Economides (1998), Beard et al. (2001) and Sibley and Weisman
(1998).
Regulating Investments in Vertically Related Industries 32
the regulated linear wholesale price w.36 As the upstream marginal cost is normalized to
0, the wholesale price w also represents the upstream margin. Price regulation is needed
to avoid anticompetitive e ects resulting from the monopolistic nature of the upstream
sector. We assume that the wholesale price w is set such that the upstream monopolist
can just recover the fixed infrastructure cost F .37 This implies that the wholesale price is
always positive (w > 0) and, as is shown in the appendix, that it is an increasing function
of the fixed cost, wF (F ) > 0 (see Section B.7 in the appendix).
We restrict our attention to two downstream firms, D1 and D2. These firms o er their
products directly to consumers, but require the upstream good as an input. Downstream
firms use a fixed proportions technology, that is, they transform one unit of the input good
into one unit of the output good. The final product is di erentiated and firms compete
either in quantities qi or prices pi, with i ‘ {1, 2} denoting the respective downstream firm.
Following Singh and Vives (1984), we assume representative consumers with preferences
described by the quadratic utility function U (q1, q2) = – (q1 + q2)≠ 1/2 (q21 + 2“q1q2 + q22).
– > 0 is the maximum willingness to pay, and “ ‘ (0, 1) can be viewed as a measure of
product homogeneity, which increases in “. As “ approaches 0, the products of the two
downstream firms become independent. As “ approaches 1, the products of the firms
become completely homogeneous. In the remainder we will sometimes refer to a market
with rather homogenous goods as a market with tough competition. The resulting inverse
market demand functions are linear and given by pi (qi, q≠i) = –≠qi≠“q≠i, for i, ≠i = 1, 2,
i ”= ≠i. Moreover, we denote the total quantity in the market by Q = q1 + q2.
The downstream competitors have ex-ante symmetric constant marginal costs of produc-
tion, denoted by c. In our model, an investment opportunity in downstream process
innovation exists. The investment  i lowers the perceived marginal cost of providing
the downstream product from w + c to w + ci with ci = c ≠  i. This investment can
either be conducted by the downstream firms or by the upstream monopolist. We as-
sume the exact amount of investment to be not verifiable for the regulator. The regulator
decides ex-ante which sector is responsible for the investment. Therefore, our analysis
distinguishes between two cases. Under the upstream investment regime, the upstream
monopolist undertakes the investment. Under the downstream investment regime, the
two downstream firms invest themselves. Regardless of which sector is undertaking the
investment, it has to be done for each downstream firm separately. Hence, both indus-
try segments have the same cost structure in investing. The investment cost is given by
36The assumption of linear access prices resembles the situation in many network utilities (see also
footnote 31).
37A similar approach regarding when the wholesale price is set is used by Valletti and Cambini (2005).
Though this assumption on the timing of the regulator’s decision making might seem strong, the wholesale
price set by the regulators provides some commitment. Valletti (2003) stresses the need, when imple-
menting a regulatory policy, that regulators are endowed with some commitment power over time. A
discussion on the commitment value of a regulator’s decision can be found in Guthrie (2006) and Spiller
(2005), p. 627-630.
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K
2  2i per downstream firm, where K is a parameter determining the marginal cost of
investment. Moreover, we (implicitly) assume that investment is subsidized. That is, the
respective investor(s) receive ex-ante a lump sum payment su cient to cover the expected
investment cost. As the investment is non-verifiable, the subsidy is paid ex-ante whether
or not the investment is undertaken and hence, investment (and our remaining analysis)
is independent of this subsidy. This assumption ensures that the upstream monopolist
can break even, though the wholesale price only allows to recover the fixed cost F . There
are a number of possible interpretations of this subsidy. One of them is the government’s
support on R&D. More on this assumption can be found at the end of Section 2.4.
The timing is as follows: At stage 1 the regulator determines the investment regime.
At stage 2 the respective investor(s) take(s) the investment decision. Finally, at stage 3
competition in quantities or prices takes place.
2.3 Vertical Separation (VS)
We begin by considering the setting with a vertically separated industry. That is, the
downstream competitors and the upstream monopolist act independently from each other.
We investigate the di erences in pre-competition investment activity among two di erent
investment regimes and two modes of competition, Cournot competition and Bertrand
competition.
2.3.1 Competition Stage
In order to gain a better understanding of how the mode of competition influences the
investment incentives, we need to analyze how cost reducing investment influences com-
petition. Therefore, we start with providing a short description of the competition stage
under the two di erent modes of competition. Under Cournot competition, the down-
stream firms choose quantities in order to maximize
max
qi
ﬁi = (pi(qi, q≠i)≠ w ≠ (c≠ i)) qi
for i,≠i ‘ {1, 2}, i ”= ≠i. Under Bertrand competition, however, the downstream firms
choose prices in order to maximize
max
pi
ﬁi = (pi ≠ w ≠ (c≠ i)) qi (pi, p≠i)
for i,≠i ‘ {1, 2}, i ”= ≠i. All results of the competition stage for given levels of investment
are provided in detail in Section B.1 of the appendix. Notice that, except for the firms’
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individual marginal cost, ci = c ≠  i, the investment regime has no influence on the
competition.
Under both modes of competition a decrease in downstream firm i’s marginal cost ci,
makes a lower price (Bertrand) resp. a higher quantity (Cournot) for firm i optimal.
First of all, this leads to a higher industry output. Moreover, it also a ects competition
as the rival firm ≠i might react to the change in output or price by firm i. As is well
known, Cournot and Bertrand competition have di erent properties in this respect (see,
e.g., Vives, 2001). Under Cournot competition, quantities are strategic substitutes, that
is, an output increase by firm i leads to a decrease in output by firm ≠i. In other
words, the output increase by one firm is partly compensated by the rival firm and hence,
total output is only increased modestly. Under Bertrand competition, however, prices are
strategic complements, that is, a decrease in price by firm i makes it optimal for firm ≠i
to also lower its price. In other words, the price decrease by one firm is amplified by the
subsequent price decrease by the rival firm. This leads to a relatively large increase in total
output. In sum, it holds that the output increase is larger under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot competition
1
ˆQC
ˆ i <
ˆQB
ˆ i
2
. Having this fact in mind, we can now
investigate the di erent investment regimes.
2.3.2 Investment Stage
Before we analyze the di erences in investment among the two modes of competition,
we compare investment under the di erent investment regimes
1
 UpstreamV S ,  DownstreamV S
2
with the socially optimal investment
1
 Welfare
2
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. [Investment under Vertical Separation] Under vertical separation, invest-
ment is always below the socially optimal level regardless of the investment regime and the
mode of competition,  Welfare >  UpstreamV S , DownstreamV S .
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is rather intuitive. Private investors only take the e ect of investment on their
profits into account and miss out the e ect on consumers and all other firms’ profits. As
market power exists in our model, private investment is always below the socially optimal
investment. Notice that this result simplifies our subsequent analysis as we only have to
determine the investment regime with the highest investment incentives in order to find
the ‘best’ regime from a welfare perspective.
Upstream Investment Regime. Under the upstream investment regime, the monopo-
list chooses how much to invest in the cost-reduction of the downstream firms. It antici-
pates downstream industry demand, that is, QC under Cournot competition respectively
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QB under Bertrand competition, and takes the wholesale price w as given. Hence, the
upstream monopolist maximizes
max
 i, ≠i
ﬁU = wQú ( i, ≠i)≠ K2  
2
i ≠
K
2  
2
≠i.
The first term consists of the regulated wholesale price w multiplied by total indus-
try output Qú, where Qú ( i, ≠i) = QC ( i, ≠i) under Cournot competition and
Qú ( i, ≠i) = QB (pi ( i, ≠i) , p≠i ( i, ≠i)) under Bertrand competition. In order
to improve the clarity of expression, we use similar ‘reduced’ notation in the remainder of
this chapter. As the wholesale price is regulated and identical for all downstream firms,
the monopolist only considers overall industry output, regardless of which downstream
firm produces this output. The second term constitutes the cost of investment. The
corresponding optimality conditions for the di erent modes of competition are given by:
 Cournoti :
;
w
ˆQú ( i, ≠i)
ˆ i
≠K i = 0
<
(2.1)
 Bertrandi :
I
w
ˆQ
!
púi , pú≠i
"
ˆpúi
ˆpúi ( i, ≠i)
ˆ i
≠K i = 0
J
(2.2)
Though the upstream monopolist does not directly gain from investment into downstream
process innovation, it benefits indirectly. Investment lowers the marginal cost of the
downstream firms and thus, increases market output. As the wholesale margin is positive
(w > 0) an output increase is profitable for the monopolist. Notice that the upstream
monopolist invests to the same extent in both downstream firms. We know from Section
2.3.1 that market output under Bertrand competition is more responsive to investment
than market output under Cournot competition, ˆQCˆ i <
ˆQB
ˆpi
ˆpi
ˆ i . Thus, the marginal
revenue of investment is higher under Bertrand relative to Cournot competition and so is
the investment level.
Downstream Investment Regime. Under the downstream investment regime, the
downstream firms choose how much to invest into the reduction of their own marginal
costs. They take the access price w as given and anticipate their future demand
qi ( i, ≠i) and q≠i ( i, ≠i) in the subsequent competition stage. Thus, the downstream
competitors non-cooperatively maximize
max
 i
ﬁi = (pi (Qú ( i, ≠i))≠ w ≠ (c≠ i)) qúi ( i, ≠i)≠
K
2  
2
i ,
under Cournot competition and
max
 i
ﬁi = (púi ( i, ≠i)≠ w ≠ (c≠ i)) qi
!
púi ( i, ≠i) , pú≠i ( i, ≠i)
"≠ K2  2i ,
under Bertrand competition. In contrast to the upstream monopolist, downstream firms
are not primarily interested in the e ect of investment on the industry output level, but
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on their individual output as well as prices. Maximization with respect to the investment
 i yields the following optimality conditions for the di erent modes of competition
 Cournoti :
Y___]___[
ˆpi(qúi , qú≠i)
ˆq≠i
ˆq≠i
ˆ i
qúi¸ ˚˙ ˝
strategic effect,>0
+ qúi¸˚˙˝
quantity effect
≠ K i¸ ˚˙ ˝
cost effect
= 0
Z___^
___\ (2.3)
 Bertrandi :
Y___]___[(p
ú
i ≠ w ≠ (c≠ i))
ˆqi
!
púi , pú≠i
"
ˆp≠i
ˆp≠i
ˆ i¸ ˚˙ ˝
strategic effect,<0
+ qi
!
púi , p
ú
≠i
"¸ ˚˙ ˝
quantity effect
≠ K i¸ ˚˙ ˝
cost effect
= 0
Z___^
___\ . (2.4)
We can disentangle these optimality conditions into three di erent e ects: (i) Investment
comes at a cost (cost e ect). (ii) As the investment lowers the unit cost of production,
the firm has a positive e ect of investment on every unit of output (quantity e ect).
Hence, the higher the firm’s output, the larger is this e ect. This is in contrast to our
result on the upstream investment regime, where the monopolist considers only output
changes, but not the cost reduction on infra-marginal output. (iii) Finally, a strategic
e ect from investment exists which relates to our discussion in section 2.3.1. Under
Cournot competition, the firms’ output decisions are strategic substitutes. That is, when
a firm acts aggressively in the market by increasing its output, the rival firm will react in
an accommodating way and reduce its own sales. Hence, a firm additionally gains from
investment as it induces an output reduction of the rival firm. That is, the strategic e ect
has a positive impact on investment. Under Bertrand competition, however, the firms’
prices are strategic complements. That is, a firm causes more aggressive competition in
the market and hurts its own profits, resulting in a negative strategic e ect and hence,
reduced investment incentives. Thus, investment under Bertrand competition is always
lower than under Cournot competition (compare Qui, 1997).
Now we can state the first part of our main result, which compares investment under the
upstream investment regime
1
 UpstreamV S
2
with investment under the downstream invest-
ment regime
1
 DownstreamV S
2
.
Proposition 2.1. [Comparison of Investment Regimes under Vertical Separation]
(i) Under Cournot competition, the downstream investment regime always provides an in-
vestment outcome closer to the social optimum relative to the upstream investment regime,
 Welfare >  DownstreamV S >  UpstreamV S .
(ii) Under Bertrand competition, the upstream investment regime provides an invest-
ment outcome closer to the social optimum relative to the downstream investment regime,
 Welfare >  UpstreamV S >  DownstreamV S , if and only if F is su ciently large, F > Fˆ , with
Fˆ ≥ wˆB
1
Fˆ
2
= 4≠2“28≠3“2
1
–≠ c+ BúV S
2
.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Let us now provide an intuition for this result. Under the downstream investment regime,
the incentive to invest stems from the cost reduction induced through investment as well
as from the e ect of investment on competition. Under the upstream investment regime,
however, the incentive to invest stems from the increase in total output induced by the
investment. With Cournot competition, investment by one downstream firm leads to an
output increase by that firm and an output reduction by the rival firm. Hence, the increase
in market output is modest. This is beneficial for the downstream investor, but provides
only modest investment incentives to the upstream monopolist. Thus, the downstream
investment regime always leads to a higher investment level. With Bertrand competi-
tion, investment triggers more intense competition and hence, a large increase in market
output. This is beneficial for the upstream monopolist, but hurts the downstream com-
petitors. So, investment incentives under the upstream investment regime are relatively
more pronounced while they are rather weak under the downstream investment regime.
However, the upstream monopolist invests only, when the regulated wholesale margin is
large enough to make investment attractive at all. This is only the case, when the fixed
upstream cost F is su ciently large, such that a high upstream margin is needed for the
monopolist in order to recoup this cost.
2.4 Vertical Integration (VI)
In this section, we consider the setting where the upstream and the downstream sector
are partially integrated. That is, one of the downstream firms is owned by the upstream
monopolist. The analysis of such a setting is particularly relevant in light of the ongo-
ing discussion on the optimal vertical structure in network industries. This discussion
focuses on the question whether the upstream monopolist should be allowed to engage
at the downstream market (VI) or not (VS).38 We denote the downstream a liate of
the upstream monopolist by D1 and the independent downstream firm by D2. While
the independent downstream firm maximizes only its own downstream profits, ﬁ2, the
integrated firm maximizes the sum of upstream and downstream profits,  + ﬁ1.
2.4.1 Competition Stage
Under VI, the downstream a liate of the integrated upstream monopolist takes the e ect
of its output resp. price choice on the upstream profit into account. That is, the behavior
of the downstream a liate might a ect the independent downstream firm’s demand for the
38A good overview on this discussion is provided by Motta (2004). Some recent literature discusses
di erent vertical structures explicitly (compare Cremer et al., 2006, and Hö er and Kranz, 2011a, 2011b).
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upstream good and hence, upstream profits. The maximization problem under Cournot
competition is given by
max
q1
 + ﬁ1 = w (q1 + q2) + (p1 (q1, q2)≠ w ≠ (c≠ 1)) q1.
This can be rewritten as
max
q1
 + ﬁ1 = wq2 + (p1 (q1, q2)≠ (c≠ 1)) q1,
which reveals that the production cost of downstream firm 1 is now given only by c ≠
 1 instead of w + c ≠  1. The independent downstream firm D2 maximizes only its
downstream profits, that is,
max
q2
ﬁ2 = (p2 (q1, q2)≠ w ≠ (c≠ 2)) q2.
However, it takes the lower marginal cost of production of the integrated firm through its
output choice q1 into account. The corresponding maximization problems under Bertrand
competition are stated in Section B.1 of the appendix. Under VI the same di erences
as under VS with respect to the di erent modes of competition persist. Therefore, we
omit a more thorough discussion of these di erences here and refer to Section 2.3.1. In
addition, in the remainder of this chapter we report only the maximization problems and
optimality conditions for Cournot competition and refer to Section B.1 of the appendix
for the corresponding maximization problems under Bertrand competition.
2.4.2 Investment Stage
Before we analyze the di erences in investment among the two modes of competition,
we compare investment under the di erent investment regimes
1
 UpstreamV I ,  DownstreamV I
2
with the socially optimal investment
1
 Welfare
2
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2. [Investment under Vertical Integration] Under vertical integration, invest-
ment is always below the socially optimal level, regardless of the investment regime and
the mode of competition, that is,  Welfare >  UpstreamV I , DownstreamV I .
Proof. See Appendix.
This result reflects our findings under VS in Section 2.3.2 and Lemma 2.1. Private in-
vestors do not take the e ect of investment on consumers and the other firm’s profits into
account. As market power exists in our model, private investment is always below the
socially optimal investment. Again, this result simplifies our subsequent analysis as we
have to determine only the investment regime with the highest investment incentives in
order to find the ‘best’ regime from a welfare perspective.
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Upstream Investment Regime. Under the upstream investment regime, the monopo-
list chooses how much to invest in the cost reduction of the downstream firms. It antici-
pates downstream industry demand, that is, QC under Cournot competition respectively
QB under Bertrand competition, and takes the wholesale price w as given. Thereby, it
takes its own downstream profits into account. Hence, under Cournot competition the
upstream monopolist maximizes
max
 1, 2
 + ﬁ1 = wQú ( 1, 2) + (p1 (Qú ( 1, 2))≠ w ≠ c+ 1) qú1 ( 1, 2)≠
K
2  
2
1 ≠
K
2  
2
2.
The first term represents the upstream profit and the second term the downstream a l-
iate’s profit. Maximization yields the following optimality conditions for investment in
the own downstream a liate’s and the independent downstream firm’s production cost
 1 :
Y___]___[w
ˆQú ( 1, 2)
ˆ 1¸ ˚˙ ˝
>0
+ ˆp1(q
ú
1 , q
ú
2)
ˆqú2
ˆqú2
ˆ 1
qú1¸ ˚˙ ˝
strategic effect
+ qú1¸˚˙˝
quantity effect
≠ K 1¸ ˚˙ ˝
cost effect
= 0
Z___^
___\ (2.5)
 2 :
Y___]___[w
ˆQú ( 1, 2)
ˆ 2¸ ˚˙ ˝
>0
+ ˆp1 (q
ú
1 , q
ú
2)
ˆqú2
ˆqú2
ˆ 2
qú1 + (pú1 ≠ w ≠ c+ 1)
ˆqú1
ˆ 2¸ ˚˙ ˝
<0
≠ K 2¸ ˚˙ ˝
cost effect
= 0
Z___^
___\ (2.6)
Investment in each of the two downstream firms boosts the demand for the upstream good
just as under VS (the first term in expressions (2.5) and (2.6)). In addition, investment
now also a ects the downstream a liate’s profit: First, investment in the own downstream
a liate’s production cost has the same e ects on the a liate’s profit as investment by
the downstream a liate itself. These are the quantity, the strategic and the cost e ect.
Second, investment in the downstream rival’s production cost hurts the own downstream
a liate’s profits. That is, it makes the downstream rival more aggressive which leads to
lower prices and output for the downstream a liate. Thus, while investment in the own
downstream a liate  1 is larger than under VS, investment in the downstream rival  2
is lower than under VS. This can be easily seen by comparing the optimality conditions
under VI (expressions (2.5) and (2.6)) and under VS (expression (2.1)).
Downstream Investment Regime. Under the downstream investment regime, the
downstream firms choose how much to invest into the reduction of their own production
cost. They take the access price w as given and anticipate their future demand qú1 and qú2
in the subsequent competition stage. Thus, the downstream investment problem is given
by
max
 1
 + ﬁ1 = wQú ( 1, 2) + (p1 (Qú ( 1, 2))≠ w ≠ c+ 1) qú1 ( 1, 2)≠
K
2  
2
1 ≠
K
2  
2
2.
for the integrated firm and
max
 2
ﬁ2 = (p2 (Qú ( 1, 2))≠ w ≠ (c≠ 2)) qú2 ( 1, 2)≠
K
2  
2
2,
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for the independent firm. Maximization with respect to the investments in cost reduction,
 1 and  2, yields the following optimality conditions
 1 :
Y___]___[w
ˆQú ( 1, 2)
ˆ 1¸ ˚˙ ˝
>0
+ ˆp1(q
ú
1 , q
ú
2)
ˆqú2
ˆqú2
ˆ 1
qú1¸ ˚˙ ˝
strategic effect
+ qú1¸˚˙˝
quantity effect
≠ K 1¸ ˚˙ ˝
cost effect
= 0
Z___^
___\ (2.7)
 2 :
Y___]___[
ˆp2 (qú1 , qú2)
ˆqú1
ˆqú1
ˆ 2
qú2¸ ˚˙ ˝
strategic effect
+ qú2¸˚˙˝
quantity effect
≠ K 2¸ ˚˙ ˝
cost effect
= 0
Z___^
___\ (2.8)
Notice that the incentives to invest by downstream firm D1 are equal to the incentives un-
der the upstream investment regime, holding investment of firm D2 constant (expressions
(2.5) and (2.7) are identical). The reason for this result lies in the fact that the investment
decision stays within the same firm regardless of the specific investment regime. The op-
timality condition for investment by downstream firm D2, however, is equivalent to the
corresponding condition under VS.
Now we can state the second part of our main result, which compares investment under the
upstream investment regime with investment under the downstream investment regime
under VI.
Proposition 2.2. [Comparison of Investment Regimes under Vertical Integration] The
downstream investment regime always provides an investment outcome closer to the social
optimum relative to the upstream investment regime regardless of the mode of competition,
that is,  Welfare >  DownstreamV I >  UpstreamV I .
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us now provide an intuition for this result. Under VI, the investment regime does
not a ect the incentives to invest in the integrated firm’s downstream production cost as
the investment decision always stays within the same firm. Thus, the investment regime
plays only a role for investment in the independent downstream firm. As was described in
this section, investment in the independent downstream firm hurts the integrated firm’s
downstream profits while it increases the upstream profits. Hence, under the upstream
investment regime the integrated firm’s investment incentives are rather weak. Under the
downstream investment regime, however, investment incentives by the independent firm
are identical to those under VS, given the integrated competitors investment. In sum, as
is shown in the corresponding proof in the appendix, these are always higher than the
integrated monopolist’s incentives and hence, the downstream regime always provides a
superior result under VI regardless of the mode of competition.
We should shortly mention here how the vertical ownership structure influences the down-
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stream firms’ investment activity. VI partly alleviates the double marginalization problem
caused through the presence of a positive upstream fixed cost F and the linear wholesale
price w needed for its recovery. That is, the integrated firm faces a lower marginal cost
of production. This leads, for given investments, to higher output by the integrated firm1
qV S1 < q
V I
1
2
, lower output by the independent firm
1
qV S2 > q
V I
2
2
and higher total output1
QV S < QV I
2
under both modes of competition for given investments (see Section B.1 in
the appendix for the explicit results). The investment levels are influenced according to
the same pattern, as firm output is the main determinant of investment. That is, VI causes
more investment by the integrated firm
1
 V S1 <  V I1
2
, less investment by the independent
firm
1
 V S2 >  V I2
2
and higher total investment
1
 V S1 + V S2 <  V I1 + V I2
2
compared to
VS under both modes of competition. This aggravates the static e ect of VI and leads to
an even larger market output. Hence, in line with previous literature, VI yields a better
overall performance compared to VS (compare, e.g., Buehler and Schmutzler, 2008).
Moreover, it is noteworthy that our assumption on linear wholesale prices with a positive
upstream margin, caused by our assumption on upstream fixed cost recovery, is central for
our results. An increase in the wholesale price, caused by an increase in the upstream fixed
cost, stimulates upstream investment incentives and mitigates downstream investment
incentives. Hence, only with a su ciently high wholesale price, the mode of competition
starts to matter for determining the ‘best’ investment regime. A linear access price as well
as our underlying assumption on upstream capital cost recovery resemble the situation in
many regulated network utilities.39 Moreover, notice that a positive regulated upstream
margin requires some commitment on the regulator’s side. That is, the wholesale price has
to be determined before the investment decision takes place. A similar approach is used
by, e.g., Valletti and Cambini (2005). In addition, Valletti (2003) stresses the need, when
implementing a regulatory policy, that regulators are endowed with some commitment
power over time. A discussion on the commitment value of a regulator’s decision can be
found in Guthrie (2006) and Spiller (2005), p. 627-630.
Finally, we should discuss our assumption on upstream cost recovery which is related to
the discussion on linear wholesale prices in the preceding paragraph. In our analysis,
we have assumed that the revenues from the regulated wholesale price w (F ) just cover
the upstream capital cost F . The cost of investment, however, is covered by an ex-ante
subsidy which is paid whether or not the investment is undertaken. Technically, this
subsidy ensures that the wholesale price w (F ) is independent of the investment regime.
Consequently, a simple comparison of both investment regimes becomes possible. How-
ever, if the wholesale price would also cover the upstream investment cost, the wholesale
39Non-linear tari s are under suspicion to make discrimination of the downstream competitors possible.
See, e.g., European Commission (2007), p. 58. Moreover, the owners of a regulated infrastructure are
generally entitled to revenues in order to recover their cost. See, e.g., §21 EnWG for the case of German
energy sector regulation.
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price would depend on the investment regime. That is, for a given upstream fixed cost
F¯ , the wholesale price under the upstream investment regime would be larger than under
the downstream investment regime
1
wUpstream
1
F¯
2
> wDownstream
1
F¯
22
. Thus, a simple
comparison of investment under both regimes would not be possible. Moreover, such an
assumption would lead to an additional spot market distortion under the upstream in-
vestment regime. While this would imply an interesting trade-o  to analyze, it is beyond
the scope of this study.
2.5 Conclusion
The emergence of smart metering technology in electricity distribution networks has pro-
voked an intense debate among policy makers as well as regulators. The debate has mainly
centered on whether and how to promote their implementation. Smart meters are seen
as a means to promote energy e ciency through higher functionality and accuracy com-
pared to the traditional electromechanical induction meters. European authorities have
exerted strong pressure on the EU member states to implement smart meters nationwide
until 2020 (see, e.g., European Parliament, 2009). Several European countries have al-
ready enacted legislation to promote investment in this new technology. In the U.K., a
‘Smart Metering Implementation Programme’ (see DECC, 2010) has been initiated, while
in Germany market rules have been established for conducting metering services (see Bun-
desregierung, 2008). In the U.S., several regional initiatives exist in order to enhance the
implementation of metering services and demand response systems (see FERC, 2011).
Several contributions exist on how to optimally realize the potential gains from this new
technology. Joskow and Tirole (2006, 2007) explore the e ect of real-time pricing, associ-
ated with the introduction of smart metering, on electricity retail competition. Borenstein
and Holland (2005) investigate the e ect of real-time pricing on long-term capacity in-
vestments. Holland and Mansur (2006) and Allcott (2011) empirically investigate the
short-run e ects and Borenstein (2005) and Léautier (2011) empirically analyze the long-
run e ects of real-time pricing on welfare. Borenstein (2007) analyzes how much bill
volatility is caused by real-time pricing and whether financial instruments can be used to
reduce this volatility. However, none of these articles considers the incentives of private
investors to implement advanced metering technologies in the first place. We explicitly
investigate the e ect of di erent regulation-imposed investment regimes on the incentives
to invest in a technology that has similar properties to the smart metering technology.
Therefore, we develop a framework in which we compare investment in the implemen-
tation of such a new technology by a regulated upstream monopolist to investment by
downstream competitors. We show that the nature of downstream competition as well
as the vertical ownership structure of the industry should always be considered when
Regulating Investments in Vertically Related Industries 43
determining the investment regime, as di erent regulatory approaches may be optimal
under di erent modes of competition. It has become a common notion in the literature to
interpret di erent natures of competition as a manifestation of the importance of capacity
constraints (compare, e.g., Tirole, 1988, and Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). Moreover,
the capital intensity of the upstream infrastructure also plays a crucial role as it influences
the regulated wholesale price and hence, the monopolist’s margin, which is a major deter-
minant of investment. As a central message of our findings, policy makers and regulators
should be aware of the specific characteristics of the electricity sector under regulation
when deciding on the optimal roll-out plan for smart metering devices.
Chapter 3
Exclusive Retailing
3.1 Introduction
When new mobile handsets enter a market, they are often exclusively marketed through
one of the mobile carriers in this market. Examples for such ‘exclusive retailing’ (ER)
arrangements from the U.S. mobile phone industry include the introduction of LG’s
‘Chocolate’ via Verizon’s cellular service, Samsung’s ‘Instinct’ and Palm’s ‘Pre’ via Sprint,
Blackberry’s ‘Pearl’ via T-Mobile, and Apple’s ‘iPhone’ via AT&T. Most of such exclu-
sive retailing arrangements are abandoned once the handset receives recognition in the
market. Market observers argue that ER is largely used by small mobile handset pro-
ducers (see BCG, 2006)40. However, the rationale of the handset producers behind the
adoption as well as the withdrawal of ER have not been formally analyzed. Their e ects
on competition and welfare have also not received due analysis.
In this chapter, we provide a rationale for such exclusive retailing arrangements. ER
eliminates the disciplining e ect of intrabrand competition between retailers, giving the
exclusive retailer market power and hence, a higher retail margin. While creating such
a double markup e ect is costly for the manufacturer, it also comes with two profit-
enhancing e ects. First, it can serve as a mechanism to enhance brand-specific marketing
investments by retailers (investment e ect). This can be profitable for the manufacturer
if the retailer owns a relatively more e cient marketing investment technology.41 Sec-
40Examples outside the mobile phone sector include AC/DC’s new music album in 2008 which was
exclusively sold via Walmart and the U.S. toy company Hasbro sells its toy action figures exclusively
through Target (compare Subramanian, 2009).
41In our mobile handset context, this would mean that the ER arrangements enhance marketing invest-
ments by the mobile carrier into the handset. BCG (2006) argues that ER is largely used by small mobile
handset producers. These are often not that well known for their products and the mobile carriers have
a much better distribution network as well as access to customer data. Hence, mobile carriers have often
a relatively better technology in marketing mobile handsets. A similar argument can be made for a lot of
other products, in particular when the manufacturer does not have direct contact to its final customers.
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ond, ER might serve as a commitment device for reduced interbrand competition among
manufacturers. That is, the elimination of intrabrand competition by one manufacturer
leads to a unilateral price increase, incentivizing the competing manufacturer to increase
prices (competition softening e ect). While the investment e ect can be interpreted as
pro-competitive, the two other e ects are clearly anti-competitive.
Our model analyzes a vertically related industry where two upstream manufacturers pro-
duce di erentiated brands and sell them to two downstream retailers at linear wholesale
prices. The downstream retailers resell the upstream goods to consumers. Producing
as well as reselling the brand is associated with constant production/resale costs which
are set to zero for simplicity. While consumers have di erent preferences regarding the
brands, they are indi erent between retailers. The manufacturers can choose to sell their
brands via both retailers or exclusively via one of the retailers.42 Thus, three di erent
settings can arise: (i) Both manufacturers sell to both retailers. (ii) One manufacturer
sells to both retailers, while the other manufacturer sells to only one retailer. (iii) Each
manufacturer sells to only one retailer.43 Besides reselling brands, retailers can also con-
duct brand specific marketing. Investment into marketing raises the perceived relative
quality of a brand and enhances demand for the brand regardless of which retailer resells
the good. We assume that the di erent parties cannot contract on a specific level of
marketing e ort.
When manufacturers sell their brand non-exclusively, intrabrand competition at the retail
stage drives down prices to the retailers’ marginal cost, which consists of the wholesale
price being paid for the brand. Retailers could invest into brand specific marketing. But
as intrabrand competition eliminates any retail margin, retailers would never gain from
such an investment and hence, do not invest. If a manufacturer adopts ER, intrabrand
competition at the retail stage does not exist anymore. Hence, the retailer can gain a
positive margin on the sale of the brand. Moreover, the brand specific investment becomes
now retailer specific. Thus, investment becomes lucrative for the retailer and positive
investment levels can be observed. In addition, the possibility of the retailer to gain a
positive margin results in a double markup problem. This leads to an unilateral retail
price increase of the exclusively sold brand and thus, weakens interbrand competition.
Using this model, we can derive the following results. First, we find that (wholesale and
retail) prices, investment and retail profits are higher when one or both manufacturers
adopt exclusivity relative to a situation where none of the manufacturers chooses exclusiv-
ity. However, more exclusivity in the market does not necessarily mean higher equilibrium
For example, the microchip producer Intel partly relies on marketing by its downstream retailers.
42In other words, manufacturers can choose whether or not they want to have intrabrand competition
at the retail stage.
43Here, we rule out the case where both manufacturers exclusively sell to the same retailer and hence,
foreclose the second retailer from the market. Though it turns out that this setting would maximize
industry profits, we believe that such foreclosure would never be allowed by competition authorities.
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values.44
Second, with competition among upstream brands, we show that three types of equilibria
exist, depending on the cost of investment and the intensity of interbrand competition:
(i) Both manufacturers do not adopt exclusive retailing (NER). (ii) One manufacturer
does not adopt ER, while the other manufacturer adopts ER. (iii) Both manufacturers
adopt ER. When adopting ER, manufacturers trade o  the cost (double markup e ect)
and the benefits (investment e ect and competition softening e ect) of such behavior.
Equilibrium (i) occurs when the investment cost is large and interbrand competition is
rather weak. Equilibrium (ii) occurs when both, investment cost and the intensity of
interbrand competition, attain intermediate values. Equilibrium (iii) occurs for either
very tough interbrand competition, very low investment costs or both.
Third, when upstream brands are asymmetric with respect to the investment cost in
marketing their brand, the occurrence of equilibrium (i) is not a ected. Moreover, the
asymmetric equilibrium (ii) occurs for a larger parameter space, while equilibrium (iii)
occurs for a smaller parameter space. In particular, for rather asymmetric brands the
symmetric ER (iii) equilibrium only occurs for highly competitive markets.
Finally, we find that the incentive for a manufacturer to adopt ER contradicts with a
welfare maximizing regulator’s view of ER. This gives scope for regulatory intervention.
In particular, ER should only be allowed if retail investment is su ciently e cient or
interbrand competition is rather tough.
This study contributes to two streams of literature, vertical restraints and exclusive con-
tracting. Both analyze restrictions which are put on one trading party by another trading
party. While in most of these articles the selling party restricts the buying party in es-
tablishing alternative trading relationships, in this work the selling party commits itself
to trade only with one of the buyers.
The literature on vertical restraints considers di erent kinds of restrictions such as ex-
clusive dealing, resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, franchise fees and quantity
forcing. Similar to our work, this literature models the vertical structure of an indus-
try explicitly. Besanko and Perry (1993, 1994) model the equilibrium incentives to adopt
exclusivity when interbrand competition exists. Though we also consider interbrand com-
petition, they look at exclusive arrangements where a retailer is allowed to deal with only
one manufacturer, while we look at situations where a manufacturer deals with only one
retailer. While the former is most often described as exclusive dealing, we characterize the
latter as exclusive retailing. Moreover, Besanko and Perry (1993) investigate the situation
when a manufacturer can conduct retailer-specific investment. We, in contrast, investi-
44E.g., wholesale prices might be lower when both brands are distributed exclusively compared to a
situation when only one brand is distributed exclusively.
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gate the case when the retailer can conduct manufacturer-specific investment. Besanko
and Perry (1994) do not consider investments at all, but foreclosure of retailers. We ex-
plicitly rule out any foreclosure. Similar to our work, Mathewson and Winter (1984) and
Winter (1993) analyze the role of vertical restraints for inducing retail advertising e orts.
They investigate the e ect of di erent kinds of vertical restraints, but do not consider ER.
Moreover, they do not consider interbrand competition, as we do. Among others, Rey and
Stiglitz (1995) discuss vertical restraints as a measure to weaken upstream competition.45
They consider a similar setting to ours, but restrict their analysis to symmetric outcomes
only where either none or both manufacturers choose exclusivity, while we also analyze
potential asymmetric outcomes. Armstrong (1999) and Harbord and Ottaviani (2001)
analyze the link between the type of payment within a contract (lump-sum vs. linear
payment) and the manufacturer’s decision to adopt exclusivity. They find that down-
stream competition and the possibility of resale among retailers play an important role
on the optimality of exclusivity. However, they neither consider investments nor upstream
competition.
The literature on exclusive contracting considers only exclusive dealing arrangements and
no other forms of restraints. In contrast to our work, this literature uses an incomplete
contracting framework. Two di erent views of exclusivity arrangements can be found.
The anticompetitive view (Aghion and Bolton, 1987, Rasmusen et al., 1991, Bernheim
and Whinston, 1998, and Segal and Whinston, 2000) argues that exclusivity serves to
foreclose potential rivals from the market and hence, hinders competition. The pro-
competitive view (Klein, 1988, Frasco, 1991, Marvel, 1982, Masten and Snyder, 1993, and
Areeda and Kaplow, 1988) argues that exclusivity is needed in order to protect the return
on non-contractible asset-specific investments. Without exclusivity investment incentives
would be reduced. Such contracting arrangements can therefore be welfare enhancing,
even when these lead to the foreclosure of potential rivals (compare, e.g., Fumagalli et
al., 2009). Although we use a di erent methodology, we incorporate both the pro- as
well as the anticompetitive view of exclusivity. Finally, de Fontenay et al. (2010) analyze
the equilibrium incentives to adopt exclusivity in a modified Nash bargaining framework
and apply the results to a prominent example of ER mentioned in our introduction, the
‘iPhone’ by Apple. Inc. However, they do not consider any anticompetitive elements of
exclusivity.
In the next Section we present our model. In Section 3.3 we derive the outcomes for all
di erent regimes of ER and in Section 3.4 the equilibrium incentives of manufacturers
to adopt exclusivity. In Section 3.5 we analyze the incentives of manufacturers to adopt
ER in case of asymmetric manufacturers. In Section 3.6 we derive welfare results and in
Section 3.7 we conclude.
45Similar contributions, but with a di erent objective, are Telser (1960) and Jullien and Rey (2007).
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3.2 The Model
Our model consists of three types of agents: Manufacturers, retailers and consumers.
Manufacturers. We consider two manufacturers, denoted by i = 1, 2, who produce
di erentiated brands at a constant marginal cost equal to zero. The manufacturers need
retailers in order to sell their goods to consumers. Manufacturers simultaneously choose
whether to adopt exclusive retailing (ER) or non-exclusive retailing (NER). We define ER
as selling exclusively to one retailer, while NER implies that the manufacturer sells to all
retailers. After choosing the specific distribution system, the manufacturers are assumed
to set a linear wholesale price wi.46
Four di erent distribution systems can potentially arise:47 (i) Both manufacturers choose
NER (N/N). (ii) One of the manufacturers chooses NER, while the other manufacturer
chooses ER (E/N). (iii) Both manufacturers choose ER (E/E) and both manufacturers
choose di erent retailers. Hence, both retailers are active on the market, each reselling
one brand. (iv) Both manufacturers choose ER and both manufacturers sell their brand
via the same retailer. As a result, the other retailer is foreclosed from the market, while
the first retailer has monopoly power over the whole market. The fourth case is excluded
from our subsequent analysis, as we believe that such a monopolization of the market
(which in fact yields the highest industry profits) would always be banned by competition
authorities.48
Retailers. There are two retailers, denoted by j = A, B, who are active on the retail
market with a constant marginal cost of reselling equal to zero. Hence, their perceived
marginal cost consists only of the wholesale price wi. The retailers are assumed to be un-
di erentiated. That is, consumers are indi erent between retailers, but they di erentiate
among brands. We assume retailers to compete in prices. Retailers can undertake brand-
specific demand-enhancing investments. The investment raises the consumers valuation
for a specific brand regardless of which retailer conducts the investment. ◊ij denotes in-
vestment by retailer j in brand i and ◊i is the sum of investments by both retailers in brand
i. The investment is not contractible. Following our example from above, the investment
46The use of linear wholesale prices can be justified by our focus on ‘innovative’ industries. Such
industries are usually associated with high degrees of uncertainty and asymmetric information regarding
product quality (compare, e.g., Beggs, 1992, and Dana and Spier, 2001). Linear prices can serve as a
tool to share the risk among trading parties. Moreover, linear wholesale prices are widely used in the
literature, e.g. Arya et al. (2008), Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) as well as Inderst and Valletti (2009).
A more thorough discussion follows at the end of this chapter.
47For a graphical illustration of the distribution systems see Appendix C.1.
48In principle, we can achieve the same results in a n ◊ m model, where n is the number of manu-
facturers and m is the number of retailers. However, in an equilibrium where all manufacturers adopt
exclusivity, m > n implies that some of the retailers are foreclosed from the market. Moreover, in the
same equilibrium, n > m implies that at least one retailer has to sell two brands exclusively. This elim-
inates any competition between the two respective brands, which is equivalent to distribution system
(iv).
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can be thought of as marketing e ort undertaken by mobile service providers into a spe-
cific handset/brand. Marketing for specific handsets by a mobile service provider can be
more e cient than by the handset manufacturer itself, depending on the brand value in
the mobile service sector as well as the available marketing technologies. Marketing e ort
is hard to contract on as the actual value of a marketing campaign depends on many ‘soft’
factors. The investment cost is assumed to be retailer- as well as brand-specific and given
by C (◊ij) = 12Ki◊2ij. Ki expresses the slope of the marginal cost of investment and might
di er among brands, but not among retailers. For example, manufacturers having a high
brand value in the mobile service sector are associated with a relatively high Ki, while
manufacturers with a low brand value within the sector are associated with a relatively
small Ki. In other words, retail investment is more e cient for manufacturers with just
a weak brand value. For most of the analysis we analyze the case with (K1 = K2 © K),
that is, symmetric brands. In Section 3.5 we consider a case with asymmetric brands
(K1 ”= K2).49
Consumers. We assume the following linear demand system that can be derived from a
quadratic utility function as it is used in Singh and Vives (1984). Demand for brand 1 is
given by q1 (p1, p2) and demand for brand 2 by q2 (p2, p1), with
q1 (p1, p2) = –≠ —p1 + “p2 + ◊1 and q2 (p2, p1) = –≠ —p2 + “p1 + ◊2,
where – = 1≠d/1≠d2, — = 1/1≠d2, “ = d/1≠d2 and ◊i = ◊iA + ◊iB. The parameter d ‘ (0, 1)
represents the degree of product homogeneity. As d approaches 0, the brands of the two
manufacturers become independent. As d approaches 1, the brands become completely
homogeneous. In the remainder we will sometimes refer to a market with rather homoge-
neous brands as a market with tough (interbrand) competition. When both retailers sell
the same brand and set the same price, demand is divided equally between both retail-
ers. The investment ◊i can be thought of as increasing the relative valuation for brand 1
relative to brand 2. This implies that raising ◊i has no direct e ect on the demand for
brand j.
Timing. At stage 1 both manufacturers choose simultaneously their distribution chan-
nel(s). At stage 2 manufacturers set wholesale prices to one or both of the retailers,
depending on the choice at stage 1. At stage 3 retail companies undertake the demand
enhancing marketing investments. At stage 4 retail companies compete.
49We assume Ki not to be too small in order to ensure that the model is well defined!
Ki > 4(1≠d2)/(8≠4d≠2d2+d3)
"
.
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3.3 Characterization of Distribution Systems
As we show below, all the distribution systems mentioned above can occur as an equi-
librium outcome in our model: N/N , E/N and E/E. In this section, we characterize
these equilibria with respect to prices, retail investment and profits. Before we do so,
we introduce a framework in order to disentangle the di erent e ects stemming from a
manufacturer’s exclusivity decision. Superscripts E/E and N/N describe the equilibrium
values in the E/E resp. N/N equilibrium. E/N describes the equilibrium values of the
brand which is sold exclusively via one retailer, while the competing manufacturer sells her
brands non-exclusively. In contrast, N/E describes the equilibrium values of the brand
not being sold exclusively, while the competing brand is sold exclusively. All equilibrium
values and results can be found in the Appendix.
Framework. We identify three sub-e ects from the introduction of ER: The double
markup e ect captures the unilateral price response to the exclusivity decision. The
competition softening e ect takes the competitive response to the double markup e ect
into account. Finally, the investment e ect captures the impact from retail investment
which is linked to the introduction of ER. We characterize the three e ects using the
case where only one manufacturer adopts ER relative to the situation without exclusivity
(N/N æ E/N), which serves as our benchmark case. The e ects from the introduction
of ER by the second brand (N/N æ E/E) are derived correspondingly and can be found
in the appendix.
(I) Double markup e ect. Exclusivity grants the downstream retailer a monopoly
in reselling the brand. This allows the retailer to increase the retail price above the
wholesale price and earn an additional markup. The double markup e ect captures the
unilateral e ect stemming from this retail market power. Conceptually, we define the
double markup e ect as the unilateral e ect stemming from the introduction of exclu-
sivity, neglecting the investment possibility and holding all the (wholesale and retail)
competitors’ choice variables constant. This allows us to abstract from any e ect result-
ing from the competition among manufacturers and to focus solely on the price increase
of the exclusive brand. Technically, we take the di erence of the variable of interest
in equilibrium with and without exclusivity, fixing all the choice variables of the com-
peting brand at the level without exclusivity and setting the investment level to zero,
fi
1
E/N | wj = wN/Nj , pj = pN/Nj , ◊i = 0
2
≠ fi (N/N), where fi (·) denotes the variable of
interest.
(II) Competition softening e ect. The competition softening e ect captures the
e ect from exclusivity which stems from the existence of interbrand competition, neglect-
ing any investment opportunities. Thus, while the double markup e ect is capturing
the unilateral e ect from exclusivity, the competition softening e ect captures the addi-
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tional bilateral e ect (or the competitive response) to the double markup e ect, neglect-
ing the investment possibility. Technically, the competition softening e ect is given by
fi (E/N | ◊i = 0) ≠ fi
1
E/N | wj = wN/Nj , pj = pN/Nj , ◊i = 0
2
. As the firms’ choice vari-
ables are strategic complements, the unilateral price increase due to the double markup
e ect is followed by a price increase by the competing firm. Hence, the competition
softening e ect captures the anticompetitive element of ER.
(III) Investment e ect. The investment e ect captures the e ect from investment
(induced by the exclusivity choice) on all the variables, taking into account the unilat-
eral as well as the bilateral e ect from retail market power. Technically, we derive the
investment e ect as the residual e ect (the total e ect net of the double markup as well
as the competition softening e ect), which is given by fi (E/N)≠ fi (E/N | ◊i = 0). The
investment e ect captures the pro-competitive element of ER.
We can now characterize the di erent equilibrium distribution systems.
Both manufacturers choose NER - (N/N). Under N/N , the outcome of the mar-
ket game coincides with a standard di erentiated Bertrand game: When both manu-
facturers distribute their brand non-exclusively, intrabrand competition exists for both
brands. Retail firms are undi erentiated and compete in prices. Hence, competition
drives down retail prices to the retailers’ marginal cost, which consists of the wholesale
price (p1 = w1, p2 = w2). Thus, retail companies do not make any profit (ﬁA = ﬁB = 0).
Retail investment is brand-specific, that is, regardless of which retailer undertakes the
investment, the demand enhancing e ect from investment a ects all retailers to the same
extent. As retail companies do not earn a positive retail margin, they do not have any
incentive to invest and hence, no investment takes place (◊1 = ◊2 = 0). Consequently,
manufacturers set their wholesale prices just as retail firms would not exist and the out-
come of the market game coincides with a standard di erentiated Bertrand game.
One manufacturer chooses ER and the other manufacturer chooses NER -
(E/N). When one of the manufacturers chooses exclusivity, intrabrand competition for
this brand is broken and a retail monopoly is created. While this changes the analysis
of the exclusive brand completely, the analysis of the retail and investment stage of the
nonexclusive brand remains identical to the N/N -case. We denote the exclusive brand by
1 and the nonexclusive brand by 2.
The adoption of ER by one retailer induces an increase of wholesale and retail prices of
both brands relative to the N/N -equilibrium as well as a positive retail investment level
and retail profit for the exclusive brand. The e ects in detail are as follows:
The monopoly right on the sale of brand 1 allows the exclusive retailer to raise the retail
price above the wholesale price and to gain a positive retail margin, while the wholesale
price stays constant (double markup e ect). As for brand 2 intrabrand competition still
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exists, no extra retail margin can be gained here.
Retail prices are strategic complements. Hence, the nonexclusive brand raises its retail
as well as its wholesale price.50 The price increase of the nonexclusive brand softens in-
terbrand competition in the market and gives the exclusive retailer and the manufacturer
scope to set higher prices (competition softening e ect).
As investment is retailer-specific now, the exclusive retailer can recoup some of the benefit
from investment and faces an increased incentive to invest. A positive investment level in
brand 1 can be observed, while no investment is undertaken in brand 2 (◊ú1 > 0, ◊ú2 = 0).
Investment increases the consumers’ valuation of the brand, which in turn makes a higher
retail and wholesale price of the exclusive brand optimal. Due to the strategic comple-
mentarity of retail prices, the nonexclusive brand’s prices also increase (investment e ect).
As all three e ects have a positive impact on prices and no intrabrand competition exists
for brand 1 anymore, the profit of the exclusive retailer increases. As for brand 2 intra-
brand competition still exists, no retail profits can be made on the sale of this brand.
Moreover, the profit of manufacturer 2 increases due to the higher price level and hence,
weaker interbrand competition. However, the e ect on the profit of manufacturer 1 is am-
biguous as the double markup e ect decreases profits, while the other two e ects increase
the manufacturer’s profit.
Both manufacturers choose ER - (E/E).When both manufacturers choose exclusiv-
ity in selling their brands, they break intrabrand competition for both brands and create
monopolies on the downstream market for selling the particular brand. According to the
same reasoning from above, this means higher prices, investments and retail profits for
both brands relative to the N/N -regime. However, this is not necessarily true relative to
the E/N -regime as the three e ects of exclusivity partly change when both manufacturers
adopt ER.
Both retailers have a monopoly right on the sale of ‘their’ brand. Consequently, both re-
tailers can raise the retail price above the wholesale price and gain a positive retail margin,
while both wholesale prices stay constant. As this double markup e ect is constructed
as a unilateral e ect, the impact is exactly the same as under the E/N regime. But this
time, both retail prices increase and not only one of them (double markup e ect).
The competition softening e ect is stronger on all (wholesale and retail) prices compared
to the E/N -equilibrium. Due to the reciprocal adoption of ER both retail prices are
higher and hence, the competitive price adjustment is stronger (competition softening ef-
fect).
Investment has become retailer-specific for both retailers. That is, both retailers invest
in ‘their’ respective brand. Individual investment levels are higher relative to when only
50As interbrand competition for brand 2 still exists, pN/E2
1
wN/E2
2
= wN/E2 . Hence, when manufacturer
2 raises the wholesale price, the retail price increases by the same amount, ˆpN/E2 /ˆwN/E2 = 1.
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one retailer undertakes the investment: The demand enhancing investment increases the
quantity which consumers are willing to purchase at a given price. In the E/E-regime the
price level is already higher relative to the E/N regime (both without investment). So is
the retail margin and investment is more lucrative. Moreover, higher investment levels
also lead to a retail price increase, which again increases the retail margin and hence,
investment incentives. The higher investment level has a positive impact on all prices
relative to the N/N regime.
However, the impact relative to the E/N regime is ambiguous: For a very e cient in-
vestment technology (very low values of K), it becomes lucrative for the manufacturer to
decrease the wholesale price in order to increase the retail margin and hence, incentivize
additional investment. In other words, the e ect of investment on a manufacturer’s sales
are so high that it overcompensates the wholesale price decrease. Nevertheless, this e ect
is not strong enough to overcompensate the positive impact on prices through the double
markup and competition softening e ect as shown in Proposition 3.1 (investment e ect).
In sum, all equilibrium values under the E/E regime are higher than under the N/N
regime. Moreover, the retail prices, investments and profits under the E/E-regime are
also higher compared to the E/N-regime. However, this is not necessarily true for the
wholesale prices as is shown in the next section. In addition, we can say that the adoption
of exclusivity by the manufacturer of a nonexclusive brand has a positive impact on the
profit of a manufacturer who has also adopted ER.
Equilibrium comparison. The following Proposition compares retail as well as whole-
sale prices, investment levels and retail profits in the three di erent equilibria and sum-
marizes the results we have described in this section. The comparison of wholesale profits
can be found in Section 3.4.
Proposition 3.1. [Equilibrium Comparison] Retail as well as wholesale prices, retail
profits and investment levels are highest when both manufacturers adopt exclusive retailing
and lowest when both firms do not adopt exclusive retailing. In the asymmetric distribution
regime, the retail price, the investment level and the retail profit of the exclusive brand are
higher relative to the nonexclusive brand. In contrast, the wholesale price of the exclusive
brand is lower relative to the nonexclusive brand. That is,
pi : pE/Ei > p
E/N
i > p
N/E
i > p
N/N
i
wi : wE/Ei >(ú) w
N/E
i > w
E/N
i > w
N/N
i
◊i : ◊E/Ei > ◊
E/N
i > ◊
N/E
i = ◊
N/N
i
ﬁRetaili : ﬁ
E/E
i > ﬁ
E/N
i > ﬁ
N/E
i = ﬁ
N/N
i .
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(ú) If and only if K > K¯ = (4≠2d≠5d2+2d3+d4)/(4≠d2).
Proof. See Appendix.
Generally, we can say that a higher degree of exclusivity leads to higher prices at the
wholesale and at the retail stage as well as to higher retail profits. In addition, also the
investment level increases.
All three e ects stemming from ER a ect the retail price positively. Hence, it is not sur-
prising that the retail price is increasing with exclusivity. But it should be noted that the
retail price of the exclusive brand in the asymmetric equilibrium is higher than the retail
price of the nonexclusive brand. This is because the double markup and the investment
e ect a ect the retail price of the exclusive brand directly while the retail price of the
nonexclusive brand is a ected only indirectly via the competition softening as well as the
investment e ect due to the strategic complementarity of retail prices.
The opposite result can be observed for the wholesale prices. As described above, the
double markup e ect does not a ect any of the wholesale prices, but both wholesale
prices are a ected by the competition softening and the investment e ect. However, the
sum of these e ects is stronger on the wholesale price of the nonexclusive brand than on
the wholesale price of the exclusive brand. As for the former no retail margin exists, the
price responses by the manufacturer are always more extreme and hence, the e ects are
stronger.51 However, the wholesale price under the E/E-regime is only higher relative to
the N/E-regime, whenever K is not extremely small
1
K > K¯
2
. If this was the case, retail
investment is so e cient that it is optimal for the manufacturer to give the retail company
additional incentives to invest by lowering the wholesale price and hence, leave the retail
company a larger share of the joint profit. This e ect is stronger under the E/E-regime
as investment incentives are higher relative to the E/N regime.52
Investment in a brand is zero whenever the manufacturer has not adopted exclusivity,
while the investment level is positive when exclusivity has been adopted. Moreover, the
investment level in a brand increases when also the competing brand adopts exclusivity
as investment levels are strategic complements. The adoption of exclusivity by the com-
peting manufacturer increases the price level and retail margin in the market and hence,
softens competition. A higher retail margin makes investment more lucrative, as invest-
ment increases sales (for a given price) which are associated with a higher retail margin
now. Hence, investment incentives and eventually, investment levels are higher.
Finally, the retail profit is zero whenever the retailer does not have an exclusive distri-
bution right, and positive when he has one. Moreover, the retail profit is higher when
51The exclusive manufacturer faces a trade-o  when increases wE/N . On the one hand, it allows the
manufacturer to extract more of the joint profit. On the other hand, it exaggerates the double markup
problem
!
ˆpE/N/ˆwE/N > 0
"
and decreases the investment activity of the retailer.
52Note that this additional constraint
!
K¯
"
is just slightly stronger than the constraints implied by
the SOCs. So, this case appears only for extremely e cient retail investment technologies. Moreover, it
should be noted that for these values the E/E-regime would arise endogenously.
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both manufacturers have adopted ER relative to when only one manufacturer has done
so
1
ﬁE/Ei > ﬁ
E/N
i
2
: Interbrand competition is weakest when both manufacturers have
adopted ER due to the double markup as well as competition softening e ect. Weaker
competition allows retail firms to increase their retail price and hence, they can earn a
higher margin and profit.
3.4 Endogenous Choice of Distribution System
The preceding analysis has taken the distribution system as given. In this section, we
show that all the contractual solutions, we described in the last section, can arise as the
equilibrium outcome of this game. As mentioned above, the manufacturers choose non-
cooperatively whether they sell their brand exclusively or non-exclusively at the beginning
of this game. The Nash equilibrium in this stage depends on the relative size of the
manufacturers’ equilibrium profits, ﬁE/Ei , ﬁ
N/N
i , ﬁ
E/N
i and ﬁ
N/E
i .
The following Proposition states our main result regarding the existence of the di erent
first stage equilibria.
Proposition 3.2. [Endogenous Choice of Distribution System] There exist three equilibria
in pure strategies in this game, given di erent combinations of d and K:
(i) Both manufacturers do not adopt exclusive retailing.
(ii) One manufacturer adopts exclusive retailing and the other manufacturer does
not adopt exclusive retailing.
(iii) Both manufacturers adopt exclusive retailing.
In addition, multiple equilibria of type (i) and (iii) exist for some parameter combinations.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Figure 3.1, we can observe that all three equilibria emerge for a rather substantial pa-
rameter space. Notice that the investment cost has to be su ciently convex (Ki has to be
large enough) to establish an equilibrium. In the white area in Figure 3.1 this ‘convexity
condition’ is not fulfilled and no equilibrium can be established. The occurrence of the
di erent equilibria can be explained quite intuitively using the manufacturers rationale
for ER and how it is a ected by the intensity of competition d and the investment cost
K.
If the retail investment technology is very e cient (low K), the benefit for the manufac-
turer from ER through the investment e ect is larger than the cost from ER through the
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double markup e ect. But if the investment becomes more expensive (K increases), retail
investment becomes less important and hence, ER becomes less profitable or unprofitable.
Hence, for a low K ER is more profitable than for a high K and more firms adopt ER.53
Moreover, if interbrand competition is rather weak (low d), the retail markup under ER
is large as the competitive pressure on the exclusive retailer from the competing brand is
weak. Hence, the double markup e ect is large and ER is costly for the manufacturer.
However, if d is high, the competitive pressure on the retailer under ER from the compet-
ing brand is also high. Thus, the retail markup is small and ER becomes more lucrative.
When d is very high, ER is optimal for manufacturers even when retail investment is not
feasible (e.g. K æ Œ). With a very high d, the double markup e ect vanishes, but the
competition softening e ect prevails. Hence, manufacturers might adopt ER even without
the possibility of retail investment.
It remains to be explained, when and why only one and not the other manufacturer
adopts exclusivity for some parameter combinations and not for others.54 As can be seen
in Figure 3.1, for intermediate values of d and K one manufacturer has the incentive
to adopt exclusivity, given the other manufacturer does not adopt exclusivity. When
the first manufacturer chooses ER, the retail prices increase and interbrand competi-
tion in the market becomes softer. This raises the nonexclusive manufacturer’s profit1
ﬁN/EManufacturer > ﬁ
N/N
Manufacturer
2
. Hence, the e ect from ER on the second manufacturer’s
profit has to be stronger than for the first manufacturer, so that she actually adopts ER.
The adoption of ER is more profitable, when d is relatively higher or/and K is relatively
lower as then the cost/benefit of ER would be lower/higher (see above). Consequently,
combinations of d and K exist, so that one manufacturer adopts ER and the other man-
ufacturer does not do so.
53Note that the double markup as well as the competition softening e ect are not dependent on K by
construction.
54In more formal terms, we can say that for the parameter constellations leading to one of the symmetric
equilibria, the manufacturers’ incentive to (not) adopt exclusivity is a dominant strategy regardless of
what the competing manufacturer is doing. In contrast, for the parameter constellations leading to
the asymmetric equilibrium, the manufacturer’s decision to (not) adopt exclusivity is dependent on the
belief what the other manufacturer is doing. Hence, the competing manufacturers choice alters the own
optimality condition in such a way that a di erent decision becomes optimal. We are interested in how
the respective optimality conditions are altered.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the distribution systems arising in equilibrium under di erent
combinations of d and K.
3.5 Asymmetric Brands
In this section, we analyze manufacturers di ering in their associated retail investment
e ciency. That is, we assume that the cost of retail investment is di erent among brands
(K2 ”= K1). However, we continue to assume that retail firms are symmetric. This implies
that investment in one brand is cheaper than investment in the other brand, regardless
of the retail firm undertaking the investment. We define the di erence in the retail
investment cost by K2 ≠K1 =   > 0.
A natural and realistic interpretation of these assumptions is as follows: The parameterKi
can be interpreted as the e ciency of retail marketing relative to manufacturer marketing
in a certain brand. The e ciency of retail marketing usually depends on a manufacturer’s
brand reputation in a market and the marketing skills of the retailer. If a firm’s brand
reputation is well established in the market, retail investment might be ine ciently costly
(relative to marketing by the manufacturer itself) and hence, the respective cost parameter
Ki should be rather high. In contrast, if a manufacturer has recently entered a new
market and retail companies are well-established in that market, Ki should be rather low.
Moreover, manufacturers not having any direct contact to their final customers and selling
their products via retailers should be associated with a low Ki.55
Di erent retail marketing e ciencies among brands can appear, if an established brand
is already present in the market (high Ki), while another brand is a new entrant or
55As already mentioned above, the microchip producer Intel largely relies on marketing by its down-
stream retailers.
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without a high brand reputation in this market (low Ki). This reflects the situation in the
mobile phone industry as our leading example quite well. While the three largest mobile
handset producers in 2007 (Nokia, Samsung, Motorola) covered almost 2/3 of worldwide
sales, Apple was a newcomer in this market and LG as well as Palm only played a
minor role (see Gartner, 2007). This also implies that the large producers already had
established marketing channels and their products were well known, while the small and
new manufacturers might have lacked a high brand reputation or had to arrange new
marketing channels. Thus, for Apple, LG and Palm it was relatively more e cient to rely
on marketing by a third party already active in the mobile phone market. Referring to
the examples of ER in the mobile handset industry mentioned in the introduction, ER
has been used by these rather small or unknown mobile handset producers.
Our main result for asymmetric brands is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.3. [Asymmetric Brands] Suppose upstream manufacturers are asymmetric
with respect to the brand specific investment technology parameter, K1 ”= K2, then:
(i) The parameter space of the N/N -equilibrium and the parameter space, where
either the E/N- or the E/E-equilibrium occur does not change.
(ii) The parameter space where the E/N-equilibrium occurs increases to the ex-
pense of the parameter space where the E/E-equilibrium occurs.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the occurrence of the equilibrium outcomes for di erent values of  ,
with   = K2 ≠K1 and K = K1.
First, introducing asymmetric brands does not alter the parameter space of the N/N -
equilibrium. The value of Ki matters only for a firm actually adopting ER, as otherwise
no investment is undertaken. Hence, there is no change in the occurrence of the N/N -
equilibrium. Moreover, the introduction of asymmetric brands keeps the parameter space,
where either the E/N - or the E/E-equilibrium occurs, constant. This follows immediately
from the preceding result.
Second, the introduction of asymmetric brands increases the space, where the E/N -
equilibrium occurs and decreases the space of the E/E-equilibrium. Consequently, the
asymmetric equilibrium occurs for a larger set of parameters and the E/E-equilibrium for
a smaller set of parameters, the larger the asymmetry among brands. The intuition for
this is as follows. Suppose, we observe the E/E-equilibrium and raise the cost di erence
K2 ≠K1 by increasing K2: For manufacturer 1’s decision, whether or not to adopt ER,
nothing changes. But if the increase in K2 is su ciently large, exclusivity might not be
the optimal strategy for manufacturer 2 anymore and she chooses not to adopt ER. Hence,
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the larger the cost di erence K2 ≠ K1 , the larger is the ‘E/N space’ to the expense of
the ‘E/E space’. Notice that it is su cient to introduce a very small asymmetry for the
multiplicity of equilibria to disappear.
Figure 3.2: Asymmetric Brands: Illustration of the equilibrium distribution systems for
di erent asymmetries among brands (  : 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1).
BCG (2006) argues that exclusive retailing arrangements are largely used by small mobile
handset producers. Moreover, it can be observed frequently that ER is used directly after
the introduction of a new mobile handset, while it is abandoned when the handset has
been established in the market. A potential interpretation of these findings could be as
follows. The relative e ciency of retail marketing is most likely higher for new handsets
by rather small producers or by a new entrant in the market than for their well known
and large competitors
1
Ksmall/unkown < Klarge/established
2
. This makes ER more attractive
for new products or entrants than for established brands. Consequently, it is optimal
for the former to adopt ER, while most of the latter refrain from such arrangements.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this in the context of our model. That is, the larger the di erence
in the retail marketing e ciency, the larger is the parameter space where the asymmetric
equilibrium occurs. However, it could be argued, further, that once the new handset
receives recognition in the market the relative retail marketing e ciency decreases. That
is, the handset is better known, and its producer does not have to rely on marketing
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investment by its retailer. This means, while ER is often a profitable strategy just after
market entry, it is not profitable anymore after being present in the market for a longer
time. In our model, this would imply that the di erence in retail market e ciencies
became smaller
1
Ksmall/unkown ≠Klarge/established
2
¿ and so has the parameter space in
which the asymmetric equilibrium occurs.
3.6 Welfare Implications
As has been shown in the preceding analysis, a manufacturer trades of the cost (double
markup e ect) against the benefits from ER (investment e ect and strategic e ect) when
adopting ER. In contrast to this rationale, a welfare maximizing regulator trades o  the
pro-competitive e ect of ER (investment e ect) against the anticompetitive e ect of ER
(double markup e ect and the strategic e ect). This simple comparison already suggests
that a manufacturer’s interest in adopting ER is not aligned with a regulator’s interest,
rationalizing government intervention. In this section, we analyze this issue in more depth
using again the case of symmetric manufacturers.
The first part of our welfare result is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.4. [Consumer Surplus] Suppose manufacturers are symmetric:
(i) Consumer surplus is decreasing with exclusive retailing when only one manu-
facturer adopts ER and the other manufacturer does not adopt ER.
(ii) Consumer surplus is increasing with exclusive retailing, if and only if both
manufacturers adopt ER and the retail investment technology is su ciently
e cient.
Proof. See Appendix.
Graph (a) in Figure 3.3 illustrates these results. In the meshed area, consumers lose from
ER, while in the remaining area consumers benefit from ER (given the manufacturer(s)
adopt ER).
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Figure 3.3: Consumer Surplus (a): Inside (outside) the meshed area, consumer surplus is
lower (higher) under ER. Welfare (b): Inside (outside) the meshed area, welfare is lower
(higher) under ER.
(a) (b)
A more e cient retail investment technology results in a higher investment e ect, which
unambiguously increases consumer surplus. This e ect has to be strong enough to counter
the price increase from the double markup as well as the competition softening e ect,
which unambiguously decrease consumer surplus. As is shown in Proposition 3.1, (indi-
vidual and total) retail investment is lower in the E/N -regime than in the E/E-regime
and so is the investment e ect. This smaller investment e ect under E/N turns out be
insu cient to counter the two other e ects which decrease consumer surplus. Hence, the
adoption of ER by one manufacturer always harms consumers (Prop. 3.4 (i)), while it
benefits consumers when it is adopted by both manufacturers and investment is relatively
e cient (Prop. 3.4 (ii)).
The second part of our welfare result is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.5. [Welfare] Suppose manufacturers are symmetric and the retail invest-
ment technology is su ciently e cient:
(i) In contrast to Proposition 3.4, welfare is also increasing with exclusive retail-
ing, if only one manufacturer adopts ER.
(ii) For exclusive retailing to be welfare enhancing, retail investment must be more
cost e cient the weaker the interbrand competition is.
Proof. See Appendix.
Graph (b) in Figure 3.3 the e ect of ER on welfare. In the meshed area, ER decreases
welfare, while in the remaining area ER increases welfare (given the manufacturer(s) adopt
ER).
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In order to understand this result, it is helpful to disentangle the separate e ects on
consumer and producer surplus: The investment e ect unambiguously increases consumer
and producer surplus. In contrast, the double markup and the competition softening e ect
unambiguously decrease welfare. However, while the double markup e ect is negative
on consumer as well as producer surplus, the competition softening e ect is sometimes
positive on producer surplus.
Furthermore, the overall harm caused by the double markup and the competition softening
e ect is decreasing in the intensity of competition. Therefore, in addition to the result on
consumer surplus, welfare is also increasing in exclusivity for a relatively high investment
cost and hence, a smaller investment e ect, given the competition is su ciently tough.
This can be easily seen by comparing the meshed areas in the two graphs of Figure 3.3.
Based on this analysis, we can make two observations, which are in contrast to Proposition
3.4: First, ER can also have a positive e ect on welfare in the E/N -regime, as the benefit
for producers from the investment e ect outweighs the harm caused by the double markup
as well as the competition softening e ect, if competition is not too weak.
Second, a negative relationship between the cost of investment K and the intensity of
competition d exists, for ER to be welfare enhancing. While the (positive) investment
e ect decreases with the investment cost, the adverse impact from the double markup
and the competition softening e ect decrease with tougher competition. Hence, ER turns
out to be welfare enhancing for a rather ine cient investment technology as long as
competition is su ciently tough. The right graph in Figure 3.3 illustrates when ER is
welfare enhancing and when not. In the meshed area, ER decreases welfare. In the
remaining area, ER enhances welfare (given the manufacturer(s) adopt ER).
3.7 Conclusion
This study has identified a new rationale for exclusive retailing agreements, combining
a pro- and an anticompetitive view of ER. ER comes at a cost for the manufacturer
as it distorts downstream competition, gives retail firms a margin and creates a double
markup problem. However, it is this retail margin that incentivizes downstream retailers
to invest in (pro-competitive) brand-specific marketing which benefits the manufacturer
of the brand. Moreover, the additional margin for the retail firm is a (anticompetitive)
commitment device for higher prices in the market and softer interbrand competition.
We analyze the equilibrium incentives for a manufacturer to adopt ER when inter- and
intrabrand competition exist. Therefore, we prove that parameter combinations exists
under which no manufacturer, one manufacturer and both manufacturers adopt ER. We
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find, the more e cient the retail investment technology and the tougher interbrand com-
petition, the more often ER arrangements can be observed. In addition, we characterize
each of these equilibria with respect to prices, investment levels and profits.
We find that manufacturers adopt ER too often from a welfare point of view. ER is
usually welfare enhancing, whenever retail investment is rather e cient and/or interbrand
competition is are rather tough. But if interbrand is su ciently weak and manufacturers
do not depend on retail marketing, such arrangements should be forbidden by competition
authorities.
We shall discuss the importance of some of the assumptions for our results in the re-
mainder. In our model, firms compete in prices. In principle, ER also occurs in a setup
where firms compete in quantities. However, the competition softening e ect would van-
ish, while the double markup and the investment e ect remain to exist.
Moreover, our results do not depend on the timing in our model. That is, all e ects in
this analysis continue to exist qualitatively when the manufacturer cannot commit to set
a wholesale price before the retail investment is undertaken.
Furthermore, we have only considered demand enhancing investments, increasing con-
sumers’ perceived quality of a brand. This kind of investment has always a positive e ect
on the competing firm’s profit. An interesting case would be to consider cost decreasing
investments as this would always have a negative e ect on the competitor’s profit.
It is noteworthy that our assumption on linear wholesale prices is central to our analysis.
This assumption causes the double markup and the competition softening e ect. If we
allow for non-linear wholesale tari s, both e ects vanish and any ine ciency stemming
from the introduction of exclusivity does not appear anymore. This assumption on the
pricing structure can be understood as the simplest possible way to model potential
downstream distortions caused through ER. Another possibility for modelling a similar
downstream distortion is the introduction of product di erentiation at the downstream
stage. The introduction of ER would restrict the product variety in the industry and
hence, harm consumers and welfare.
In addition, empirical as well as theoretical evidence justifies our assumption on linear
wholesale prices. Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003), Milliou and Petrakis (2007), and Milliou,
Petrakis and Vettas (2009) o er support for the use of simple, linear contracts in vertical
trading relationships. They find that the distribution of bargaining power between the
contracting parties, the ability to renegotiate contracts and product non-specifiability play
an important role for the superiority of linear wholesale prices. Chintagunta, Liu and
Zhu (2011) provide evidence that linear wholesale prices are widely used between mobile
handset producers and wireless carriers. Linear wholesale tari s can also be observed
in other retail sectors. The U.K. Competition Commission produced evidence in its
2007 Groceries Market investigation on the usage of linear wholesale prices in the British
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groceries market (see, e.g., Competition Commission, 2007).
Finally, we should mention that another interesting project for future research would be to
explicitly include upstream market entry in our framework. New market entrants should
be particularly dependent on third party marketing investment. As we have shown, ER
serves as an instrument to incentivize such investment and hence, might have an entry
promoting e ect.
Appendix A
A.1 Preliminary Definitions.
(I) Feasible capacity.   describes the feasible capacity and  1 describes the feasible
baseload capacity in the market. It is given by
  =
I
X,
L,
if X Æ L
if X > L
,  1 =
I
X1,
L,
if X1 Æ L
if X1 > L
.
The feasible peakload capacity is given by  ≠  1.
(II) Spot market definitions. The di erent critical spot market realizations are defined
as follows.
◊X1 : P
!
X1, ◊
X1
"≠ c1 = 0, ◊X1· : P 1X1, ◊X1· 2≠ (c1 + ·) = 0
◊X1 : P
1
X1, ◊X1
2
≠ c = 0, ◊X1· : P
1
X1, ◊X1·
2
≠ (c1 + ·) = 0
◊X : P
!
X, ◊X
"≠ c = 0, ◊X· : P !X, ◊X· "≠ (c1 + ·) = 0
◊L : P
!
L, ◊L
"≠ c = 0, ◊L· : P !L, ◊L· "≠ (c1 + ·) = 0
◊M1 : P
!
 1, ◊M1
"≠ c1 = 0, ◊· : P (0, ◊· )≠ (c1 + ·) = 0
◊M1 : P
1
 1, ◊M1
2
≠ c = 0, ◊M : P ! , ◊M"≠ c = 0
Remember that the actual size of the transmission line T di ers from the nominal size
L. The frequency of the capacity is denoted by g (T ), its support is given by [≠‘,+‘],
and its cumulative distribution is denoted by G (T ). If the size of the transmission and
generation capacities is su ciently di erent, that is, |X ≠ L| > ‘, the former (latter) is
larger (smaller) with probability 1 (0). However, if transmission and generation capacities
are su ciently close, the uncertainty of the transmission line also a ects the relative size of
the generation and transmission capacities. G (.) is the probability that the transmission
line is binding before the generation capacity is and 1≠ G (.) is the probability that the
generation capacity is binding before the transmission line is doing so. Formally, we assign
the following probabilities
G (X ≠ L) =
Y__]__[
0,
1,
(0, 1) ,
if L≠X > ‘
if X ≠ L > ‘
otherwise
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(III) Spot market profits and welfare under simultaneous market clearing.
In this section, we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as
welfare for di erent spot markets. W (X,X1, L, ◊) denotes the economy’s welfare and
ﬁi (x, x1, l, ◊) the profit of a generator.
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊, ◊M1
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) =
ˆ Q
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = 0
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M1 , ◊M1
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L))
ˆ X1
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv +G (X1 ≠ L)
ˆ L
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L)) (P (X1, ◊)≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M1 , ◊M
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 +Q≠ L))
Aˆ X1+Q
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ X1+Q
X1
cdv
B
+G (X1 +Q≠ L)
Aˆ L
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ L
X1
cdv
B
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 +Q≠ L)) (P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1)x1 +G (X1 +Q≠ L) (c≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M , ◊
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) = (1≠G (X ≠ L))
Aˆ X
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ X
X1
cdv
B
+G (X ≠ L)
Aˆ L
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ L
X1
cdv
B
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = (1≠G (X ≠ L)) ((P (X, ◊)≠ c1)x1 + (P (X, ◊)≠ c) (x≠ x1))
+G ((X ≠ L)) (c≠ c1)x1
(IV ) Spot market profits and welfare under sequential market clearing. In
this section, we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as
welfare for di erent spot markets. W (X,X1, L, ◊) denotes the economy’s welfare and
ﬁi (x, x1, l, ◊) the profit of a generator at spot market realization ◊. Notice that welfare
under sequential market clearing only di ers from welfare in simultaneous market clearing
as the generators’ choice variables Q (· (L)), X1 (· (L)) and X (· (L)) are now depending
on the transmission fee (· (L)) which has to be taken into account. In addition, the
critical spot market realizations are also a ected by the transmission fee.
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• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊, ◊
M1
·
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) =
ˆ Q(·(L))
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = 0
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊
M1
· , ◊M1·
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L))
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv +G (X1 ≠ L)
ˆ L
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = (P (X1, ◊)≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M1· , ◊
M
·
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 +Q≠ L))
Aˆ X1(·(L))+Q(·(L))
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ X1(·(L))+Q(·(L))
X1(·(L))
cdv
B
+G (X1 +Q≠ L)
Aˆ L
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ L
X1(·(L))
cdv
B
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = (P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M· , ◊
È
W (X,X1, L, ◊) = (1≠G (X ≠ L))
Aˆ X(·(L))
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ X(·(L))
X1(·(L))
cdv
B
+G (X ≠ L)
Aˆ L
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ L
X1(·(L))
cdv
B
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = (P (X, ◊)≠ c1)x1 + (P (X, ◊)≠ c) (x≠ x1)
A.2 Proof of Remark 1.1
(I) Welfare and first order conditions. The previous results enable us to derive
overall welfare. It is obtained by the integral over all spot markets.
W (X,X1, L) =
ˆ ◊
◊
W (X,X1, L, ◊) dF (◊)≠ k1x1 ≠ k (x≠ x1)≠ tl
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Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ◊. The first derivatives are
given by:
WX = (1≠G (X ≠ L))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ k
WX1 = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L))
ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
(P (X1, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+
ˆ ◊
◊M
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ (k ≠ k1)
WL = G (X1 ≠ L)
ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
(P (L, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊) +G (X1 +Q≠ L)
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
+G (X ≠ L)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ t
(II) Equilibrium. In equilibrium the first derivatives have to be equal to zero. Hence,
the transmission line and total generation capacity have to be of the same size:
Xú = Lú
This is
WX (Xú, Xú1 , Lú) +WL (Xú, Xú1 , Lú) =
ˆ ◊
◊X
(P (Xú, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ (k + t) = 0 (A.1)
WX1 (Xú, Xú1 , Lú) =
ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
(P (Xú1 , ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊
◊X1
(c≠ c1) dF (◊) (A.2)
≠ (k1 ≠ k) = 0
(III) Uniqueness. As in equilibrium Xú = Lú has to hold, it is su cient to check the
second order conditions only for the joint equilibrium conditions from (II) with respect
to X and X1. The second derivatives are given by
WXX (Xú, Xú1 , Lú) +WLL (Xú, Xú1 , Lú) =
ˆ ◊
◊X
Pq (Xú, ◊) dF (◊) < 0
WX1X1 (Xú, Xú1 , Lú) =
ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
Pq (Xú1 , ◊) +
ˆ ◊X
◊X1
Pq (Xú1 +Q, ◊) < 0
WXX1 (Xú, Xú1 , Lú) = 0
It is easy to see that the absolute value of the cross derivatives is smaller than the absolute
value of any of the second derivatives
| Wxx (X,X1, L) |, | Wx1x1 (X,X1, L) |>| Wxx1 (X,X1, L) |
Hence, the product of the cross derivatives is smaller than the product of the second
derivatives:
ﬁxx (X,X1, L) · ﬁx1x1 (X,X1, L) > 0
That is, the first order conditions describe a unique equilibrium.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 1.1
(I) Preliminaries: Profits and first order conditions. The results for the spot
market equilibria enable us to derive the investors’ overall profits. It is obtained by the
integral over all spot markets. For generators this is given by:
ﬁi (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ◊
◊
ﬁi (x, x1, l, ◊) dF (◊)≠ k1x1 ≠ k (x≠ x1) (A.3)
Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ◊. The first derivatives are
given by:
ﬁx = (1≠G (X ≠ L))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ k
ﬁx1 = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L))
ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
(P (X1, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X1 +Q≠ L))
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+G (X1 +Q≠ L)
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ (k1 ≠ k)
The first derivative with respect to the optimal transmission line is already given in the
proof of 1.1:
WL = G (X1 ≠ L)
ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
(P (L, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊) +G (X1 +Q≠ L)
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
+G (X ≠ L)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ t
(II) Equilibrium. The equilibrium equates the first derivatives to zero. Hence, in
equilibrium, transmission and generation capacity have to be of equal size:
Xˆ = Lˆ
This is
ﬁX =
1
1≠G
1
Xˆ ≠ Lˆ
22 ˆ ◊
◊X
1
P
1
Xˆ, ◊
2
≠ c
2
dF (◊)≠ k = 0 (A.4)
ﬁX1 =
ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
1
P
1
Xˆ1, ◊
2
≠ c1
2
dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊
◊X1
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ (k1 ≠ k) = 0 (A.5)
WL = G
1
Xˆ ≠ Lˆ
2 ˆ ◊
◊X
1
P
1
Lˆ, ◊
2
≠ c
2
dF (◊)≠ t = 0 (A.6)
Comparing equations (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6) with the first order conditions of the socially
optimal investment (A.1) and (A.2), it is straightforward to see that investment under
simultaneous market clearing leads to the socially optimal investment outcome.
(III) Uniqueness. The first oder conditions are identical to the first order conditions
characterizing the socially optimal investment (Remark 1.1). As we have shown, these
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characterize a unique equilibrium. Hence, also the first order conditions under (II) do.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1.2
A.4.1 Preliminaries: Balanced Budget
We assume that the regulator has to fulfill the following budget balancing equation:
BB : ≠ ´ ◊X·◊L·
´ Qú(·(L),◊)
L (P (L, ◊)≠ c≠ · (L)) dydF (◊)≠
´ ◊
◊X·
´X(·(L))
L (P (L, ◊)≠ c≠ · (L)) dydF (◊)
+
´ ◊X1·
◊· Q
· (· (L) , ◊) · (L) dF (◊) +
´ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
X1 (· (L)) · (L) dF (◊)
+
´ ◊L·
◊
X1
·
(X1 (· (L)) +Qú (· (L))) · (L) dF (◊) +
´ ◊¯
◊L·
L· (L) dF (◊)≠ tL = 0
(A.7)
This equation implies that the revenues from the transmission fee are equal to the invest-
ment cost and the cost to run the adjustment market.
A.4.2 Market generation investment
(I) Preliminaries: Profits and first order conditions. The results for the spot
market equilibria enable us to derive the investors’ overall profits. It is obtained by the
integral over all spot markets. For generators this is given by:
ﬁi
!
xB , xP , l
"
=
ˆ ◊
◊
ﬁi
!
xB , xP , l, ◊
"
dF (◊)≠ k1x1 ≠ k (x≠ x1) (A.8)
Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ◊. The first derivatives are
given by:
ﬁx (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ◊
◊X·
(P (X, ◊)≠ · ≠ c) dF (◊)≠ k
ﬁx1 (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
(P (X1, ◊)≠ · ≠ c1) dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊X·
◊
X1
·
(P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ · ≠ c1) dF (◊)
+
ˆ ◊
◊X·
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ (k1 ≠ k)
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(II) Equilibrium. The equilibrium equates the first derivatives to zero. This is
X˜ :
ˆ ◊
◊X·
!
P
!
X˜, ◊
"≠ · ≠ c" dF (◊)≠ k = 0 (A.9)
X˜1 :
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
!
P
!
X˜1, ◊
"≠ · ≠ c1" dF (◊) + ˆ ◊
◊
X1
·
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ (k1 ≠ k) = 0 (A.10)
(III) Uniqueness. The second derivatives are given by
ﬁx1x1 (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
2Pq
!
X˜1, ◊
"
dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊X·
◊
X1
·
2Pq
!
X˜1 +Q, ◊
"
dF (◊) < 0
ﬁxx (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ◊
◊X·
2Pq
!
X˜, ◊
"
dF (◊) < 0
ﬁxx1 (x, x1, l) = 0
As is easy to see, the absolute value of the cross derivatives is smaller than the absolute
value of any of the second derivatives and hence, the product of the cross derivatives is
smaller than the product of the second derivatives
|ﬁxx1 (x, x1, l)| < |ﬁxx (x, x1, l)| , |ﬁx1x1 (x, x1, l)|
ﬁxx (x, x1, l) · ﬁx1x1 (x, x1, l) > 0.
That is, the first order conditions describe an unique equilibrium.
A.4.3 Optimal transmission line investment
(I) Welfare. The results for the spot market welfare enable us to derive the investors’
overall profits. It is obtained by the integral over all spot markets. Welfare is given by
W (X,X1, L) =
ˆ ◊
◊
W (X,X1, L, ◊) dF (◊)≠ k (X (· (L))≠X1 (· (L)))≠ k1X1 (· (L))≠ tL (A.11)
Taking the first derivative and rearranging gives:
WL =
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
· (L)Qú· (· (L)) ·L (L) dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
(P (X1 (· (L)) , ◊)≠ c1)X1· (· (L)) ·L (L) dF (◊)(A.12)
+
ˆ ◊L·
◊
X1
·
· (L) (X1· (· (L)) +Qú· (· (L))) ·L (L) dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊¯
◊
X1
·
(c≠ c1)X1· (· (L)) ·L (L) dF (◊)
+
ˆ ◊¯
◊L·
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ kX· (· (L)) ·L (L)≠ (k1 ≠ k)X1· (· (L)) ·L (L)≠ t
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(II) Balanced Budget. Taking the first derivative of the budget balancing equation
and rearranging gives
BBL =
´ ◊X1·
◊· · (L)Q·· (· (L) , ◊) ·L (L) dF (◊) +
´ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
· (L)X1· (· (L)) ·L (L) dF (◊)
+
´ ◊L·
◊
X1
·
· (L) (X1· (· (L)) +Qú· (· (L))) ·L (L) dF (◊) +
´ ◊¯
◊L·
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
≠kX· (· (L)) ·L (L) dF (◊)≠ t≠
´ ◊X·
◊L·
(P (L, ◊)≠ c≠ · (L))Qú· (· (L) , ◊) ·L (L) dF (◊)
≠ ´ ◊◊X· (P (L, ◊)≠ P (X, ◊))X· (· (L)) dF (◊) +
´ ◊X·
◊L·
Qú (· (L) , ◊) ·L (L) dF (◊)
+
´ ◊
◊X·
X (· (L)) ·L (L) dF (◊) +
´ ◊X1·
◊· Q
· (· (L) , ◊) ·L (L) dF (◊)
+
´ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
X1 (· (L)) ·L (L) dF (◊) +
´ ◊L·
◊
X1
·
(X1 (· (L)) +Qú (· (L))) ·L (L) dF (◊) = 0
(A.13)
We can now substitute BBL (expression (A.13)) into WL (expression (A.12)):
WL = ·L (L)
1´ ◊X·
◊L·
(P (L, ◊)≠ c≠ · (L))Qú· (· (L) , ◊) dF (◊) +
´ ◊
◊X·
(P (L, ◊)≠ P (X, ◊))X· (· (L)) dF (◊)
2
≠·L (L)
3´ ◊X·
◊L·
Qú (· (L) , ◊) dF (◊) +
´ ◊
◊X·
X (· (L) , ◊) dF (◊) +
´ ◊X1·
◊· Q
ú (· (L) , ◊) dF (◊)
4
≠·L (L)
3´ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
X1 (· (L)) dF (◊) +
´ ◊L·
◊
X1
·
(X1 (· (L)) +Qú (· (L))) dF (◊)
4
As all elements within the brackets are positive, the whole term is also positive. If we
determine the sign of ·L, we know the sign of WL. ·L is given by
·L =
1
t≠ ´ ◊◊L· (P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
23 ´ ◊X·
◊L·
Qú (· (L) , ◊) dF (◊) +
´ ◊
◊X·
X (· (L)) dF (◊)
+
´ ◊L·
◊
X1
·
((X1· (· (L)) +Qú· (· (L))) · (L) + (X1 (· (L)) +Qú (· (L)))) dF (◊)
+
´ ◊X1·
◊· (Q·· (· (L) , ◊) · (L) +Q· (· (L) , ◊)) dF (◊) +
´ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
(X1· (· (L)) · (L) +X1 (· (L))) dF (◊)
≠ ´ ◊X·◊L· ((P (L, ◊)≠ c≠ · (L))Qú· (· (L) , ◊)) dF (◊)≠
´ ◊
◊X·
(P (L, ◊)≠ c≠ · (L))X· (· (L)) dF (◊)
4≠1
Note that the second term is positive for ÷ Ø ≠1. Hence, the sign of ·L only depends on
the first term of the equation, that is,
sign ·L = sign
A
t≠
ˆ ◊
◊L·
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
B
, (A.14)
Thus, ·L also describes the size of the transmission line. In order to evaluate the size
of the transmission capacity relative to the generation stock, we subtract the first order
condition describing generation investment (expression (A.9)) from the term in brackets
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in expression (A.14).
ˆ ◊
◊L·
!
P
!
L˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊)≠ t≠ ˆ ◊
◊X·
!
P
!
X˜, ◊
"≠ · ≠ c" dF (◊) + k ? 0
We get:
(i) t Æ k + !1≠ F !◊X· "" · ∆ ·L Æ 0: The transmission line matches the generation capacity
(corner solution).
(ii) t > k + !1≠ F !◊X· "" · ∆ ·L > 0: The transmission line does not match the generation
capacity (interior solution).
Hence, given our assumption t < k on the transmission line, (i) always holds. That is,
the line capacity matches the generation capacity, X˜ = L˜. Q.e.d.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.1
This proposition compares the investment incentives under sequential market clearing
with the investment incentives under simultaneous market clearing. In order to show
whether under sequential market clearing investment incentives are stronger or weaker, it
is su cient to subtract the respective equilibrium conditions from each other. We start
with total capacity:
A.5.1 Total Generation Capacity
We evaluate the di erence between the first derivatives describing total capacity under
sequential market clearing (expression (A.9)) and under simultaneous market clearing
(expression (A.4) and expression (A.6)) evaluated at the sequential market clearing equi-
librium values, X˜ = L˜.
ˆ ◊¯
◊X·
!
P
!
X˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊)≠ ˆ ◊¯
◊X·
·dF (◊)≠ k
≠
ˆ ◊¯
◊X
!
P
!
X˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊) + (k + t) ? 0
Reformulating yields the following expression:
ˆ ◊X
◊
Q·
L˜
dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊X·
◊X
A
Q·
L˜
≠ P
!
L˜, ◊
"≠ c
·
B
dF (◊)
The first term is clearly positive. If the second term is also positive, the whole expression is
positive and hence, total capacity under sequential market clearing exceeds total capacity
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under simultaneous market clearing. The second term can be rewritten as
1
L·
´ ◊X·
◊X
´ ·
0 Q
· (v, ◊)
QcccaˆQ· (v, ◊)ˆ· vQ· (v, ◊)¸ ˚˙ ˝
=÷·
+1
Rdddb dvdF (◊)
≠ 1L·
´ ◊X·
◊X
´ L
0 P (v, ◊)
QccccaˆP (v, ◊)ˆL vP (v, ◊)¸ ˚˙ ˝
=÷≠1L
+ P (v, ◊)≠ c
P (v, ◊)¸ ˚˙ ˝
‘[0,1]
Rddddb dvdF (◊) .
This expression is positive, if ÷ Ø ≠1. Q.e.d.
A.5.2 Baseload Generation Capacity
Again, we evaluate the di erence between the first order conditions describing baseload
capacity under sequential market clearing (expression (A.10)) and under simultaneous
market clearing (expression (A.5)) evaluated at the equilibrium value under sequential
market clearing, X˜1.
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
X1
·
!
P
!
X˜1, ◊
"≠ · ≠ c1" dF (◊) + ˆ ◊¯
◊
X1
·
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ (k1 ≠ k)
≠
ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
!
P
!
X˜1, ◊
"≠ c1" dF (◊)≠ ˆ ◊¯
◊X1
(c≠ c1) dF (◊) + (k1 ≠ k) ? 0
Reformulating yields the following expression, which is weakly negative.
…
ˆ ◊X1·
◊X1
!
P
!
X˜1, ◊
"≠ · ≠ c" dF (◊)¸ ˚˙ ˝
Æ0
≠
ˆ ◊X1·
◊
X1
!
P
!
X˜1, ◊
"≠ c1" dF (◊)≠ ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
·
·dF (◊) Æ 0
Hence, baseload capacity is lower under sequential market clearing than under simulta-
neous market clearing.
A.5.3 Transmission Capacity
From the proof in subsection A.4.3 we know that for our assumption t < k the transmission
capacity always matches the generation capacity, that is, X˜ = L˜. Moreover, it has
also been shown in subsection A.5.1 that the generation capacity with sequential market
clearing exceeds the generation capacity with simultaneous market clearing, X˜ > Xˆ.
Hence, it holds that L˜ > Lˆ. Q.e.d.
However, if we allow for t > k, X˜ = L˜ does not necessarily hold. In order to understand
how this influences our result with respect to the transmission capacity, we again evaluate
the di erence between the first order conditions describing transmission capacity under
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sequential market clearing (expression (A.14)) and under simultaneous market clearing
(expression (A.6)) evaluated at the sequential market clearing equilibrium value L˜.
First-best line investment is given by
ˆ ◊
◊L
1
P
1
Lˆ, ◊
2
≠ c
2
dF (◊)≠ (k + t) = 0
Optimal investment under sequential market clearing is given by,
ˆ ◊
◊L·
!
P
!
L˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊)≠ t = 0
Subtracting these two expressions from each other and evaluating the di erence at the
equilibrium values under sequential market clearing gives:
SequentialMarketClearing˙ ˝¸ ˚ˆ ◊
◊L·
!
P
!
L˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊)≠ t≠
SimultaneousMarketClearing˙ ˝¸ ˚ˆ ◊
◊L
!
P
!
L˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊)≠ (k + t)
= ≠
ˆ ◊L·
◊L
!
P
!
L˜, ◊
"≠ c" dF (◊)¸ ˚˙ ˝
spotmarket distortion effect
+ k¸˚˙˝
sunk cost effect
.
If the equation above is greater than zero, it holds that X˜ > Xˆ. If it is smaller than zero,
the opposite is true, that is X˜ < Xˆ. Notice that the first and the second term of the
equation are independent of each other. Hence, for k large enough - everything else equal
- the former holds, otherwise the latter is true.
A.6 Generalization
A.6.1 Preliminary Definitions
(I) Definitions. For tractability, we now explicitly express the peakload capacity. That
is, L≠ L1 = L0 and X ≠X1 = X0 and  ≠  1 =  0, with
 1 =
I
X1,
L1,
if X1 Æ L1
if X1 > L1
,  0 =
I
X0,
L0,
if X0 Æ L0
if X0 > L0
.
As with the two-node network, the actual size of the transmission lines, T1 resp. T0,
di ers from their nominal size, L1 resp. L0. The frequencies, the support and the cdf
are denoted and given just as in the two-node network. Notice that the transmission line
uncertainties are independent among lines.
(II) Spot market profits and welfare under simultaneous market clearing. In
this section, we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as
welfare for di erent spot markets. W (X,X1, L, L1, ◊) denotes the economy’s welfare and
ﬁi (x, x1, l, l1, ◊) the profit of a generator.
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• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊, ◊M1
È
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ◊) =
ˆ Q
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ◊) = 0
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M1 , ◊M1
È
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
ˆ X1
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
+G (X1 ≠ L1)
ˆ L1
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1)) (P (X1, ◊)≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M1 , ◊M
È
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
Aˆ X1+Q
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ X1+Q
X1
cdv
B
+G (X1 ≠ L1)
Aˆ L1+Q
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ L1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ L1+Q
L1
cdv
B
ﬁ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1)) (P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M , ◊
È
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1)) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
Aˆ X
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ X
X1
cdv
B
+G (X1 ≠ L1) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
Aˆ L1+X0
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ L1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ L1+X0
L1
cdv
B
+(1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))G (X0 ≠ L0)
Aˆ X1+L0
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ X1+L0
X1
cdv
B
+G (X1 ≠ L1)G (X0 ≠ L0)
Aˆ L
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ L1
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ L
L1
cdv
B
ﬁ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ◊) = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1)) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0)) ((P (X, ◊)≠ c1)x1 + (P (X, ◊)≠ c)x0)
+G (X1 ≠ L1) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0)) (P (X1 + L0, ◊)≠ c1)x1
+(1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))G (X0 ≠ L0) (P (L1 +X0, ◊)≠ c)x0.
(III) Spot market profits and welfare under sequential market clearing. In
this section, we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as
welfare for di erent spot markets. W (X,X1, L, L1, ◊) denotes the economy’s welfare and
ﬁi (x, x1, l, l1, ◊) the profit of a generator. Notice that here we only state the generation
spot market profits for X1 Æ L1 and X0 Æ L0. As is shown below, this is the only relevant
case.
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• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊, ◊
M1
·
È
W (X,X1, L, L1◊) =
ˆ Qú(·(L))
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = 0
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊
M1
· , ◊M1·
È
W (X,X1, L, L1, ◊) =
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
(P (v, ◊)≠ c1) dv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, ◊) = (P (X1, ◊)≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M1· , ◊
M
·
È
W (X,X1, L, L1, ◊) =
ˆ X1(·(L))+Qú(·(L))
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ Qú(·(L))
0
cdv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, l1, ◊) = (P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1)x1
• at spot markets ◊‘
Ë
◊M· , ◊
È
W (X,X1, L, L1, ◊) =
ˆ „
0
P (v, ◊) dv ≠
ˆ X1(·(L))
0
c1dv ≠
ˆ „
X1(·(L))
cdv
ﬁ (x, x1, l, l1, ◊) = (P (X, ◊)≠ c1)x1 + (P (X, ◊)≠ c) (x≠ x1)
A.6.2 Proof of Remark 1.2.
Socially optimal investment
(I) Welfare and first order conditions. The previous results enable us to derive
overall welfare. It is obtained by the integral over all spot markets.
W (X1, X0, L1, L0) =
ˆ ◊
◊
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ◊) dF (◊)≠ k1x1 ≠ kx0 ≠ tl1 ≠ tl0 (A.15)
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Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ◊. The first derivatives are
given by:
WX1 = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
(P (X1, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1)) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))G (X0 ≠ L0)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X1 + L0, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ k1
WX0 = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1)) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
+G (X1 ≠ L1) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (L1 +X0, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ k
WL1 = G (X1 ≠ L1)
ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
(P (L1, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊) +G (X1 ≠ L1)
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(P (L1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+G (X1 ≠ L1) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (L1 +X0, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+G (X1 ≠ L1)G (X0 ≠ L0)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (L, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ t
WL0 = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))G (X0 ≠ L0)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X1 + L0, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
+G (X1 ≠ L1)G (X0 ≠ L0)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (L, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ t
(II) Equilibrium. In equilibrium, the first derivatives have to be equal to zero. Hence,
transmission and generation capacity have to be of the equal capacity:
Xú1 = Lú1 and Xú0 = Lú0
Using X ≠X1 = X0 and L≠ L1 = L0, this is
Xú :
ˆ ◊¯
◊X
(P (Xú, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ (k + t) = 0 (A.16)
Xú1 :
ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
(P (Xú1 , ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊) +
ˆ ◊¯
◊X1
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ (k1 ≠ k) = 0 (A.17)
(III) Uniqueness. As in equilibrium Xú = Lú and Xú1 = Lú1 have to hold, it is su cient
to check the second order conditions only for the joint equilibrium conditions from (II)
Appendix to Chapter 1 79
with respect to X and X1. The second derivatives are given by
WXX (X,X1, L, L1◊) +WLL (X,X1, L, L1◊) =
ˆ ◊
◊X
Pq (X, ◊) dF (◊) < 0
WX1X1 (X,X1, L, ◊) =
ˆ ◊X1
◊
X1
Pq (X1, ◊) +
ˆ ◊X
◊X1
Pq (X1 +Q, ◊) < 0
WXX1 (X,X1, L, ◊) = 0
As is easy to see, the absolute value of the cross derivatives is smaller than the absolute
value of any of the second derivatives
| Wxx (X,X1, L) |, | Wx1x1 (X,X1, L) |>| Wxx1 (X,X1, L) |
Hence, the product of the cross derivatives is smaller than the product of the second
derivatives:
ﬁxx (X,X1, L) · ﬁx1x1 (X,X1, L) > 0
That is, the first order conditions describe a unique equilibrium.
Investment under simultaneous market clearing
(I) Profits and first order conditions. The previous results enable us to derive overall
profits and welfare. These are obtained by the integral over all spot markets and given
by
ﬁi (x1, x0, l1, l0) =
ˆ ◊
◊
ﬁi (x1, x0, l1, l0, ◊) dF (◊)≠ k1x1 ≠ kx0 (A.18)
Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ◊. The first derivatives for
generation investment are given by:
ﬁX1 = (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
(P (X1, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(P (X1 +Q, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1)) (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))G (X0 ≠ L0)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X1 + L0, ◊)≠ c1) dF (◊)≠ k1
ﬁX0 = (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0)) (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
+ (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))G (X1 ≠ L1)
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (L1 +X0, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)
+G (X0 ≠ L0) (1≠G (X1 ≠ L1))
ˆ ◊
◊M
(P (X1 + L0, ◊)≠ c) dF (◊)≠ k
Appendix to Chapter 1 80
The first order conditions for the socially optimal transmission line investment are iden-
tical to those in section A.6.2.
(II) Equilibrium. The equilibrium equates the first derivatives to zero. Hence, in
equilibrium, transmission lines and generation capacity have to be of equal size:
Xˆ1 = Lˆ1 and Xˆ0 = Lˆ0
This is
ﬁX1 =
1
1≠G
1
Xˆ1 ≠ Lˆ1
22 ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
1
P
1
Xˆ1, ◊
2
≠ cB
2
dF (◊) (A.19)
+
1
1≠G
1
Xˆ1 ≠ Lˆ1
22 ˆ ◊M
◊M1
1
P
1
Xˆ1 +Q, ◊
2
≠ cB
2
dF (◊)
+
1
1≠G
1
Xˆ1 ≠ Lˆ1
22 ˆ ◊
◊M
1
P
1
Xˆ, ◊
2
≠ c1
2
dF (◊)≠ k1 = 0
ﬁX0 = (1≠G (X0 ≠ L0))
ˆ ◊
◊M
1
P
1
Xˆ, ◊
2
≠ cP
2
dF (◊)≠ k = 0 (A.20)
WL1 = G
1
Xˆ1 ≠ Lˆ1
2 ˆ ◊M1
◊
M1
1
P
1
Xˆ1, ◊
2
≠ c1
2
dF (◊) (A.21)
+G
1
Xˆ1 ≠ Lˆ1
2 ˆ ◊M
◊M1
(c≠ c1) dF (◊)
+G
1
Xˆ1 ≠ Lˆ1
2 ˆ ◊
◊M
1
P
1
Xˆ, ◊
2
≠ c1
2
dF (◊)≠ t
WL0 = G
1
Xˆ0 ≠ Lˆ0
2 ˆ ◊
◊M
1
P
1
Lˆ, ◊
2
≠ c
2
dF (◊)≠ t = 0 (A.22)
The sum of conditions (A.19) and (A.21) is identical to condition (A.17) and the sum of
conditions (A.20) and (A.22) is identical to condition (A.16). Hence, under simultaneous
market clearing the socially optimal investment outcome emerges. Q.e.d.
(III) Uniqueness. Conditions (A.19), (A.20), (A.21) and (A.22) are identical to the
conditions describing the socially optimal investment (expression (A.16) and (A.17)). As
we have shown, the latter constitute an unique equilibrium. Hence, also the first order
conditions (A.19), (A.20), (A.21) and (A.22) do. Q.e.d.
A.6.3 Proof of Proposition 1.2.
The generation profit function, the welfare function and the budget balancing equation are
identical to the respective functions in the two-node case (eq. (A.3), (A.7) and (A.11)).
Hence, given our assumption t < k on the transmission line, total transmission capacity
always matches total generation capacity, X˜ = L˜. Moreover, the transmission capacity at
any line never exceeds the generation capacity. This implies that L˜1 = X˜1 and L˜0 = X˜0.
Hence, the results from the two-node case also apply here. Q.e.d.
Appendix B
B.1 Preliminaries.
(I) Preliminaries: Utility function and demand system. The representative con-
sumer’s utility function is given by
U (qi, q≠i) = – (qi + q≠i)≠ 1/2
!
q2i + 2“qiq≠i + q2≠i
"
,
with, i, ≠i = 1, 2, i ”= ≠i. The respective demand system for product i is given by
qi (pi, p≠i) =
1
1 + “ –≠
1
1≠ “2 pi +
“
1≠ “2 p≠i.
Consequently, inverse demand is given by
pi (qi, q≠i) = –≠ pi ≠ “p≠i.
(II) Preliminaries: Welfare. Welfare in our model is given by the sum of consumer
surplus, upstream and downstream firm profits net the investment cost and the fixed
infrastructure cost of the upstream firm, taking the mode of downstream competition and
the vertical structure as given:
W = CS + + ﬁi + ﬁ≠i ≠ K2
!
 2i + 2≠i
"≠ F.
Given our linear demand system, consumer surplus can be expressed solely in terms of
market quantities,
CS = q2i + 2“qiq≠i + q2≠i.
Notice that for for all symmetric outcomes, consumer surplus can be expressed as
(1 + “)Q, with Q = qi + q≠i.
(III) Preliminaries: Upstream profit  . The profit function of the (regulated)
upstream monopolist is given by
  (Q) = wQ≠ F,
where w is the regulated upstream price and wQ = F .
(IV ) Preliminaries: Downstream profits under vertical separation ﬁi. The profit
function of downstream firm i for a given wholesale price w and investment  i under
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Cournot competition is
ﬁi (qi, q≠i) = (pi (qi, q≠i)≠ w ≠ c+ i) qi.
The respective profit function under Bertrand competition is given by
ﬁi (pi, p≠i) = (pi ≠ w ≠ c+ i) qi (pi, p≠i) .
(V ) Preliminaries: Profits under vertical integration,  , ﬁ1 and ﬁ2. In contrast to
vertical separation, the integrated firm - denoted by 1 - also considers its ‘upstream’ profit
  when choosing the optimal quantity q1 resp. price p1. The independent downstream
competitor - denoted by 2 - makes its choice as under vertical separation taking into
account that the integrated monopolist faces a lower perceived cost of production. The
profit functions for a given wholesale price w and investments,  1 and  2, under Cournot
competition are given by
  (q1, q2) + ﬁ1 (q1, q2) = wQ+ (p1 (q1, q2)≠ w ≠ c+ 1) q1 ≠ F
= wq2 + (p1 (q1, q2)≠ c+ 1) q1 ≠ F
ﬁ2 (q1, q2) = (p2 (q1, q2)≠ w ≠ c+ 2) q2.
The respective profit functions under Bertrand competition are given by
  (p1, p2) + ﬁ1 (p1, p2) = wQ (p1, p2) + (p1 ≠ w ≠ c+ 1) q1 (p1, p2)≠ F
= wq2 (p1, p2) + (p1 ≠ c+ 1) q1 (p1, p2)≠ F
ﬁ2 (p1, p2) = (p2 ≠ w ≠ c+ 2) q2 (p1, p2)
(V I) Preliminaries: Cournot downstream competition under vertical separa-
tion. In this section, we present the outcomes of the downstream competition for given
wholesale prices and investments depending on the ex ante investments, where qúi repre-
sents individual output of firm i, Qú represents market output and púi represents the price
of the good produced by firm i for i, ≠i = 1, 2, i ”= ≠i.
qúi ( i, ≠i) =
(2≠“)(a≠c≠w)+2 i≠“ ≠i
4≠“2 , Q
ú ( i, ≠i) = 2(2≠“)(a≠c≠w)+(2≠“)( i+ ≠i)4≠“2
púi ( i, j) =
(2≠“)(–+(1+“)(c+w))≠(2≠“2) i≠“ ≠i
4≠“2 , ﬁ
ú
i ( i, ≠i) =
1
(2≠“)(a≠c≠w)+2 i≠“ ≠i
4≠“2
22
(V II) Preliminaries: Bertrand downstream competition under vertical separa-
tion. In this section, we present the outcomes of the Bertrand downstream competition
depending on the ex ante investments, where qúi represents individual output of firm i, Qú
represents market output and púi represents the price of the good produced by firm i for
i, ≠i = 1, 2, i ”= ≠i.
qúi ( i, ≠i) =
(1≠“)(2+“)(–≠c≠w)+(2≠“2) i≠“ ≠i
(1≠“2)(4≠“2) , Q
ú ( i, ≠i) = 2(–≠c≠w)+ i+ ≠i(1+“)(2≠“)
púi ( i, ≠i) =
(2+“)((1≠“)–+c+w)≠2 i≠“ ≠i
4≠“2 , ﬁ
ú
i ( i, ≠i) =
((1≠“)(2+“)(–≠c≠w)+(2≠“2) i≠“ ≠i)2
(1≠“2)(4≠“2)2
(V III) Preliminaries: Cournot downstream competition under vertical inte-
gration. In this section, we present the outcomes of the Cournot downstream competi-
tion depending on the ex ante investments, where qú1 (qú2) represents individual output of
firm D1 (D2), Qú represents market output and pú1 (pú2) represents the price of the good
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produced by firm D1 (D2).
qú1 ( 1, 2) = (2≠“)(a≠c)+“w+2 1≠“ 24≠“2 , Qú ( 1, 2) =
2(a≠c)≠w+ 1+ 2
2+“
qú2 ( 1, 2) = (2≠“)(a≠c)≠2w+2 2≠“ 14≠“2 , ﬁú1 ( 1, 2) =
1
(2≠“)(a≠c)+“w+2 1≠“ 2
4≠“2
22
pú1 ( 1, 2) =
(2≠“)(–+(1+“)c)+“w≠(2≠“2) 1≠“ 2
4≠“2 , ﬁ
ú
2 ( 1, 2) =
1
(2≠“)(a≠c)≠2w+2 2≠“ 1
4≠“2
22
pú2 ( 1, 2) =
(2≠“)(–+(1+“)c)+(2≠“2)w≠(2≠“2) 2≠“ 1
4≠“2 ,
(IX) Preliminaries: Bertrand downstream competition under vertical integra-
tion. In this section, we present the outcomes of the Bertrand downstream competition
depending on the ex ante investments, where qú1 (qú2) represents individual output of firm
D1 (D2), Qú represents market output and pú1 (pú2) represents the price of the good pro-
duced by firm D1 (D2).
qú1 ( 1, 2) =
(1≠“)(2+“)(–≠c)≠“(1≠“2)w+(2≠“2) 1≠“ 2
(1≠“2)(4≠“2) , Q
ú ( 1, 2) = 2(–≠c)+ 1+ 2≠(1+“)w(1+“)(2≠“)
qú2 ( 1, 2) =
(1≠“)(2+“)(–≠c)≠2(1≠“2)w+(2≠“2) 2≠“ 1
(1≠“2)(4≠“2) , p
ú
1 ( 1, 2) = (2+“)((1≠“)–+c)+3“w≠2 1≠“ 24≠“2
pú2 ( 1, 2) =
(2+“)((1≠“)–+c)+(2+“2)w≠2 2≠“ 1
4≠“2
ﬁ1 ( 1, 2) =
(1≠“)(2+“)(–≠c)≠“(1≠“2)w+(2≠“2) 1≠“ 2
((1≠“)(2+“)(–≠c)≠(4+“)(1≠“)w+(2≠“2) 1≠“ 2)≠1(1≠“2)(4≠“2)2
ﬁ2 ( 1, 2) = (
(2+“)(1≠“)(–≠c)≠2(1≠“2)w+(2≠“2) 2≠“ 1)2
(1≠“2)(4≠“2)2
B.2 Socially optimal investment
B.2.1 Vertical Separation
(I) Cournot competition. The socially optimal investment under Cournot competition
is derived by maximizing the respective welfare function taking the Cournot downstream
competition outcome as given:
W = CSCSep + CSep + 2ﬁCSep ≠
K
2  
2
1 ≠
K
2  
2
2 ≠ F
The symmetric first-order conditions are given by
W i = 2 (1 + “) (2≠ “)2
2 (a≠ c≠ w) + i + ≠i
(4≠ “2)2 + w
(2≠ “) !4≠ “2"
(4≠ “2)2 (B.1)
+4(2≠ “) (a≠ c≠ w) + 2 i ≠ “ ≠i
(4≠ “2)2 ≠ 2“
(2≠ “) (a≠ c≠ w) + 2 ≠i ≠ “ i
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K i = 0
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for i‘ {1, 2} and i ”= ≠i. The second derivatives are given by
W i i =
2 (1 + “) (2≠ “)2 + 2 !4 + “2"
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K.
W i ≠i =
2 (1 + “) (2≠ “)2
(4≠ “2)2
Hence, for the second order conditions to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is,
K >
2(1+“)(2≠“)2+2(4+“2)
(4≠“2)2 .
(II) Bertrand competition. The socially optimal investment under Bertrand com-
petition is derived by maximizing the respective welfare function taking the Bertrand
downstream competition outcome as given:
W = CSBSep + BSep + 2ﬁBSep ≠
K
2
!
 21 + 22
"≠ F
The symmetric first-order conditions are given by
W i = 2 (1 + “)
2 (–≠ c≠ w) + i + j
(1 + “)2 (2≠ “)2 + w
1
(1 + “) (2≠ “) (B.2)
+2
!
2≠ “2" (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c≠ w) + !2≠ “2" i ≠ “ ≠i
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2
≠2“
!
(1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c≠ w) + !2≠ “2" ≠i ≠ “ i"
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K i = 0
for i‘ {1, 2} and i ”= ≠i. The second derivatives are given by
W i i = 2
(1≠ “) (2 + “)2 + !2≠ “2"2 + “2
(1≠ “)2 (4≠ “2)2 ≠K
W i ≠i = 2
(1≠ “) (2 + “)2 ≠ 2“ !2≠ “2"
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 (B.3)
Hence, for the second order conditions to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is,
K > 2 (1≠“)(2+“)
2+(2≠“2)2+“2
(1≠“)2(4≠“2)2 .
B.2.2 Vertical Integration
(I) Cournot competition. The socially optimal investment under Cournot competition
is derived by maximizing the respective welfare function taking the Cournot downstream
competition outcome as given:
W = CSCInt + CInt + ﬁCInt1 + ﬁ
C
Int2 ≠
K
2
!
 21 + 22
"≠ F
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The first-order conditions are given by
W 1 = 2
(1 + “) (2≠ “)2 (a≠ c)≠ “3w + !4≠ 3“2" 1 + “3 2
(4≠ “2)2 + w
(2≠ “)
4≠ “2 (B.4)
+4(2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
(4≠ “2)2 ≠ 2“
(2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ 2w + 2 2 ≠ “ 1
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K 1 = 0
W 2 = 2
(1 + “) (2≠ “)2 (a≠ c)≠ !4≠ 3“2"w + !4≠ 3“2" 2 + “3 1
(4≠ “2)2 + w
(2≠ “)
4≠ “2 (B.5)
≠2“ (2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
(4≠ “2)2 + 4
(2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ 2w + 2 2 ≠ “ 1
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K 2 = 0.
The second derivatives are given by
W 1 1 = W 2 2 =
4
4≠ “2 ≠K
W 1 2 = ≠
2“
4≠ “2
Hence, for the second order conditions to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is,
K > 44≠“2 .
(II) Bertrand competition. The socially optimal investment under Bertrand com-
petition is derived by maximizing the respective welfare function taking the Bertrand
downstream competition outcome as given:
W = CSBInt + BInt + ﬁBInt1 + ﬁ
B
Int2 ≠
K
2
!
 21 + 22
"≠ F
The first-order conditions are given by
W 1 = 2
(1≠ “) (2 + “)2 (–≠ c)≠ 4“ !1≠ “2"w + !4≠ 3“2" 1 ≠ “3 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 (B.6)
+w 1(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)
+
!
2≠ “2" 2 (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠ !4 + 2“ + “2" (1≠ “)w + 2 !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ 2“ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2
≠2“ (2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ 2
!
1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K 1 = 0
W 2 = 2
(1≠ “) (2 + “)2 (–≠ c)≠ !4≠ 3“2 ≠ “4"w + !4≠ 3“2" 2 ≠ “3 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 (B.7)
+w 1(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)
≠“ 2 (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠
!
4 + 2“ + “2
"
(1≠ “)w + 2 !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ 2“ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2
+2
!
2≠ “2" (2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ 2 !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K 2 = 0
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The second derivatives are given by
W 1 1 = W 2 2 =
2
!
2≠ “2"
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2) ≠K
W 1 2 = ≠
2“
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)
Hence, for the second order conditions to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is,
K > 2 (2≠“
2)
(1≠“2)(4≠“2) . Moreover, as is easy to show, the absolute value of the second
derivatives is larger than the absolute value of the cross derivative. Hence, the product
of the second derivatives is larger than the product of cross derivatives. Given, the lower
bound on K, the first order conditions constitute an unique equilibrium.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2.1
B.3.1 Cournot competition
(I) Upstream Investment Regime. Under the upstream investment regime, the up-
stream monopolist maximizes its profits taking the regulated wholesale price w as given.
The respective maximization problem is given by
  ( 1, 2) = w
2 (2≠ “) (a≠ c≠ w) + (2≠ “) ( 1 + 2)
4≠ “2 ≠
K
2  
2
1 ≠
K
2  
2
2
The symmetric first-order conditions are given by
  i ( i, ≠i) =
w
2 + “ ≠K i = 0 (B.8)
for i‘ {1, 2} and i ”= ≠i. Notice that in equilibrium, the upstream monopolist invests the
same amount in both downstream firms. The second order conditions are given by
  i i = ≠K < 0
  i ≠i = 0
As both second derivatives are negative and the product of the second derivatives is
larger than the product of cross derivatives, the first order conditions constitute a unique
equilibrium. As a next step, we compare the socially optimal investment with investment
by the upstream monopolist. Therefore, we subtract expression (B.8) from expression
(B.1) at the equilibrium value of (B.8).
W i ≠  i =
2 (2≠ “)2 (3 + 2“) (a≠ c≠ w + úi )
(4≠ “2)2 > 0
This expression is clearly positive. As  úi =  ú≠i this result holds for investment in
both downstream firms. Hence, investment by the upstream monopolist falls short of the
socially optimal investment. Q.e.d.
(II) Downstream Investment Regime. Under the downstream investment regime,
the downstream competitors maximize their profits taking the regulated wholesale price
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w as given. The respective maximization problems are given by
ﬁi ( i, ≠i) =
3 (2≠ “) (a≠ c≠ w) + 2 i ≠ “ ≠i
4≠ “2
42
≠ K2  
2
i
for i‘ {1, 2} and i ”= ≠i. The first-order conditions are given by
ﬁi i = 4
(2≠ “) (a≠ c≠ w) + 2 i ≠ “ ≠i
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K i = 0 (B.9)
and the second order conditions are given by
ﬁi i i =
8
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K < 0
For the second derivatives to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is, K > 8(4≠“2)2 .
If this is the case, both second derivatives are negative. Thus, the first order conditions
constitute an unique equilibrium. As a next step, we compare the socially optimal invest-
ment with investment by the downstream competitors, by subtracting expression (B.9)
from expression (B.1) at the equilibrium value of (B.9).
W i ≠ ﬁ i = 2 (2 (1 + “) (2≠ “)≠ “)
a≠ c≠ w + úi
(2 + “) (4≠ “2) +
w
(2 + “) > 0
This expression is clearly positive. As  úi =  ú≠i this result holds for investment in both
downstream firms. Hence, investment by the downstream firms falls short of the socially
optimal investment. Q.e.d.
B.3.2 Bertrand competition
(I) Upstream Investment Regime. Under the upstream investment regime, the up-
stream monopolist maximizes its profits by choosing investments  i and  ≠i taking the
regulated wholesale price w as given. The respective maximization problem is given by
  ( i, ≠i) = w · 2 (–≠ c≠ w) + i + ≠i(1 + “) (2≠ “) ≠
K
2  
2
i ≠
K
2  
2
≠i
for i‘ {1, 2} and i ”= ≠i. The first-order conditions are given by
  i =
w
(1 + “) (2≠ “) ≠K i = 0 (B.10)
and the second order conditions are given by
  i i = ≠K < 0
  i ≠i = 0
Both second derivatives are negative and their product is larger than the product of
cross-derivatives. Hence, the first order conditions constitute a unique equilibrium. As a
next step, we compare the upstream monopolist’s investment incentives with the socially
optimal investment. Therefore, we subtract expression (B.10) from expression (B.2) at
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the equilibrium value of (B.10).
W i ≠  i = 4 (1≠ “)2
2 (–≠ c≠ w) + úi + ú≠i
(1 + “)2 (2≠ “)2
+2 (2 + “)2 (1≠ “)2 (–≠ c≠ w + 
ú
i )
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 > 0
This expression is clearly positive. Hence, investment by the upstream monopolist falls
short of the socially optimal investment. Notice that as the investment equilibrium is
symmetric, that is,  úi =  ú≠i, it is su cient to show this result only for investment in
one of the downstream firms.
(II) Downstream Investment Regime. Under the downstream investment regime,
the downstream competitors maximize their profits by choosing their investment level  i
resp.  ≠i taking the regulated wholesale price w as given. The profit functions are given
by
ﬁi ( i, j) =
!
(1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c≠ w) + !2≠ “2" i ≠ “ ≠i"2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠
K
2  
2
i
for i‘ {1, 2} and i ”= ≠i. The first-order conditions are given by
ﬁi ( i, j) = 2
!
2≠ “2" (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c≠ w) + !2≠ “2" i ≠ “ ≠i
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K i = 0 (B.11)
and the second-order conditions are given by
ﬁ i i =
2
!
2≠ “2"2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K < 0
For the second derivatives to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is, K > 2(2≠“
2)2
(1≠“2)(4≠“2)2 .
As a next step, we compare investment by the downstream firms with the socially opti-
mal investment. Therefore, we subtract expression (B.11) from expression (B.2) at the
equilibrium value of (B.11).
W i ≠ ﬁ i =
2 (4 (1 + “) (2 + “)≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c≠ w + úi ) + w (2≠ “) (2 + “)2 (1≠ “)
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 > 0
This expression is clearly positive. Hence, investment by the upstream monopolist falls
short of the socially optimal investment.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.1
(I) Cournot competition. We compare the investment incentives of the upstream
monopolist with those of the downstream competitors. Therefore, we subtract expres-
sion (B.8) from expression (B.9) and evaluate this di erence at the values given through
expression B.8. That is,
ﬁ i ≠  i = 4
(2≠ “) (a≠ c≠ w) + 2 úi ≠ “ ú≠i
(4≠ “2)2 ≠
w
2 + “
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This can be rewritten as
ﬁ i ≠  i =
4 (a≠ c+ úi )≠
!
8≠ “2"w
(2 + “) (4≠ “2) > 0. (B.12)
This expression is positive as long as w < 4a≠c+ i8≠“2 holds. Notice that w never exceeds
the profit maximizing wholesale price, that is, wMonopolist = a≠c+ i2 . As
a≠c+ i
2 < 4
a≠c+ i
8≠“2
it always holds that expression (B.12) is positive and the downstream firms invest more
relative to the upstream monopolist. Notice that - as  úi =  új - it is su cient to
show this result for investment in only one downstream firm. From lemma 2.1, we know
that underinvestment takes place relative to the socially optimal investment regime in
all investment regimes. Hence, the downstream investment regime always yields a better
performance than the upstream investment regime from a welfare perspective. Q.e.d.
(II) Bertrand competition. We compare the investment incentives and, thus, the
investment outcome, by subtracting the investment first derivative of the upstream mo-
nopolist (expression (B.10)) from the respective investment first derivative of one of the
downstream firms (expression (B.11)). That is,
  i ≠ ﬁ i = ≠
2
!
2≠ “2" (a≠ c+ úi )≠ !8≠ 3“2"w
(2≠ “)2 (1 + “) (2 + “)
This expression is positive if and only if w > wˆB = 4≠2“
2
8≠3“2 (–≠ c+ i) holds. Hence, for
w > wˆB the upstream investment regime yields more investment relative to the down-
stream investment regime. Notice that - unlike for Cournot competition - this threshold
is clearly below the upstream profit maximizing wholesale price. Q.e.d.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 2.2
B.5.1 Cournot competition
(I) Upstream Investment Regime. Under the upstream investment regime, the up-
stream monopolist maximizes its profits taking its downstream a liate’s profit into ac-
count and the regulated wholesale price w as given. The respective maximization problem
is given by
  ( 1, 2) = w
2 (2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ (2≠ “)w + (2≠ “) ( 1 + 2)
4≠ “2
+
3 (2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
4≠ “2
42
≠ K2  
2
1 ≠
K
2  
2
2
Notice that - unlike with vertical separation - the upstream monopolist would not like to
invest the same amount in both downstream firms. The first-order conditions are given
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by
  1 = w
2≠ “
4≠ “2 + 4
(2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K 1 = 0 (B.13)
  2 = w
2≠ “
4≠ “2 ≠ 2“
(2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K 2 = 0 (B.14)
and the second order conditions are given by
  1 1 = 8(4≠“2)2 ≠K,   2 2 = ≠ 2“
2
(4≠“2)2 ≠K,   2 1 = 4“(4≠“2)2
For the first order condition to constitute an unique equilibrium it has to hold that K is
su ciently large, that is, K > 8(4≠“2)2 . Notice that this condition also ensures that the
determinant of the Hessian has the correct sign. As a next step, we compare the socially
optimal investment with investment by the upstream monopolist. Therefore, we subtract
expression (B.13) from expression (B.4) at the equilibrium value of (B.13) and expression
(B.14) from expression (B.5) at the equilibrium value of expression (B.14).
W 1 ≠  1 = 2
(1≠ “) !4≠ “2" (a≠ c) + “ !4≠ “2"w + !4≠ “2" 1 ≠ “ !4≠ “2" 2
(4≠ “2)2 (B.15)
W 2 ≠  2 = 2
(1 + “) (2≠ “)2 (a≠ c)≠ !4≠ 3“2"w + !4≠ 3“2" 2 + “3 1
(4≠ “2)2 (B.16)
+4(2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ 2w + 2 2 ≠ “ 1
(4≠ “2)2
Both expression are clearly positive. Hence, investment by the upstream monopolist falls
short of the socially optimal investment. Q.e.d.
(II) Downstream Investment Regime. Under the downstream investment regime,
the downstream competitors maximize their profits taking the regulated wholesale price
w as given. The respective maximization problems are given by
ﬁ1 ( 1, 2) = w
2 (2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ (2≠ “)w + (2≠ “) ( 1 + 2)
4≠ “2
+
3 (2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
4≠ “2
42
≠ K2  
2
1
ﬁ2 ( 1, 2) =
3 (2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ 2w + 2 2 ≠ “ 1
4≠ “2
42
≠ K2  
2
2
The first-order conditions are given by
ﬁ1 1 = w
(2≠ “)
4≠ “2 + 4
(2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K i = 0 (B.17)
ﬁ2 2 = 4
(2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ 2w + 2 2 ≠ “ 1
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K 2 = 0 (B.18)
and the second order conditions are given by
ﬁ1 1 1 = ﬁ2 2 2 =
8
(4≠ “2)2 ≠K
For the second derivatives to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is, K > 8(4≠“2)2 .
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Thus, the first order conditions constitute a unique equilibrium.
As a next step, we compare the socially optimal investment with investment by the down-
stream competitors. For investment by the integrated firm we subtract expression (B.17)
from expression (B.4) at the equilibrium value of (B.17) for evaluating the integrated firm.
W 1 ≠ ﬁ1 1 = 2
(1≠ “) !4≠ “2" (a≠ c) + “ !4≠ “2"w + !4≠ “2" 1 ≠ “ !4≠ “2" 2
(4≠ “2)2 > 0
For evaluating investment by the independent downstream firm, we subtract expression
(B.18) from expression (B.5) at the equilibrium value of (B.18)
W 2≠ﬁ2 2 = 2
(2≠ “) !2≠ “2" (a≠ c)≠ 2 !2≠ “2"w + 2 !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ !2≠ “2" 1
(4≠ “2)2 +w
(2≠ “) !4≠ “2"
4≠ “2 > 0
Both expressions are clearly positive. Hence, investment by both firms is below the socially
optimal investment level. Q.e.d.
B.5.2 Bertrand competition
(I) Upstream Investment Regime. Under the upstream investment regime, the up-
stream monopolist maximizes its profits taking its downstream a liate’s profit into ac-
count and the regulated wholesale price w as given. The respective maximization problem
is given by
  ( 1, 2) = w · 2 (–≠ c) + 1 + 2 ≠ (1 + “)w(1 + “) (2≠ “)
+
!
(1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠ “ !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ “ 2"
((2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ (4 + “) (1≠ “)w + (2≠ “2) i ≠ “ j)≠1 (1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2
≠K2  
2
1 ≠
K
2  
2
2
Notice that - unlike with vertical separation - the upstream monopolist prefers to invest
more in his downstream a liate than the independent downstream firm. The first-oder
conditions are given by
  1 = w ·
1
(1 + “) (2≠ “) (B.19)
+
!
2≠ “2" 2 (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠ !4 + 2“ + “2" (1≠ “)w + 2 !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ 2“ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K 1 = 0
  2 = w ·
1
(1 + “) (2≠ “) (B.20)
≠“ 2 (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠
!
4 + 2“ + “2
"
(1≠ “)w + 2 !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ 2“ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K 2 = 0
In equilibrium, these have to be equal to 0. The second order conditions are given by
  1 1 =
2
!
2≠ “2"2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K
  2 2 =
2“2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K
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The second order conditions are negative if K is su ciently large, that is, K >
2(2≠“2)2
(1≠“2)(4≠“2)2 . Thus, the first order condition constitute an unique equilibrium. As a
next step, we compare the socially optimal investment with investment by the upstream
monopolist. Therefore, we subtract expression (B.19) from expression (B.6) at the equi-
librium value of (B.19) and expression (B.20) from expression (B.7) at the equilibrium
value of (B.20).
W 1 ≠  1 = 4
(2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ “ !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ “ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 > 0 (B.21)
W 2 ≠  2 = 2
(1≠ “) (2 + “)2 (–≠ c)≠ !4≠ 3“2 ≠ “4"w + !4≠ 3“2" 2 ≠ “3 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2
+2
!
2≠ “2" (2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ 2 !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 > 0
As is easy to see, both expressions are positive. Thus, investment by the upstream
monopolist falls short of the socially optimal investment. Q.e.d.
(II) Downstream Investment Regime. Under the downstream investment regime,
the downstream competitors maximize their profits taking the regulated wholesale price
w as given. The respective maximization problems are given by
ﬁ1 ( 1, 2) = w · 2 (–≠ c) + i + j ≠ (1 + “)w(1 + “) (2≠ “)
+
!
(1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠ “ !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ “ 2"
((2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ (4 + “) (1≠ “)w + (2≠ “2) 1 ≠ “ 2)≠1 (1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2
≠ K2  
2
1
ﬁ2 ( 1, 2) =
!
(2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ 2 !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ 1"2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠
K
2  
2
2
The first-order conditions are given by
ﬁ1 1 = w ·
1
(1 + “) (2≠ “) (B.22)
+
!
2≠ “2" 2 (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠ !4 + 2“ + “2" (1≠ “)w + 2 !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ 2“ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K 1 = 0
ﬁ2 2 = 2
!
2≠ “2" (2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ 2 !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K 2 = 0 (B.23)
The second order conditions are given by
ﬁ1 1 1 = ﬁ2 2 2 =
2
!
2≠ “2"2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K
For the second derivatives to hold, K has to be su ciently large, that is, K > 2(2≠“
2)2
(1≠“2)(4≠“2)2 .
Thus, the first order conditions constitute an unique equilibrium.
As a next step, we compare the socially optimal investment with investment by the
downstream competitors. Therefore, we subtract expression (B.22) from expression (B.6)
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at the equilibrium value of (B.22) for evaluating the integrated firm.
W 1 ≠ ﬁ1 1 = 4
(2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ “ !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ “ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 > 0
Notice that this expression is identical to expression (B.21) and is clearly positive. In
order to evaluate investment by the independent downstream firm, we subtract expression
(B.23) from expression (B.7) at the equilibrium value of (B.23)
W 2 ≠ ﬁ2 2 = 4
(1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c) + !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠
4 (1≠ “)≠ “2 !3≠ “ + “2"
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 w
This expression can be rewritten as
…W 2 ≠ ﬁ2 2 =
4 (1≠ “) ((2 + “) (–≠ c)≠ w) + “2 !3≠ “ + “2"w + 4 !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ 4“ 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 … > 0
This expression is also clearly positive. Hence, investment by both firms is below the
socially optimal investment level. Q.e.d.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.2
(I) Cournot competition. In this section, we compare the investment incentives among
investment regimes by comparing the respective first order conditions describing equilib-
rium investment. For investment by the integrated firm, we investigate the di erence of
expression (B.17) and (B.13). It is given by
  1 ≠ ﬁ1 1 = 0.
Notice that for investment in the integrated firms’ production cost, the investment regime
does not matter as the investment decision stays within the same firm. For investment
in the independent firm’s production cost, we subtract expression (B.18) from expression
(B.14):
  2 ≠ ﬁ2 2 =
w (2≠ “) !4≠ “2"
(4≠ “2)2 ≠ 2“
(2≠ “) (a≠ c) + “w + 2 1 ≠ “ 2
(4≠ “2)2 (B.24)
≠4(2≠ “) (a≠ c)≠ 2w + 2 2 ≠ “ 1
(4≠ “2)2
This expression is positive if and only if w > 24≠“ (a≠ c+ 2) holds. However, this
threshold is weakly larger than the profit maximizing wholesale price an unregulated
upstream monopolist would set. Hence, expression (B.24) is negative and investment by
the independent downstream firm is weakly larger than by the upstream firm. Q.e.d.
(II) Bertrand competition. In this section, we compare the investment incentives
among the di erent investment regimes by comparing the respective first order conditions
describing equilibrium investment. For investment by the integrated firm, we investigate
the di erence of expression (B.19) and (B.22). It is given by
  1 ≠ ﬁ1 1 = 0
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Notice that for investment in the integrated firms’ production cost, the investment regime
does not matter as the investment decision stays within the same firm. For investment
in the independent firm’s production cost, we subtract expression (B.20) from expression
(B.23):
  2 ≠ ﬁ2 2 = w ·
1
(1 + “) (2≠ “)
≠“ 2 (1≠ “) (2 + “) (–≠ c)≠
!
4 + 2“ + “2
"
(1≠ “)w + 2 !2≠ “2" 1 ≠ 2“ 2
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 ≠K 2
≠2 !2≠ “2" (2 + “) (1≠ “) (–≠ c)≠ 2 !1≠ “2"w + !2≠ “2" 2 ≠ “ 1
(1≠ “2) (4≠ “2)2 +K 2.
This can be rewritten an
  j ≠ ﬁj j = ≠2
(–≠ c+ 2)≠ 2w
4≠ “2 < 0 (B.25)
This expression is negative if w < 12 (a≠ c+ 2) holds. This threshold is equal to the
profit maximizing wholesale price an unregulated upstream monopolist would set. Hence,
expression (B.25) is weakly negative and hence, investment by the independent down-
stream firm is weakly larger than by the upstream firm. Q.e.d.
B.7 Regulated wholesale price
We assume that the wholesale price is set in order to ensure fixed cost recovery of the
upstream monopolist. This reflects, for instance, the procedure under rate-of-return reg-
ulation. That is, the following budget balancing equation has to be fulfilled
BBEq : wQú ≠ F = 0,
where F is the upstream infrastructure/capital cost. However, it is also (implicitly)
assumed that the investment cost is not covered by the regulated price. A possible in-
terpretation is that the investment cost is covered by an ex-ante R&D subsidy. Notice
that we also assume that the wholesale price is determined before the downstream cost
reducing investment takes place. In this section, we show that the wholesale price w is
increasing in the fixed cost F , that is, wF (F ) > 0. Using the implicit function theorem,
we can express the sign of wF (F ) as
sgn
dw
dF
= sgn
A
≠
ˆBBEqD
ˆF
ˆBBEqD
ˆw
B
= sgn (wQúw +Qú)
It is su cient to determine the sign of (wQúw +Qú) in order to determine the sign of
wF (F ) > 0. Here, we report the corresponding values wQúw +Q takes, given the di erent
modes of competition, vertical structures and investment regimes:
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Downstream Cournot Bertrand
V S 2 (a≠c≠2w)(2+“)
2K
(1+“)((4≠“2)(2+“)K≠4) 2
(a≠c≠2w)(4≠“2)K
K(1+“)(2≠“)(4≠“2)≠2(2≠“2)
V I 2 (–≠c≠w)K(4≠“
2)+w(2+“)
(1+“)(K(2≠“)(4≠“2)≠4) 2
(2+“)(2≠“2)K(–≠c≠(1+“)w)+“(2≠“)w
(2≠“)(2≠“2)((1+“)(2+“)K≠2)
Upstream Cournot Bertrand
V S 2 (a≠c≠2w)(2+“)K+2w
K(2+“)2 2
(1+“)(2≠“)(a≠c≠2w)K+2w
(2≠“)2(1+“)2K
V I 2(a≠c≠w)+ 1+ 2+w( 1w+ 2w)2+“
2(a≠c≠(1+“)w)+ 1+ 2+w( 1w+ 2w)
2+“
Thus, wQúw +Qú is positive, regardless of the mode of competition, the vertical structure
and the investment regime. Hence, it always holds that wF (F ) > 0. Q.e.d.
Appendix C
C.1 Preliminaries.
(I) Preliminaries: Distribution Systems. The following graphs illustrate the four
di erent distribution systems, withM1 andM2 representing the manufacturers andR1 and
R2 representing the retail firms. Distribution system (iv) is excluded from our analysis.
Figure C.1: Distribution Systems
(i) (ii)
(iii) (iv)
(II) Preliminaries: Equilibrium Values. To avoid very long expressions, we define
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the following polynomials:
A (K, d) © 2K + d2 ≠ 1, F (K, d) © 8≠ 8d2 ≠ 16K + 8d2K ≠ d4K
B (K, d) © Kd2 ≠ 2K ≠ d2 + 1, G (K, d) © d4K ≠ 6d2K + 8K + 4d2 ≠ 4
C (K, d) © ≠d2K + 2dK + 4K + d3 + 2d2 ≠ d≠ 2, H (K, d) © d3K ≠ 2d2K ≠ 4dK + 8K + 4d2 ≠ 4
D (K, d) © ≠5d2K + 8K ≠ d4 + 5d2 ≠ 4, I (K, d) © d3K + 2d2K ≠ 4dK ≠ 8K ≠ 4d2 + 4
E (K, d) © 3dK + 4K + d3 + 2d2 ≠ d≠ 2, J (K, d) = 2d3K + 5d2K ≠ 2dK ≠ 8K ≠ 4d2 + 4
L (K, d) = d6K2 ≠ 11d4K2 + 40d2K2 ≠ 48K2 + 10d4K ≠ 50d2K + 40K ≠ 8d4 + 16d2 ≠ 8
Moreover, from the second order conditions and the non-negativity constraints we know
that B < 0. This implies A > 0, C > 0, D > 0, E > 0, F < 0, I < 0, and J < 0.
Using all SOCs and non-negativity conditions, we can restrict the parameter space to
K > 4(1≠d2)/(8≠4d≠2d2+d3), in order for the model to be well defined. This also implies
G, H > 0. The equilibrium values are given in Table C.1.
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Table C.1: Equilibrium Values
(N/N) (E/N) (E/E)
w1
1≠d
2≠d
(1≠d)C
D
(1≠d)I
(2≠d)J
w2
1≠d
2≠d
(1≠d)E
D
(1≠d)I
(2≠d)J
p1
1≠d
2≠d
(1≠d)(A+K)C
AD
2(1≠d)L
(2≠d)HJ
p2
1≠d
2≠d
(1≠d)E
D
2(1≠d)L
(2≠d)HJ
q1
1
(2≠d)(1+d)
KC
(1+d)AD ≠ (2+d)KG(1+d)HJ
q2
1
(2≠d)(1+d) ≠ EB(1+d)AD ≠ (2+d)KG(1+d)HJ
◊1 0 (1≠d)CAD ≠ 4(1≠d)G(2≠d)HJ
◊2 0 0 ≠ 4(1≠d)G(2≠d)HJ
ﬁR1 0 (1≠d)K·C
2
2(1+d)A·D2 ≠ (1≠d)KFG
2
(2≠d)2(1+d)H2J2
ﬁR2 0 0 ≠ (1≠d)KFG2(2≠d)2(1+d)H2J2
ﬁM1
1≠d
(2≠d)2(1+d)
(1≠d)K·C2
(1+d)A·D2
(1≠d)(d+2)K·I·G
(d≠2)(d+1)H·J2
ﬁM2
1≠d
(2≠d)2(1+d) ≠ (1≠d)BE
2
(1+d)AD2 ≠ (1≠d)(d+2)KIG(2≠d)(d+1)HJ2
(III) Preliminaries: Framework. The strategic e ects, given the situation when only
one manufacturer adopts ER, are defined according to the description in Section 3.3.
The definition of the e ects, given the situation when both manufacturers adopt ER, are
defined as follows:
(i) Double Markup E ect. The formal definition of the double markup e ect for the
case when both firms adopt ER (N/N æ E/E) is slightly di erent from the case when
only one firm adopts ER (N/N æ E/N). The reason is that the respective outcome is not
only influenced by one manufacturer’s exclusivity decision, but by both manufacturers’
exclusivity decisions. Hence, the definition of the double markup e ect now includes one
additional element capturing the second brand’s retail markup and is given by fi(E/E |
wj = wN/Nj , pj = p
N/N
j , ◊i = ◊j = 0) + fi(E/E | wi = wN/Ni , pi = pN/Ni , ◊i = ◊j =
0) ≠ fi (N/N) © fi(E/E | wi = wj = wDM , pi = pj = pDM , ◊i = ◊j = 0). wDM and pDM
represent wholesale resp. retail prices resulting from the double markup e ect. Moreover,
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notice that for some values (e.g., all prices), the second element of this expression equals
zero. Thus, for these values the double markup e ect is given by the same definition as
for (N/N æ E/N).
(ii) Competition Softening E ect. The e ect is given by fi (E/E | ◊i = ◊j = 0) ≠
fi(E/E | wi = wj = wDM , pi = pj = pDM , ◊i = ◊j = 0).
(iii) Investment E ect. The e ect is given by fi (E/E)≠ fi (E/E | ◊i = ◊j = 0).
In Tables C.2 and C.3, we report the signs of these e ects on the equilibrium values.
Table C.2: Composition of the Total E ect: N/N∆E/N
N/N∆E/N Double Markup Competition Softening Investment Total
w1 0 + + +
w2 0 + + +
p1 + + + +
p2 0 + + +
◊1 0 0 + +
◊2 0 0 0 0
ﬁR1 + + + +
ﬁR2 0 0 0 0
ﬁM1 - + + + / -
ﬁM2 0 + + +
CS - - + +/-
PS +/- + + +/-
Welfare - - + +/-
Table C.3: Composition of the total e ect: N/N∆E/E
N/N∆E/E Double Markup Competition Softening Investment Total
w1 0 + + +
w2 0 + + +
p1 + + + +
p2 + + + +
◊1 0 0 + +
◊2 0 0 + +
ﬁR1 + +/- + +
ﬁR2 + +/- + +
ﬁM1 - +/- + +/-
ﬁM2 - +/- + +/-
CS - - + +/-
PS +/- +/- + +/-
Welfare - - + +/-
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(IV ) Preliminaries: Sturm’s theorem. Sturm’s theorem provides the basis for most
of the proofs in this appendix.56 In this section, we first introduce Sturm’s theorem and
then we give a small example on how this theorem works: Given equation
f(x) = a0xn + a1xn≠1 + · · ·+ an≠1x+ an, (C.1)
where the coe cients ai are real numbers and a0 ”= 0, let N(x) be the number of sign
changes (disregarding vanishing terms) in the sequence of functions:
f0 = f(x) = g0(x)f1(x)≠ f2(x), f1 = f Õ(x) = g1(x)f2(x)≠ f3(x), f2 = g2(x)f3(x)≠ f4(x), . . .
where for i > 1 each fi(x) is (≠1) times the remainder obtained on dividing fi≠2(x) by
fi≠1(x) and fn(x) ”= 0 is a constant. Then the number of real roots of eq. (1), located
between two real numbers a and b (b > a) excluding the own roots of expression (C.1), is
equal to N(a)≠N(b).
Sturm’s theorem provides a simple algorithm to determine the number of real roots for
each real polynomial in any given interval (a, b). Thus, if a real polynomial has no real
roots in interval (a, b), it is su cient to evaluate this polynomial at an arbitrary number
in this interval, in order to determine its sign.57 We use a simple example to illustrate
how Sturm’s theorem works: Assume, we are looking for the sign of 8 ≠ 6d ≠ 2d3 + d4
for d‘ (0, 1). Thus, the chain of Sturm’s functions is given by: f0 = 8 ≠ 6d ≠ 2d3 + d4,
f1 = ≠6 ≠ 6d2 + 4d3, f2 = ≠29 + 18d + 3d2, f3 = 111 ≠ 82d and f4 = ≠1. Now, we can
examine the changes in the signs:
d f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 N(d)
0 + - - + - 3
1 + - - + - 3
Thus, the examined expression has zero roots. Hence, the expression is positive.
C.2 Proofs.
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1.
In order to prove Proposition 3.1, we use the following definitions from above:
K > K = 4(1≠d
2)
8≠4d≠2d2+d3 , d œ (0, 1), A(.) > 0, B(.) < 0, C(.) > 0 D(.) > 0, H(.) > 0,
J(.) < 0.
Retail prices:
56In the description of Sturm’s theorem we follow Korn and Korn (1968).
57Sturm’s theorem was firstly announced 1829 (Sturm (1829)). The proof can be found in Khovanskii
and Burda (2008).
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• pN/Ei ≠ pN/Ni = 2d(1≠d
2)K
(2≠d)D(.) > 0
• pN/Ei ≠pE/Ni = (1≠d)K(3d
2K≠4K+d4≠3d2+2)
A(.)D(.) ∆ sgn(pN/Ei ≠pE/Ni ) = sgn(3d2K≠4K+d4≠3d2+2).
This polynomial is decreasing in K:
3d2K ≠ 4K + d4 ≠ 3d2 + 2|K=K = ≠(1≠ d2)d
!
8≠ 6d2 ≠ 2d3 + d4" (2≠ d)≠2(2 + d)≠1 < 0
∆ 3d2K ≠ 4K + d4 ≠ 3d2 + 2 < 0∆ pN/Ei ≠ pE/Ni < 0
• pE/Ei ≠ pE/Ni = (1≠d)(2L(.)A(.)·D(.)≠(2≠d)(A(.)+K)C(.)H(.)J(.))(2≠d)A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.) = ≠ (1≠d)dK (.)(2≠d)A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.)
This di erence is larger than zero if and only if  (.) > 0.
 KKK(.) =
!
1≠ d2" !768 !1≠ d2"+ 1536 + 432d4 + 6d5"+ (1≠ d) !288d !1≠ d2"+ 96d"
+36d8 + 66d5 + 384d4 > 0
 KK(.)|K=K = [(32 + 96d)
!
1≠ d2"+ (1≠ d) !12d !1≠ d2"+ 20d+ 2d6"+ 32d4 + 21d5 + d6]
2(1≠ d2)(2 + d) > 0∆  KK(.) > 0
 K(.)|K=K = (1≠d
2)2d[(1≠d2)(192≠48d2+10d4+d5)+(1≠d)(24d(1≠d2)+40d)+22d4+23d5]
(2≠d)2 > 0
∆  K(.) > 0
 (.)|K=K = 4(4≠d)(1≠d)
4d2(1+d)3(d2≠2d≠4)(d3+2d2≠4)
(2≠d)4(2+d) > 0∆  (.) > 0∆ pE/Ei ≠ pE/Ni > 0
Q.e.d.
Wholesale prices:
• wE/Ni ≠ wN/Ni = (1≠d
2)d2K
(2≠d)D(.) > 0
• wN/Ei ≠ wE/Ni = (1≠d
2)dK
D(.) > 0
• wE/Ei ≠ wN/Ei =
(1≠d2)d2K(4≠2d≠5d2+2d3+d4≠4K+d2K)
(2≠d)D(.)J(.)
∆ wE/Ei ≠ wN/Ei > 0… d2K ≠ 4K + d4 + 2d3 ≠ 5d2 ≠ 2d+ 4 < 0… K > d
4+2d3≠5d2≠2d+4
4≠d2 .
Q.e.d.
Investment:
• ◊N/Ei ≠ ◊N/Ni = 0
• ◊E/Ni ≠ ◊N/Ni = ◊E/Ni = (1≠d)C(.)A(.)D(.) > 0
• ◊E/Ei ≠ ◊E/Ni = (1≠d)(≠4G(.)A(.)D(.)≠(2≠d)C(.)H(.)J(.))(2≠d)A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.) = ≠ (1≠d)dK (.)(2≠d)A(.)D(.)H(.)J(.)
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∆ ◊E/Ei ≠ ◊E/Ni > 0 …  (.) > 0
 KK(.) =
!
1≠ d2" !64 !1≠ d3"+ 128d (1≠ d) + 192 + 48d4 + 14d5"
+4d8 + 18d5 + 32d4 > 0
 K(.)|K=K = d 1≠d22≠d
!
4 + 2d≠ d2" #8 !1≠ d2"+ (1≠ d) !40≠ 20d2"+ d4 + 2d5$ > 0
∆  K(.) > 0
 |K=K = 4(4≠ d)(1≠ d)3d2(1 + d)2(d2 ≠ 2d≠ 4)(d3 + 2d2 ≠ 4)(2≠ d)≠3(2 + d)≠1 > 0
∆  (.) > 0 ∆ ◊E/Ei ≠ ◊E/Ni > 0
.
Q.e.d.
Retail profits:
• ﬁN/ER ≠ ﬁN/NR = 0
• ﬁE/NR ≠ ﬁN/NR = (1≠d)K[C(.)]
2
2(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2 > 0
• ﬁE/ER ≠ ﬁE/NR =
(1≠d)K(≠2A(.)[D(.)]2F (.)[G(.)]2≠(2≠d)2[C(.)]2[H(.)]2[J(.)]2)
2(2≠d)2(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2[H(.)]2[J(.)]2 =
(d≠1)dK2 (.)
2(2≠d)2(1+d)A(.)[D(.)]2[H(.)]2[J(.)]2
∆ ﬁE/ER ≠ ﬁE/NR > 0
This di erence is larger than zero if and only if  (.) < 0.
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 K5(.) = 480d17 ≠ 3360d16 ≠ 17640d15 + 82560d14 + 249600d13 ≠ 873600d12
≠1856640d11 + 5191680d10 + 8087040d9 ≠ 18923520d8 ≠ 21288960d7
+43253760 + 33177600d5 ≠ 60456960d4 ≠ 28016640d3 + 47185920d2
+9830400d≠ 15728640 Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0
 K4(.)|K=K = ≠48(d≠ 2)2(d≠ 1)d(d+ 1)(d+ 2)2[(d≠ 1)[(1≠ d2)(3456≠ 2336d2)
+422d4(1≠ d) + 248d4] + (d2 ≠ 1)[(1≠ d2)(2432≠ 1696d2 + 626d4)
+606d4 + 33d8 + 4d9]≠ 41d8 ≠ 43d9] < 0∆  K4(.) < 0
 KKK(.)|K=K = ≠6(1≠ d2)2d2(2 + d){(1≠ d) [4044 + (1≠ d) (
!
1≠ d3" !5460 + 4d6"
+1148d6 (1≠ d) !1≠ d2" !41435 + 46476d+ 549d6"
+419d+ 2587d4 + 16950d5 + 2620d6 + 20d10)] + 261} < 0
∆  KKK(.) < 0
 KK(.)|K=K = 4(1≠d
2)3d3
(2≠d)2 {(d≠ 1){(1≠ d) [
!
1≠ d2" ((1≠ d)(3948d+ d11)
50295 + 28382d≠ 15410d3 + 2028d5 + 541d6) + 12611d4
+728d5 + 1511d6 + 72d9 + 29d10 + d11] + 1844}≠ 45} < 0
∆  KK(.) < 0
 K(.)|K=K = ≠16 4≠d(2≠d)4(2+d) )(1≠ d)5d4(1 + d)4(4≠ 2d2 ≠ d3){(1≠ d)(160≠ 76d2)
+(1≠ d2)(224≠ 140d2 + 15d4) + 3d4(1≠ d3) + 14d4 + d8} < 0
∆  K(.) < 0.
 (.)|K=K = ≠32 (4≠d)
2(1≠d)7
(2≠d)6(2+d)2 d
5(1 + d)5(4≠ d2 + 2d)(4≠ d3 ≠ 2d2)2 < 0
∆  (.) < 0.
∆ ﬁE/ER ≠ ﬁE/NR > 0.
Q.e.d.
C.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2.
In order to prove this proposition, it is su cient to show that there exist parameter values
for d and K satisfying the respective equilibrium conditions.
(i) Both manufacturers do not adopt exclusive retailing, ﬁN/NMi /ﬁE/NMi > 1 and ﬁ
N/E
Mi /ﬁE/EMi >
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1. Notice that the latter condition is needed to ensure that the type (i) equilibrium is
unique. Suppose d = 0.85 and K = 1.8. As can be easily shown, these values satisfy
the equilibrium conditions. Hence, the N/N distribution system constitutes an unique
equilibrium.
M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.110, 0.110 0.060, 0.122
Non-exclusivity 0.122, 0.060 0.061, 0.061
(ii) One manufacturer adopts exclusive retailing and the other manufacturer does not
adopt exclusive retailing, ﬁE/NMi /ﬁN/NMi > 1 and ﬁ
N/E
Mi /ﬁE/EMi > 1. The latter condition ensures
that the second manufacturer is not willing to adopt exclusivity given the first one has
done so. Suppose that d = 0.85 and K = 1.2. As can be easily shown these values satisfy
the equilibrium conditions:
M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.125, 0.125 0.065, 0.126
Non-exclusivity 0.126, 0.065 0.061, 0.061
There are two identical asymmetric equilibria of type E/N given d = 0.85 and K = 1.2.
(iii) Both manufacturers adopt exclusive retailing, ﬁE/EMi /ﬁN/EMi > 1 and ﬁ
E/N
Mi /ﬁN/NMi > 1. The
later condition ensures that the equilibrium of type (iii) is unique. Suppose that d = 0.85
and K = 0.6. As can be easily shown these values satisfy the equilibrium conditions:
M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.202, 0.202 0.086, 0.143
Non-exclusivity 0.143, 0.086 0.061, 0.061
Given d = 0.85 and K = 0.6, it is a dominant strategy for both firms to adopt exclusivity.
Thus, the E/E regime constitutes an unique equilibrium.
(iv) Finally, multiple equilibria of type (i) and (iii) exist for some parameter combinations.
That is, ﬁN/NMi /ﬁE/NMi > 1 and ﬁ
E/E
Mi /ﬁN/EMi > 1. Suppose d = 0.5 and K = 1. As can be easily
shown these values satisfy the equilibrium conditions:
M1\M2 Exclusivity Non-exclusivity
Exclusivity 0.237, 0.237 0.142, 0.226
Non-exclusivity 0.226, 0.142 0.148, 0.148
For these values both firms have no dominant strategy. If the competitor decides to adopt
ER, it is also profitable to adopt ER. Therefore, the N/N distribution system constitutes
an unique equilibrium. Q.e.d.
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C.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.
The proof consists of two steps:
(i) The N/N-equilibrium occurs if and only if it is unprofitable for both manufacturers to
adopt ER given the other manufacturer has not adopted ER. Without ER no investment
occurs. Hence, the profits in the N/N equilibrium with asymmetric brands are equal to
those in the N/N equilibrium with symmetric brands.
Moreover, the profits in the E/N equilibrium (more e cient firm adopts exclusivity)with
asymmetric brands are identical to those with symmetric brands. The more e cient
manufacturer adopts ER and hence, investment occurs only in its brand. By definition,
the investment cost of the more e cient manufacturer is identical to the investment cost
with symmetric brands. Thus, the more e cient firm’s incentives not to adopt exclusivity
given its competitor has not done so, remain unchanged.
In addition, profits in the N/E equilibrium (less e cient firm adopts exclusivity) are lower
than in the E/N equilibrium due to a smaller investment e ect (i.e. higher investment
cost). Hence, given that it is not profitable for the more e cient manufacturer to adopt
exclusivity, it is also not profitable for the less e cient manufacturer.
Hence, the outcome is identical to the scenario with symmetric brands. Q.e.d.
(ii) The E/N-equilibrium occurs only when the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. Manufacturer 1 has an incentive to adopt exclusivity when its competitor has not
adopted it.
2. Manufacturer 2 has not an incentive to adopt exclusivity when its competitor has
adopted it.
We have seen in (i) that the incentive described under 1. is the same with symmetric as
well as with asymmetric brands. Thus, we have to show that the incentive under 2. is
larger with asymmetric than with symmetric brands. It is su cient to show that ﬁE/EM2 is
lower with asymmetric than with symmetric brands. Notice that the double markup e ect
as well as the competition softening e ect are identical in both cases and the investment
e ect is decreasing in the investment cost. As manufacturer 2 has a larger investment
cost in the case with asymmetric brands, its profit is smaller than in the symmetric case.
This argument follows in algebraic form:
Let the investment cost of retailer 1 be K
1
◊211
2 +
◊212
2
2
and of retailer 2 (K + )
1
◊211
2 +
◊212
2
2
.
We want to show that ﬁE/EM2 is decreasing in  . ﬁ
E/E
M2 is given by
ﬁE/EM2 =
(2 + d)G(K, d)M(K, , d)[P (K, , d)]2
(2≠ d)(1 + d)Q(K, , d)[R(K, , d)]2
We already know thatG(K, d) > 0 ’d œ (0, 1) ·K > 4(1≠d
2)
8≠4d≠2d2+d3
∆ sgn(ˆﬁ
E/E
M2 (K, , d)
ˆ  ) = sgn(
ˆ(M(K, , d)[P (K, , d)]2/Q(K, , d)[R(K, , d)]2)
ˆ  )
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Therefore, we have to determine the sign of
ˆ
#
M(K, , d)[P (K, , d)]2
$
ˆ  Q(K, , d)[R(K, , d)]
2≠ˆ
#
Q(K, , d)[R(K, , d)]2
$
ˆ  M(K, , d)[P (K, , d)]
2.
If this term is negative, the profit of the second manufacturer decreases in  . This term
can be rewritten as 8(1 ≠ d)2(1 + d)P (.)R(.)Z(.). In order to show this, we have to
determine the signs of P (.), R(.) and Z(.).
We start by examining the sign of P (d,K, ):
P  (.) = 32≠ 48d2 + 4d3 + 16d4 ≠ 4d5 ≠K(4≠ d2)2(4 + d≠ 2d2)
∆ P K (.) = ≠(4≠ d2)2(4 + d≠ 2d2)
P  (.) |K=K = ≠4(≠1 + d)d(1 + d)(≠6≠ d+ 3d2) < 0∆ P  (.) < 0 ’ 
P (.) | =0 = ≠16 + 32d2 ≠ 16d4 + 64K + 8dK ≠ 92d2K ≠ 4d3K + 28d4K ≠ 4d5K
≠64K2 ≠ 16dK2 + 64d2K2 + 8d3K2 ≠ 20d4K2 ≠ d5K2 + 2d6K2
(P (.) | =0)KK = ≠2(2≠ d)2(2 + d)2(4 + d≠ 2d2) < 0
(P (.) | =0)K |K=K = 4d(1≠ d2)(≠10≠ d+ 5d2) < 0∆ (P (.) | =0)K < 0
(P (.) | =0) |K=K = 32(≠1+d)
3d2(1+d)2
(≠2+d)2(2+d) < 0∆ P (.) | =0 < 0∆ P (.) < 0
for any d, K,   from our domain. Next, we examine the sign of R(d,K, ).
R  (.) = 32≠ 52d2 + 20d4 +K[(≠2 + d)(2 + d)(≠4≠ d+ 2d2)(≠4 + d+ 2d2)]
∆ R K (.) = (≠2 + d)(2 + d)(≠4≠ d+ 2d2)(≠4 + d+ 2d2) < 0
R  (.) |K=K = ≠ 4(≠1+d)
2d(1+d)(≠8≠d+4d2)
≠2+d < 0∆ ˆR(.)ˆ  < 0 ’ 
R (.) | =0 = (≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K)J(K, d)
∆ sgn[R (d,K, ) | =K ] = ≠sgn[≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K]
(R (d,K, ) | =K)K = 8≠ 2d≠ 5d2 + 2d3 > 0 · (≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K)|K=K
= ≠ 4(≠1+d)2d(1+d)(≠2+d)(2+d) > 0
∆ ≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K > 0∆ R(.) < 0
for any d, K,   within our domain. In order to complete the proof, we have to show that
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Z(d,K, ) is always negative:
Z   (.) = 2(d≠ 2)X(d, k)
X    (.) = 6(2≠ d)3(2 + d)4(4 + d≠ 2d2)(16≠ 15d2 + d3 + 3d4) > 0
XKK (.) |K=K =
#
21d4 + 3(1≠ d)d4 + (1≠ d2)(224≠ 72d≠ 80d2 + 37d3 + 4d4)$
4d(4≠ d2)(1≠ d2)(2 + d)2 > 0∆ XKK (.) > 0
XK (.) |K=K = 16d2
!
1≠ d2"2 !4≠ d2" (128≠ 42d≠ 181d2 + 52d3 + 72d4 ≠ 16d5 ≠ 7d6) > 0
∆ XK(.) > 0
X(.)|K=K = 32(1≠ d)d3
!
1≠ d2"3 !48 + 10d≠ 45d2 ≠ 3d3 + 10d4" (2≠ d)3 > 0
∆ X(.) > 0∆ Z  (.) < 0 for any 
Z (.)| =0 = 2(≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K) (K, d)
We have already shown that (≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K) > 0. Thus, it holds
that
sgn[ˆZ(d,K, )ˆ  | =K ] = sgn[ (K, d)]
 KKK(.) = 6(≠2 + d)3(2 + d)4(16≠ 15d2 + d3 + 3d4) < 0
 KK(.)|K=K = ≠4d(2≠ d)(1≠ d2)(2 + d)2(128≠ 2d≠ 127d2 + 2d3 + 28d4 + 2d5) < 0
∆  KK(.) < 0
 K(.)|K=K = ≠4d2(1≠ d2)2(2 + d)(156≠ 80d≠ 129d2 + 51d3 + 16d4) (2≠ d)≠1 < 0
∆ ˆ (.)ˆK < 0
 (.)|K=K = 48(1≠ d)4d3(1 + d)3(≠10≠ d+ 5d2)(2≠ d)≠3 < 0
∆  (.) < 0∆ ˆZ(.)ˆ  | =0 < 0∆ ˆZ(.)ˆ  < 0
Z(.)| =0 = =  (d,K)I(d,K)(≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K)
We have already shown that I(.) < 0 and ≠4 + 4d2 + 8K ≠ 2dK ≠ 5d2K + 2d3K > 0.
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Therefore,
sgn[Z(d,K, )| =0] = ≠sgn[ (d,K)]
 KKK(.) = 6(≠2 + d)2(2 + d)2(16≠ 15d2 + d3 + 3d4) > 0
 KK(.)|K=K = = ≠4(≠1 + d)d(1 + d)(2 + d)(48≠ 28d≠ 33d2 + 18d3 + 2d4) > 0
∆  KK(.) > 0
 K(.)|K=K = = ≠48d2(1≠ d)(1≠ d2)2(≠3 + d+ d2)(2≠ d)≠2 > 0∆ ˆ (.)ˆK > 0
 (.)|K=K = ≠ 96(≠1+d)
5d3(1+d)3
(≠2+d)4(2+d) > 0∆  (.) > 0∆ Z(.)| =0 < 0∆ Z(.) < 0
∆ ˆﬁ
E/E
M2
ˆ  < 0
for any d, K and   from our domain. Q.e.d.
C.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4.
This proof consists of three parts:
1. We show that CSE/E > CSN/N if K < K˜ =
4(3+d)≠2d2(5+d)+2(1+d)
Ô
4(3+d)≠2d2(5+d)+2(1+d)
(4≠d2)2 .
2. We show that CSE/E > CSE/N if K < K˜.
3. We show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists if K < K˜.
ad 1. Notice that the E/E and the E/N equilibrium are symmetric. Thus, it holds that
CSE/E > CSN/N if QE/E > QN/N is true. This is the case if the following condition
is fulfilled:
(1≠d)(16+16d≠16d2≠16d3≠48K≠40dK+32d2K+28d3K+4d4K+32K2+16dK2≠16d2K2≠8d3K2+2d4K2+d5K2)
(2≠d)(1+d)H(.)J(.) >
0
… K2(32+ 16d≠ 16d2≠ 8d3+2d4+ d5)+K(≠48≠ 40d+32d2+28d3+4d4)+ 16+
16d≠ 16d2 ≠ 16d3 < 0
Solving this inequality and taking the SOC (K > K) into account this expression
is fulfilled for any K < K˜. Q.e.d.
ad 2. Notice that the investment e ect on consumer surplus is stronger in the E/E than
in the E/N equilibrium. As the investment e ect is decreasing in K, Moreover, the e ect
of K on consumer surplus is stronger in the E/E than in the E/N equilibrium. In the E/N
equilibrium investment is only undertaken by the exclusive retailer. Hence, K directly
a ects the quantity of the exclusive brand. However, the quantity of the non-exclusive
brand is only indirectly a ected. In contrast, both quantities are a ected directly in the
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E/E equilibrium. In other words, the di erence in consumer surplus in both equilibria is
increasing in K:
ˆ(CSE/E(d,K)≠CSE/N (d,K))
ˆK =
(1≠d)‰(d,K)
[A(d,K)]3[D(d,K)]3[H(d,K)]3[J(d,K)]3
∆ ˆ(CS
E/E(d,K)≠CSE/N (d,K))
ˆK < 0 … ‰(.) < 0
Using Sturm’s theorem, it can be shown that ‰(.) < 0 holds for any d, K within our
domain:
‰K10(.) =
!
1≠ d2" (≠5130 + (1≠ d) (≠62703 + (1≠ d) (≠145710d7 ≠ 57577d10 ≠ 20831d11 + 8494d12
+1260d13 ≠ 520d14 + !1≠ d2" !≠145797d2 ≠ 194182d3 + 88872d5 ≠ 114319d6 ≠ 142582d7"
≠166202 !1≠ d5"+ (1≠ d) !≠18362≠ 382381d3 + 360000d5 ≠ 103273d7")))≠ 9747 + 8559d < 0
‰K9(.)|K=K = ≠362880 (1≠ d) (2 + d)4 (1048576 + 7864320d≠ 10158080d2 ≠ 11206656d3 + 18980864d4
≠20746240d5 ≠ 3653632d6 + 64204800d7 ≠ 24083200d8 ≠ 67990528d9 + 31040832d10
+38386848d11 ≠ 18019808d12 ≠ 12651200d13 + 5740476d14 + 2509294d15 ≠ 1033931d16
≠320648d17 + 105389d18 + 31118d19 ≠ 6804d20 ≠ 1944d21 + 384d22) Sturm’s Theorem< 0
∆ ‰K9(.) < 0
‰K8(.)|K=K = 120960(1≠ d)2d(1 + d)(2 + d)3(2≠ d)≠2(≠7340032≠ 30146560d+ 57016320d2
+42270720d3 ≠ 76464128d4 + 35938304d5 ≠ 32413696d6 ≠ 112777216d7
+148110336d8 + 98087168d9 ≠ 137400192d10 ≠ 44632320d11 + 63497024d12
+12731248d13 ≠ 16717568d14 ≠ 2679720d15 + 2717456d16 + 442294d17 ≠ 302807d18
≠48374d19 + 21419d20 + 2998d21 ≠ 564d22 ≠ 216d23 + 32d24) Sturm’s Theorem< 0
∆ ‰K8(.) < 0
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‰K7(.)|K=K = 5040(≠1 + d)3d2(1 + d)2(2 + d)2(2≠ d)≠4(208666624 + 523239424d
≠1431044096d2 ≠ 649723904d3 + 1702133760d4 ≠ 2441216d5 + 567300096d6
+97677312d7 ≠ 2405477376d8 + 223821312d9 + 1969144832d10
≠206317312d11 ≠ 826604608d12 + 54924128d13 + 211237872d14 ≠ 3415200d15
≠35656848d16 ≠ 421884d17 + 3995722d18 + 152135d19 ≠ 291579d20 ≠ 26497d21
+16876d22 + 345d23 ≠ 154d24 ≠ 68d25 + 8d26) Sturm’s Theorem< 0∆ ‰K7(.) < 0
‰K6(.)|K=K = ≠(2≠ d)≠6720(1≠ d)4d3(1 + d)3(2 + d)(1148190720 + 1623719936d≠ 6943670272d2
≠1522401280d3 + 8220934144d4 + 2014773248d5 ≠ 774782976d6 ≠ 5065863168d7
≠4622747648d8 + 5247410176d9 + 4049376256d10 ≠ 2562309888d11
≠1816873216d12 + 678837248d13 + 503555264d14 ≠ 110289440d15
≠86226880d16 + 11722352d17 + 9880928d18 ≠ 858008d19 ≠ 795262d20 + 56696d21
+32777d22 + 1211d23 ≠ 1726d24 + 100d25 + 8d26) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ‰K6(.) < 0
‰K5(.)|K=K = (2≠ d)≠81440(≠1 + d)5d4(1 + d)4(332922880 + 199491584d≠ 1760821248d2
≠36962304d3 + 2259894272d4 + 627998720d5 ≠ 1291350016d6 ≠ 1559681024d7
+308211712d8 + 1385933824d9 + 129782016d10 ≠ 645355392d11 ≠ 145858112d12
+179201344d13 + 52903040d14 ≠ 30329632d15 ≠ 10084800d16 + 3458848d17
+1137880d18 ≠ 285658d19 ≠ 81390d20 + 16299d21 + 4552d22
≠1041d23 ≠ 26d24 + 12d25) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ‰K5(.) < 0
‰K4(.)|K=K = ≠192(2≠ d)≠10(2 + d)≠1(≠1 + d)6d5(1 + d)5(1132986368≠ 16515072d
≠5268635648d2 + 867237888d3 + 7730397184d4 + 1038114816d5
≠6994022400d6 ≠ 3360485376d7 + 4043362304d8 + 3117941248d9
≠1270275584d10 ≠ 1575115008d11 + 145991296d12 + 462831872d13
+29444576d14 ≠ 81874432d15 ≠ 11125552d16 + 9191840d17 + 1427988d18
≠720396d19 ≠ 73314d20 + 35772d21 + 578d22 ≠ 869d23 + 78d24 ≠ 8d25
+d26) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ‰K4(.) < 0
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‰K3(.)|K=K = (2≠ d)≠12(2 + d)≠2192(≠1 + d)7d6(1 + d)6(418643968≠ 196476928d
≠1758494720d2 + 647462912d3 + 2949898240d4 ≠ 332296192d5
≠3090866176d6 ≠ 306096128d7 + 1992954368d8 + 565802240d9
≠791036288d10 ≠ 362372608d11 + 180364800d12 + 123434784d13
≠20026032d14 ≠ 23989320d15 + 364488d16 + 2810316d17 + 119628d18
≠186354d19 ≠ 17010d20 + 8591d21 + 172d22 + 56d23 ≠ 63d24
+6d25) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ‰K3(.) < 0
‰K2(.)|K=K = ≠(2≠ d)≠14(2 + d)≠3768(≠4 + d)(≠1 + d)9d7(1 + d)8
(507904≠ 532480d≠ 933888d2 + 761344d3 + 909312d4 ≠ 431360d5
≠495936d6 + 82240d7 + 150576d8 + 5712d9 ≠ 21104d10
≠4340d11 + 2044d12 + 242d13 ≠ 13d14 ≠ 32d15 + 4d16)
(≠4≠ 2d+ d2)(≠4 + 2d2 + d3) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ‰K2(.) < 0
‰K(.)|K=K = 512(≠4+d)
2(≠1+d)11d8(1+d)9(≠4≠2d+d2)2(≠4+2d2+d3)2
(2≠d)16(2+d)4
[53d4 + 12d5 + 10d8 + (1≠ d)(1728≠ 584d2) + 41d4(1≠ d3)
+(1≠ d2)(1472≠ 1224d2 + 90d4)] < 0∆ ˆ‰(.)ˆK < 0
‰(.)|K=K = ≠ 6144(4≠d)
3(1≠d)13d9(1+d)10(4+2d≠d2)3(4≠2d2≠d3)3
(2≠d)18(2+d)5 < 0
∆ ‰(.) < 0
∆ ˆ(CS
E/E(d,K)≠CSE/N (d,K))
ˆK < 0
for any d, K from our domain. Using these results, we can proof the original statement:
If CSE/E > CSN/N holds, the same logic applies to the size of the consumer surplus in
the E/N equilibrium. We know that CSE/E > CSN/N holds if K is su ciently small (see
the condition above). For the remainder of this proof, we divide our parameter space into
two subspaces:
(i) 0 < d < 0.5
(ii) 0.5 Æ d < 1
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ad (i). Suppose that K = 1 + d/2. This implies that 0 < 32d2 + 48d3 + 24d4 ≠ 20d5 ≠
8d6 ≠ 2d7 ≠ d8 + d9 + d104 for d œ (0, 0.5).!
CSE/E ≠ CSE/N" |K=1+d/2 = (1≠ d)d28≠1(1 + d)≠1(1 + d+ d2)≠2(≠4≠ 2d+ d2 + 2d3)≠2(8 + d4)≠2
(≠8≠ 12d+ 9d3 + 2d4)≠2(32768 + 262144d+ 843776d2 + 1236992d3
+65536d4 ≠ 2930688d5 ≠ 5085184d6 ≠ 3376128d7 + 1018880d8
+3631872d9 + 2476224d10 ≠ 12800d11 ≠ 1026432d12 ≠ 530624d13
+75048d14 + 176824d15 + 50584d16 ≠ 18520d17 ≠ 16249d18
≠3812d19 + 32d20 + 144d21 + 16d22)) Sturm
Õs Theorem
> 0
This di erence is decreasing in K. Thus, it holds that CSE/E > CSE/N for d between 0
and 12 and K < 1 + d/2.
ad (ii) Suppose now that K = 3/2≠ d/2. Using Sturm’s Theorem this implies that
0 Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 128≠ 320d+ 96d2 + 240d3 ≠ 76d4 ≠ 96d5 + 22d6 + 20d7 ≠ 15d84 ≠ 3d
9
2 + d
10
4
(CSE/E ≠ CSE/N )|K=3/2≠d/2 = (2≠ d)≠2(1 + d)≠1(2≠ d+ d2)≠2(≠8≠ 3d+ 3d2 + 2d3)≠2
(≠16 + 20d≠ 6d2 ≠ 5d3 + d4)≠2(≠16 + 8d+ 5d2 ≠ 5d3 + 2d4)≠2
(≠29360128 + 103809024d≠ 50135040d2 ≠ 166428672d3
+177827840d4 + 95567872d5 ≠ 206496768d6 + 7089664d7
+143738048d8 ≠ 62955392d9 ≠ 56805760d10 + 56995824d11
+2648800d12 ≠ 25435624d13 + 9554739d14 + 4915108d15
≠4818244d16 + 417792d17 + 992954d18 ≠ 407896d19 ≠ 41316d20
≠14853d22 + 68536d21 ≠ 2044d23 + 1552d24 ≠ 272d25 + 16d26)
1
8 (1≠ d)
SturmÕs Theorem
> 0
This di erence is decreasing in K. Thus, it holds that CSE/E > CSE/N for d between
1/2 and 1 and K < 3/2≠ d/2. Q.e.d.
ad 3. We have already shown that if the above mentioned condition is binding, it holds
that CSN/N > CSE/N . Now, we show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists under this
condition.
First, consider the incentives of a manufacturer to adopt exclusivity given the other man-
ufacturer has not adopted exclusivity. These incentives are decreasing in K. Notice that
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K does not a ect profits in the N/N equilibrium. However, it has a negative impact on
the profit in the E/N equilibrium. Thus, the di erence between profits in both equilibria
is decreasing in K.
Second, consider the incentives of a manufacturer to adopt exclusivity given the other
manufacturer has adopted exclusivity. These incentives are decreasing in K as K a ects
profits in the E/E equilibrium directly while in the E/N equilibrium profits are only af-
fected indirectly. Thus, the di erence between the non-exclusive manufacturer’s profit
in the E/N equilibrium and the profit in the E/E equilibrium is increasing in K. The
algebraic proof follows:
ˆ(ﬁE/N1 ≠ﬁN/N1 )
ˆK =
(≠1+d)2C(.)
[A(.)]2[D(.)]3 (≠8 ≠ 4d + 18d2 + 9d3 ≠ 12d4 ≠ 6d5 + 2d6 + d7 + 32K + 16dK ≠ 46d2K ≠
17d3K + 17d4K + d5K ≠ 3d6K ≠ 32K2 ≠ 16dK2 + 20d2K2 ≠ 2d3K2 ≠ 9d4K2)
Consider now the second derivative with respect to K of the last term in this expression:
≠64≠ 32d+ 40d2 ≠ 4d3 ≠ 18d4 < 0
Evaluating the first derivative at K’s lower bound gets us:
≠ (≠1 + d)d(1 + d)
!≠128≠ 80d+ 32d2 ≠ 24d4 ≠ 7d5 + 3d6"
(≠2 + d)2(2 + d) < 0
As this expression is negative, the first derivative is negative for anyK. Again, we evaluate
this expression at the lower bound of K:
(≠1 + d)2d2(1 + d)2(≠128≠ 96d≠ 48d2 + 4d4 ≠ 4d5 ≠ 2d6 + d7)
(≠2 + d)4(2 + d)2 < 0
As this expression is negative, the incentive to adopt exclusivity, if the competitor has not
adopted exclusivity, is decreasing in K. The e ect of K on the incentives not to adopt
exclusivity given the other manufacturer has adopted exclusivity is given by:
ˆ(ﬁE/N2 ≠ ﬁE/E2 )
ˆK
= (1≠ d)
2È(d,K)
(2≠ d)[A(d,K)]2[D(d,K)]3[H(d,K)]2J(d,K)]3 ∆
ˆ(ﬁE/N2 ≠ ﬁE/E2 )
ˆK
> 0… È(.) < 0
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ÈK8 (.) = 40320(2≠ d)2(2 + d)4(≠131072 + 98304d+ 311296d2 ≠ 307200d3 ≠ 227328d4
+403456d5 ≠ 23552d6 ≠ 292288d7 + 125632d8 + 128384d9 ≠ 75968d10
≠34584d11 + 21200d12 + 5165d13 ≠ 2914d14 ≠ 292d15 + 168d16) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0
ÈK7 (.) |K=K = ≠5040(1≠ d2)d(2 + d)3(2490368≠ 2228224d≠ 4980736d2 + 5406720d3
+2267136d4 ≠ 5056512d5 + 2019328d6 + 2285568d7 ≠ 2754176d8 ≠ 545088d9
+1315264d10 + 101360d11 ≠ 315416d12 ≠ 26708d13 + 40218d14 + 5127d15
≠3190d16 ≠ 428d17 + 152d18) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ÈK7 (.) < 0
ÈK6 (.) |K=K = 720(2≠ d)≠2(1≠ d2)2d2(2 + d)2(≠20185088 + 20643840d+ 34832384d2
≠38346752d3 ≠ 12771328d4 + 21049344d5 ≠ 12476416d6 + 1000960d7
+14889216d8 ≠ 4535936d9 ≠ 7092288d10 + 1371344d11 + 1910096d12
≠113332d13 ≠ 300544d14 ≠ 4376d15 + 27280d16 + 1855d17 ≠ 1334d18
≠204d19 + 56d20) Sturm
Õs Theorem
> 0∆ ÈK6 (.) > 0
ÈK5 (.) |K=K = ≠120(1≠ d2)3(2≠ d)≠4d3(2 + d)(92274688≠ 104857600d≠ 145457152d2
+154927104d3 + 76447744d4 ≠ 42135552d5 ≠ 5560320d6 ≠ 44448768d7
≠18159616d8 + 36814848d9 + 14847104d10 ≠ 11526656d11 ≠ 5530688d12
+1817520d13 + 1038472d14 ≠ 148612d15 ≠ 116292d16 + 5176d17 + 7974d18
≠51d19 ≠ 210d20 ≠ 36d21 + 8d22) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ÈK5 (.) < 0
ÈK4 (.) |K=K = ≠(2≠ d)≠696(1≠ d2)4d4(65536000≠ 81166336d≠ 102531072d2 + 108441600d3
+86843392d4 ≠ 30713856d5 ≠ 55618560d6 ≠ 25549824d7 + 19732992d8
+24935744d9 ≠ 1266560d10 ≠ 9296064d11 ≠ 1178128d12 + 1773000d13
+370332d14 ≠ 208484d15 ≠ 49628d16 + 15309d17 + 3837d18 ≠ 641d19
≠216d20 + 36d21) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ÈK4 (.) < 0
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ÈK3 (.) |K=K = ≠(2≠ d)≠8(2 + d)≠124(1≠ d2)5d5(119013376≠ 158990336d≠ 198967296d2
+229949440d3 + 221495296d4 ≠ 126754816d5 ≠ 170844160d6 + 9434112d7
+79060992d8 + 25422080d9 ≠ 20823424d10 ≠ 13156992d11 + 2726944d1299664d14
+3030064d13 ≠ 199664d14 ≠ 388688d15 + 6936d16 + 33292d17 ≠ 1294d18 ≠ 1649d19
+200d20 + 2d21) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ÈK3 (.) < 0
ÈK2 (.) |K=K = ≠(2≠ d)≠10(2 + d)≠232(1≠ d2)6d6(33816576≠ 48726016d≠ 62046208d2
+85196800d3 + 73228288d4 ≠ 68294656d5 ≠ 56822784d6 + 25639680d7
+29120256d8 ≠ 2739648d9 ≠ 9091136d10 ≠ 1166048d11 + 1740272d12
+395040d13 ≠ 217696d14 ≠ 52732d15 + 21940d16 + 1758d17 ≠ 1031d18
+37d19 + 8d20) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0∆ ÈK2 (.) < 0
ÈK (.) |K=K = 384(2≠ d)≠12(2 + d)≠3(4≠ d)2(1≠ d)8d7(1 + d)7(≠4≠ 2d+ d2)
(≠4 + 2d2 + d3)2(896≠ 512d≠ 960d2 + 256d3 + 392d4 ≠ 28d5
≠24d6 ≠ 7d7 + 2d8) < 0∆ ÈK (.) < 0
È(.)|K=K = 1536(4≠ d)3(1≠ d)10d8(1 + d)8(2≠ d)≠14(2 + d)≠4(≠4≠ 2d+ d2)2
(≠4 + 2d2 + d3)3 < 0∆ È(.) < 0,
for any d, K from our domain of definition. Therefore, the di erence in profits of non-
exclusive manufacturer in E/N regime and profit of manufacturer in E/E regime is in-
creasing in K. In order to complete this non-existence proof, we divide our parameter
space into three subspaces:
• Consider d < 0.5 and K = 1.
1 < K˜ ∆ 0 < ≠(2≠ d)2d(2 + d)(≠8 + 4d2 + 6d3 + d4)
The incentive of manufacturer 1 to adopt exclusivity given manufacturer 2 has not
done so is given by:
≠ (1≠ d)d
2(8≠ 8d≠ d2 ≠ 2d3 ≠ 7d4 + 2d5 + d8)
(2≠ d)2(1 + d)(2≠ d2)2(1 + d2)(2 + d2)2 < 0
From the previous analysis we know that this di erence is decreasing in K. There-
fore, for d < 0.5 and K > 1 no asymmetric equilibrium exists. Consider now the
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incentives not to adopt exclusivity given the competing manufacturer has done so:
(1 + d)≠1(2≠ d2)≠2(1 + d2)≠1(2 + d2)≠2(4≠ 4d+ 2d2 + d3)≠1(≠4≠ 2d+ d2 + 2d3)≠2
(1≠ d)d2(2≠ d)≠1(≠128≠ 320d≠ 32d2 + 464d3 + 592d4 + 64d5 ≠ 436d6 ≠ 536d7
≠228d8 + 160d9 + 232d10 + 92d11 ≠ 15d12 ≠ 32d13 ≠ 13d14 + d16) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0
As this is negative, no positive incentive to adopt ER exists. From the previous
analysis we know that this di erence is increasing in K. Therefore, for d < 0.5 and
K < 1 no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
• Consider now the second subsection, where 0.5 Æ d < 0.75 and K = 1 + d/10. For
1 + d10 < K˜ it holds that
1
100(2≠ d)
2d(2 + d)(640 + 48d≠ 416d2 ≠ 704d3 ≠ 172d4 ≠ 22d5 ≠ d6)0 Sturm
Õs Theorem
> 0
The incentive of manufacturer 1 to adopt exclusivity given its competitor has not
done so is given by:
≠(1≠ d)d2 (1600 + 8640d≠ 4736d2 ≠ 4360d3 ≠ 6596d4 ≠ 7406d5 + 674d6 + 748d7 + 1119d8
+1000d9)(2≠ d)≠2(1 + d)≠1(5 + d+ 5d2)≠1(≠40≠ 8d+ 5d3 + 10d4)≠2 Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0
We know from the previous analysis that this di erence is decreasing in K. Hence,
given 0.5 Æ d < 0.75 and K > 1+ d/10 no asymmetric equilibrium exists. Consider
now the incentives not to adopt ER given the competitor has adopted ER:
(1≠ d)d2 (2≠ d)≠1(1 + d)≠1(5 + d+ 5d2)≠1(40≠ 32d+ 16d2 + 8d3 + d4)≠1(≠40≠ 8d+ 5d3 + 10d4)≠2
(≠40≠ 28d+ 8d2 + 25d3 + 2d4)≠2(51200000≠ 304640000d2 ≠ 334080000d3 + 274764800d4
+899090944d5 + 540852224d6 ≠ 453013376d7 ≠ 1044911360d8 ≠ 673223392d9 + 121484528d10
+486807040d11 + 306455472d12 + 21145876d13 ≠ 81353138d14 ≠ 48840906d15 ≠ 6462016d16
+3835231d17 + 1490522d18 + 221176d19 + 15240d20 + 400d21) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0
We know from the previous analysis that this di erence is increasing in K. Thus,
for 0.5 Æ d < 0.75 and K < 1 + d/10 no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Hence, for d < 0.75, no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
• Finally, consider the last subsection, that is, 0.75 Æ d < 1. In addition, suppose
that K < 1408/1000≠ 408d/1000. The latter implies that
1
15625 (2≠ d)2(2 + d)(185232≠ 402848d+ 9384d2 + 243040d3
+73452d4 ≠ 51236d5 ≠ 12750d6 + 2601d7) Sturm
Õs Theorem
> 0
Now, consider the incentives to not adopt exclusivity given the competing manu-
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facturer has adopted ER:
(1≠ d) (≠2 + d)≠1(1 + d)≠1(227≠ 102d+ 125d2)≠1(≠908 + 1112d≠ 352d2 ≠ 278d3 + 51d4)≠1
(908≠ 56d≠ 482d2 ≠ 97d3 + 102d4)≠2(≠908 + 408d+ 255d2 ≠ 255d3 + 125d4)≠2(15738720504451584
≠31026772800625920d≠ 16508458186889600d2 + 57675869217678016d3 + 823226689552768d4
≠48456960603325984d5 + 16259005070184112d6 + 14133753170213392d7 ≠ 16350914893485352d8
+6309091534897108d9 + 5541810617834892d10 ≠ 5959840533879032d11 + 409043007808180d12
+1641500886532907d13 ≠ 911172926276052d14 ≠ 41892114047363d15 + 352649497192055d16
≠105007538527782d17 ≠ 75443462220731d18 + 35466154432341d19 + 4900095065961d20
≠3980342487375d21 + 422825062500d22) Sturm
Õs Theorem
< 0
We know from the previous analysis that this di erence is increasing in K. There-
fore, for 0.75 Æ d < 1 and K < 1408/1000≠ 408d/1000 no asymmetric equilibrium
exists.
Thus, for K < K˜ no asymmetric equilibrium exists. Q.e.d.
C.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5.
This proof consists of four parts:
1. We show that WE/NK ,W
E/E
K < 0.
2. We determine a condition under which welfare increases with exclusivity.
3. We show that there exist E/E and E/N equilibria under this condition.
4. We show that for exclusive retailing to be welfare enhancing, retail investment must
be more cost e cient the weaker the competition is.
ad 1. The intuition behind this is simple. Consider that only the investment e ect
depends on the cost of investment. Moreover, the investment e ect is positive for welfare.
Since this e ect is stronger the smaller K is, welfare under both regimes is decreasing in
K. This can also be shown algebraically:
First, consider welfare in the E/N equilibrium: We have already shown that consumer
surplus as well as profits of the exclusive manufacturer are decreasing in K. Moreover,
the profit of the exclusive retailer is also decreasing in K. Thus, we only have to show
that the profit of the non-exclusive manufacturer is decreasing in K:
ˆﬁE/NM2
ˆK
= (1≠ d)
2 dE(.)‚(.)
[A(.)]2[D(.)]3
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with
‚KK(.) = 64 + 32d≠ 48d2 ≠ 8d3 + 14d4 > 0
‚K(.)|K=K = ≠2(1≠ d2)d
!≠4≠ 2d+ d2" !16≠ 4d≠ 6d2 + d3 + 2d4" (2≠ d)≠2(2 + d)≠1 > 0
∆ ‚K(.) > 0
‚(.)|K=K = d
2(1≠d2)2
(2≠d)≠2(2≠d2)≠2G(.)
!
128≠ 112d2 ≠ 16d3 + 64d4 + 12d5 ≠ 12d6 ≠ 2d7 + d8" > 0
∆ ‚(.) > 0
for any d, K from our domain of definition. Thus, the profit of the non-exclusive manufac-
turer is decreasing in K and so, WE/NK < 0. Now consider WE/E: We have already shown
that consumer surplus as well as manufacturer profits are decreasing in K. Therefore, it
remains to be shown that retail profits also decreases in K:
ˆﬁE/ER
ˆK
= ≠8 (1≠ d)
2 (1 + d)G(.)·(.)
[G(.)]3[J(.)]3
with
·KKK(.) = ≠3072 + 2304d+ 3840d2 ≠ 2496d3 ≠ 2112d4 + 1008d5 + 624d6
≠180d7 ≠ 96d8 + 12d9 + 6d10 < 0
·KK(.)|K=K = ≠8(≠2 + d)(≠1 + d)d(2 + d)2(14≠ 5d≠ 17d2 + 4d3 + 5d4) < 0∆ ·KK(.) < 0
·K(.)|K=K = 16(1≠ d)3d2(1 + d)(2 + d)
!≠11 + 2d+ 7d2" (2≠ d) < 0∆ ·K(.) < 0
·(.)|K=K = ≠ 192(1≠d)
5d3(1+d)2
(2≠d)3 < 0∆ ·(.) < 0
for any d, K from our domain of definition. Thus, the retail profit is decreasing in K and
so, WE/EK < 0.
ad 2. Consider the di erence between WE/N and WN/N :
WE/N ≠WN/N = (d≠ 1)S(d,K)
2 (2≠ d)2 (1 + d) [A(.)]2 [D(.)]2 > 0… S(d,K) < 0
with
S(.) = 48+32d≠200d2≠112d3+331d4+146d5≠275d6≠86d7+119d8+22d9≠25d10≠2d11+2d12≠336K≠176dK+1104d2K+
468d3K ≠ 1371d4K ≠ 426d5K +787d6K +152d7K ≠ 195d8K ≠ 18d9K +9d10K +2d12K +848K2+288dK2≠ 2068d2K2≠
492d3K2+1736d4K2+234d5K2≠534d6K2≠26d7K2+d8K2≠4d9K2+17d10K2≠896K3≠64dK3+1472d2K3≠56d3K3≠
644d4K3+82d5K3≠39d6K3≠22d7K3+47d8K3+320K4≠128dK4≠304d2K4+128d3K4≠20d4K4≠40d5K4+45d6K4
The function S(d,K) describes the threshold between the meshed and the non-meshed
region in Figure 3.3. We have to show that under this condition welfare is increasing with
exclusivity when both manufacturers adopt exclusivity. Consider therefore the di erence
between WE/E and WN/N :
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WE/E ≠WN/N = (d≠ 1)T (d,K)
(2≠ d)2 (1 + d) [H(.)]2 [J(.)]2 > 0… T (d,K) < 0
with
T (.) = 768+256d≠2816d2≠768d3+3840d4+768d5≠2304d6≠256d7+512d8≠5376K≠1280dK+16896d2K+3328d3K≠
19200d4K ≠ 3072d5K + 9216d6K + 1280d7K ≠ 1536d8K ≠ 256d9K + 13568K2 + 1280dK2 ≠ 36288d2K2 ≠ 3072d3K2 +
34816d4K2+3456d5K2≠14384d6K2≠2096d7K2+2352d8K2+432d9K2≠64d10K2≠14336K3+2048dK3+32256d2K3≠
3200d3K3 ≠ 27008d4K3 + 448d5K3 + 10784d6K3 + 760d7K3 ≠ 2064d8K3 ≠ 304d9K3 + 152d10K3 + 32d11K3 + 5120K4 ≠
3072dK4 ≠ 9472d2K4 + 4352d3K4 + 7296d4K4 ≠ 2432d5K4 ≠ 2976d6K4 + 672d7K4 + 676d8K4 ≠ 92d9K4 ≠ 81d10K4 +
5d11K4 + 4d12K4
In order to show that the first condition is stronger than the second, it is su cient to find
a K for which the following condition is satisfied:
’d œ (0, 1) : S(.) > 0 · T (.) < 0
In order to find a value for K that satisfies this condition, we divide our parameter space
into 7 subspaces, in each of which we find a K satisfying the above-mentioned conditions.
The subspaces with the corresponding values for K are:
1. d œ (0, 0.5) K = 910 +
Ô
21
10 + 117d20 ≠
Ô
21d
2. d œ (0.5, 0.8) K = 13 + 10d3
3. d œ (0.8, 0.9) K = ≠ 575 + 18d
4. d œ (0.9, 0.95) K = ≠40 + 50d
5. d œ (0.95, 0.98) K = ≠ 7853 + 850d3
6. d œ (098, 0.99) K = ≠1158 + 1200d
7. d œ (0.99, 1) K = 981125≠ 1981000d+ 1000000d2
By inserting the values for K into T (.) and S(.) and by using of Sturm’s theorem, we can
show that T (.) < 0 and S(.) > 0.58 This implies that welfare is increasing with exclusivity
if investment is su ciently e cient, i.e., S(d,K) < 0.
ad 3. Welfare is increasing with exclusivity if and only if one or both manufacturers
are willing to adopt exclusivity. In order to prove this statement, it is su cient to find
parameter values for d and K satisfying the equilibrium conditions.
(i) One manufacturer adopts exclusive retailing and the other manufacturer does not
adopt exclusive retailing, ﬁE/NMi /ﬁN/NMi > 1 & ﬁ
N/E
Mi /ﬁE/EMi > 1. Suppose that d = 0.85 and
K = 1.2. These values satisfy the conditions above:
58Note that these conditions are also satisfied for the endpoints of the intervals. The step-by-step proof
can be provided upon request.
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ﬁE/NMi /ﬁN/NMi
.= 1.06
ﬁN/EMi /ﬁE/EMi
.= 1.01
S(d,K) ≠149.11
(ii) Both manufacturers adopt exclusive retailing, ﬁE/EMi /ﬁN/EMi > 1 & ﬁ
E/N
Mi /ﬁN/NMi > 1. Suppose
that d = 0.85 and K = 0.6. These values satisfy the conditions above:
ﬁE/EMi /ﬁN/EMi
.= 1.42
ﬁE/NMi /ﬁN/NMi
.= 1.40
S(d,K) .= ≠14.44
ad 4. We have already shown that WE/N = WE/E if and only if S(.) = 0. We can
determine K Õ(d) using the implicit function theorem:
K Õ(d) = ≠
ˆS(.)
ˆd
ˆS(.)
ˆK
= U(d,K)
V (d,K)
First, note that there is no K < 1.1 satisfying S(.) = 0. Thus,
UK4(.) = 3072 + 14592d≠ 9216d2 + 1920d3 + 4800d4 ≠ 6480d5 > 0
UKKK(.)|K=1.1 = ≠ 125 (≠1568 + 672d+ 3804d2 ≠ 7320d3 ≠ 1175d4 + 2385d5
≠385d6 + 940d7) Sturm
Õs T.
> 0∆ ˆ3U(.)ˆK3 > 0’K Ø 1.1
UKK(.)|K=1.1 = ≠ 225 (≠21312 + 29128d+ 18936d2 ≠ 53440d3 + 26775d4
≠50400d5 ≠ 17255d6 + 31220d7 ≠ 900d8 + 4250d9) Sturm
Õs T.
> 0
∆ UKK(.) > 0 ’K Ø 1.1
UK(.)|K=1.1 = 1250 (114048≠ 139632d+ 102156d2 ≠ 4000d3 ≠ 216875d4
+434685d5 ≠ 26145d6 + 44380d7 + 60300d8 ≠ 116000d9
≠6000d11 > 0∆ ˆU(.)ˆK > 0 ’K Ø 1.1
U(.)|K=1.1 = 15000 (428544≠ 262656d+ 1194768d2 ≠ 740280d3 ≠ 277950d4
+1243935d5 ≠ 716030d6 + 1269320d7 + 118800d8 ≠ 273500d9
+110000d10 ≠ 252000d11) > 0∆ U(.) > 0 ’K Ø 1.1
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Second, we examine the sign of V (d,K) for S(d,K) = 0:
V (.)|S(.)=0 > 0 … S(.)≠ V (.)K4 ©W (.) < 0
WKKK(.) = ≠1344≠ 96d+ 2208d2 ≠ 84d3 ≠ 966d4 + 123d5 ≠ 117d62 ≠ 33d7 + 141d
8
2 < 0
WKK(.)|K=1.1 = 120 (1 + d)(≠12608 + 16256d≠ 9040d2 ≠ 2648d3 + 16116d4 ≠ 8730d5
≠3237d6 + 1991d7 ≠ 420d8 + 340d9) < 0
∆WKK(.) < 0 ’K Ø 1.1
WK(.)|K=1.1 = 1+d400 (≠52928 + 103616d≠ 148000d2 + 51592d3 + 67176d4 ≠ 62250d5
+49233d6 ≠ 23059d7 ≠ 17940d8 + 10780d9 ≠ 600 !d10 ≠ d11") < 0
∆ ˆW (.)ˆK < 0 ’K Ø 1.1
W (.)|K=1.1 = 1+d4000 (≠57216 + 216192d≠ 418320d2 + 249544d3 ≠ 105888d4 ≠ 40490d5
+193401d6 ≠ 128003d7 + 25480d8 ≠ 6560d9 ≠ 22600d10 + 14600d11)
SturmÕs Theorem
< 0∆W (.) < 0 ’K Ø 1.1 ∆ V (.) > 0 ’K Ø 1.1∆ K Õ(d) > 0
Q.e.d.
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